Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The term gray zone tactics means coercive actions, including military, paramilitary, cyber, space, economic, informational, and legal actions and other activities conducted below the threshold of armed conflict to alter the status quo without triggering a conventional military response.

The term Taiwan Contingency means any attempt—

(A) to overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in Taiwan;

(B) to occupy any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan;

(C) to violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; or

(D) to take significant action against Taiwan, including—

(i) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;

(ii) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; or

(iii) perpetrating a significant physical or cyber attack on Taiwan that erodes the ability of the governing institutions in Taiwan to operate or provide essential services to the citizens of Taiwan.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of War, in coordination with the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the capacity of the United States to fully implement sections 2 and 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 and 3302), including—

(1) maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan;

(2) providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability; and

(3) preserving peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific as matters of international concern.

The report required under subsection (b) shall include—

(A) a detailed assessment of whether the current and projected military posture, force structure, operational plans, and capabilities of the United States are sufficient to credibly deter—

(i) a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan;

(ii) a maritime or air blockade of Taiwan; and

(iii) major missile or air strike campaigns against Taiwan;

(B) an assessment of the United States capacity to credibly deter and resist forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan, including sustained forms of coercion across air, maritime, cyber, space, economic, and information domains;

(C) an assessment of the United States operational readiness and sustainability, including—

(i) readiness, posture, basing access and overflight, mobility, logistics resilience, prepositioned stocks, and munitions sufficiency in the Indo-Pacific region;

(ii) projected munitions expenditure rates and replenishment timelines under high-intensity conflict scenarios;

(iii) the ability of the defense industrial base to sustain operations in a protracted conflict of not less than 1 year; and

(iv) vulnerabilities to supply chain disruption, cyber attack, or anti-access/area denial strategies across domains;

(D) an assessment of the availability, reliability, and sufficiency of allied and partner contributions to deterrence and defense in a Taiwan contingency and to resist gray zone coercion; and

(E) an assessment of the capacity of the United States to comply with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8) in a scenario in which the United States is simultaneously responding to aggression initiated by the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or a terrorist organization.

For each assessment described in paragraph (1), the report shall—

(A) identify current capability gaps, shortfalls, and vulnerabilities;

(B) estimate capability gaps during the following 10 years based on current budget projections;

(C) specify budgetary, force posture, acquisition, industrial base, and legislative changes required to mitigate the gaps referred to in subparagraph (C); and

(D) include an estimated timeline and costs to achieve a level of capability sufficient to credibly deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression against Taiwan.

The report required shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified executive summary.

(1) to authorize the use of military force; or

(2) to alter or supersede any existing statutory requirement under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).