Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

The term congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

The term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in such section.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2026 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

In this section, the term National Intelligence Program has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 for the National Intelligence Program may—

(1) be available for transfer or reprogramming until such funds have been made available under the National Intelligence Program for purposes of section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(d)); or

(2) be transferred or reprogrammed, except as authorized by such section 102A(d).

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

It shall be unlawful, within the jurisdiction of the United States, without authorization to go upon any property that—

(1) is under the jurisdiction of an element of the intelligence community; and

(2) has been clearly marked as closed or restricted.

Any person who violates subsection (a) shall—

(1) in the case of the first offense, be fined under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned not more than 180 days, or both;

(2) in the case of the second offense, be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both; and

(3) in the case of the third or subsequent offense, be fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following:

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 15 the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

In this section:

The term appropriate committees of Congress means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The term budget, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

The term congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

The term covered facility or asset means property owned, leased, or controlled by the Agency, property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway Administration located immediately adjacent to the headquarters compound of the Agency, and property owned, leased, or controlled by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence where the property—

(A) is identified as high-risk and a potential target for unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the Director, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based assessment for purposes of this section;

(B) is located in the United States and beneath airspace that is prohibited or restricted by the Federal Aviation Administration;

(C) is a property of which Congress has been notified is covered under this paragraph; and

(D) directly relates to one or more functions authorized to be performed by the Agency, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001) or this Act.

The term electronic communication has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.

The term intercept has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.

The term oral communication has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.

The term radio communication has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153).

The term risk-based assessment includes an evaluation of threat information specific to a covered facility or asset and, with respect to potential impacts on the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System and the needs of national security at each covered facility or asset identified by the Director, an evaluation of each of the following factors conducted in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration:

(A) Potential impacts to safety, efficiency, and use of the National Airspace System, including potential effects on manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems, aviation safety, airport operations, infrastructure, and air navigation services relating to the use of any system or technology for carrying out the actions described in subsection (c)(1).

(B) Options for mitigating any identified impacts to the National Airspace System relating to the use of any system or technology, including minimizing when possible the use of any system or technology that disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic signals, for carrying out the actions described in subsection (c)(1).

(C) Potential consequences of the effects of any actions taken under subsection (c)(1) to the National Airspace System and infrastructure if not mitigated.

(D) The ability to provide reasonable advance notice to aircraft operators consistent with the safety of the National Airspace System and the needs of national security.

(E) The setting and character of any covered facility or asset, including whether it is located in a populated area or near other structures, and any potential for interference with wireless communications or for injury or damage to persons or property.

(F) Potential consequences to national security if threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft are not mitigated or defeated.

The term United States has the meaning given that term in section 5 of title 18, United States Code.

The terms unmanned aircraft and unmanned aircraft system have the meanings given those terms in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.

The term wire communication has the meaning given such term in section 2510 of title 18, United States Code.

Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or sections 32, 1030, and 1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code, the Director may take, and may authorize Agency personnel with assigned duties that include the security or protection of people, facilities, or assets within the United States to take—

(1) such actions described in subsection (c)(1) that are necessary to mitigate a credible threat (as defined by the Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation) that an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft poses to the safety or security of a covered facility or asset; and

(2) such actions described in subsection (c)(3).

The actions described in this paragraph are the following:

(A) During the operation of the unmanned aircraft system, detect, identify, monitor, and track the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by means of intercept or other access of a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.

(B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, including by passive or active and by direct or indirect physical, electronic, radio, or electromagnetic means.

(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.

(D) Seize or exercise control over the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.

(E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.

(F) Use reasonable force, if necessary, to seize or otherwise disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.

The Director shall develop the actions described in paragraph (1) in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation.

The Director shall conduct research, testing, training on, and evaluation of any equipment, including any electronic equipment, to determine the capability and utility of the equipment prior to the use of the equipment for any action described in paragraph (1).

Personnel and contractors who do not have assigned duties that include the security or protection of people, facilities, or assets may engage in research, testing, training, and evaluation activities pursuant to subparagraph (A).

The Director shall coordinate with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration on any action described in paragraph (1) or (3) so the Administrator may ensure that unmanned aircraft system detection and mitigation systems do not adversely affect or interfere with safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the National Airspace System.

Any unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft that is seized pursuant to subsection (b) as described in subsection (c)(1) is subject to forfeiture to the United States.

The Director and the Secretary of Transportation may each prescribe regulations, and shall each issue guidance, to carry out this section.

The Director shall coordinate the development of guidance under paragraph (1) with the Secretary of Transportation.

The Director shall coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration before issuing any guidance, or otherwise implementing this section, so the Administrator may ensure that unmanned aircraft system detection and mitigation systems do not adversely affect or interfere with safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the National Airspace System.

The regulations prescribed or guidance issued under subsection (e) shall ensure that—

(1) the interception or acquisition of, or access to, or maintenance or use of, communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft under this section is conducted in a manner consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and applicable provisions of Federal law;

(2) communications to or from an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft are intercepted or acquired only to the extent necessary to support an action described in subsection (c);

(3) records of such communications are maintained only for as long as necessary, and in no event for more than 180 days, unless the Director determines that maintenance of such records for a longer period—

(A) is necessary for the investigation or prosecution of a violation of law;

(B) is necessary to fulfill a duty, responsibility, or function of the Agency;

(C) is required under Federal law; or

(D) is for the purpose of any litigation; and

(4) such communications are not disclosed outside the Agency unless the disclosure—

(A) is necessary to investigate or prosecute a violation of law;

(B) would support the Agency, the Department of Defense, a Federal law enforcement, intelligence, or security agency, a State, local, Tribal, or territorial law enforcement agency, or other relevant person or entity if such entity or person is engaged in a security or protection operation;

(C) is necessary to support a department or agency listed in subparagraph (B) in investigating or prosecuting a violation of law;

(D) would support the enforcement activities of a regulatory agency of the Federal Government in connection with a criminal or civil investigation of, or any regulatory, statutory, or other enforcement action relating to, an action described in subsection (b);

(E) is necessary to protect against dangerous or unauthorized activity by unmanned aircraft systems or unmanned aircraft;

(F) is necessary to fulfill a duty, responsibility, or function of the Agency; or

(G) is otherwise required by law.

The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, as a part of the budget request of the Agency for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2026, a consolidated funding display that identifies the funding source for the actions described in subsection (c)(1) within the Agency.

Each funding display submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 and semiannually thereafter, the Director shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the activities carried out pursuant to this section during the period covered by the briefing.

Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall be conducted jointly with the Secretary of Transportation.

Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall include, for the period covered by the briefing, the following:

(A) Policies, programs, and procedures to mitigate or eliminate the effects of the activities described in paragraph (1) to the National Airspace System and other critical national transportation infrastructure.

(B) A description of instances in which actions described in subsection (c)(1) have been taken, including all such instances that may have resulted in harm, damage, or loss to a person or to private property.

(C) A description of the guidance, policies, or procedures established to address privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties issues affected by the actions allowed under this section, as well as any changes or subsequent efforts that would significantly affect privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties.

(D) A description of options considered and steps taken to mitigate any identified effects on the National Airspace System relating to the use of any system or technology, including the minimization of the use of any technology that disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic signals, for carrying out the actions described in subsection (c)(1).

(E) A description of instances in which communications intercepted or acquired during the course of operations of an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft were maintained for more than 180 days or disclosed outside the Agency.

(F) How the Director and the Secretary of Transportation have informed the public as to the possible use of authorities under this section.

(G) How the Director and the Secretary of Transportation have engaged with Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal law enforcement agencies to implement and use such authorities.

(H) An assessment of whether any gaps or insufficiencies remain in statutes, regulations, and policies that impede the ability of the Agency to counter the threat posed by the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned aircraft, and any recommendations to remedy such gaps or insufficiencies.

Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified form, but may be accompanied by an additional classified report.

Within 30 days of deploying any new technology to carry out the actions described in subsection (c)(1), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a notification of the deployment of such technology.

Each notification submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include a description of options considered to mitigate any identified effects on the National Airspace System relating to the use of any system or technology, including the minimization of the use of any technology that disrupts the transmission of radio or electronic signals, for carrying out the actions described in subsection (c)(1).

Nothing in this section may be construed—

(1) to vest in the Director any authority of the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration; or

(2) to vest in the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration any authority of the Director.

The authority to carry out this section with respect to the actions specified in subparagraphs (B) through (F) of subsection (c)(1), shall terminate on the date set forth in section 210G(i) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n(i)).

Nothing in this section shall be construed to provide the Director or the Secretary of Transportation with additional authorities beyond those described in subsections (b) and (d).

Clause (ii) of section 102A(n)(6)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)(6)(C)) is amended to read as follows:

(ii) Subject to section 4022(a)(2) of such title, an individual to whom authority has been delegated under subparagraph (B) may enter into transactions and agreements (other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants) under this paragraph to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research projects and prototype projects in support of intelligence activities, if—

(I) for any transaction or agreement of the National Security Agency or the National Reconnaissance Office—

(aa) the amount of the transaction or agreement does not exceed $500,000,000; and

(bb) for any transaction or agreement of an amount in excess of $100,000,000 but not in excess of $500,000,000, the Director of the National Security Agency or the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, as the case may be, notifies the congressional intelligence committees at least 14 days prior to the execution of the agreement or transaction that such agreement or transaction is essential to meet critical national security objectives; and

(II) for any transaction or agreement of an element of the intelligence community not specified in clause (I), the amount of the transaction or agreement does not exceed $100,000,000.

Section 102A(n)(6)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)(6)(C)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(viii) A head of an element of the intelligence community may enter into follow-on production contracts and transactions using any authority provided to such head by law (including regulation).

Section 506A(e)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3097(e)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following: The Director may determine that the term major system does not include a software program..

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall—

(1) develop two strategies, one for the 2-year period beginning on that date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and one for a long-term period, for the use by the Department of Defense of the Distributed Common Ground System (referred to in this section as the system), or any successor system, that each include input from the military departments, the combatant commands, and the joint commands with regard to such system, including—

(A) new requirements that the system is intended to satisfy;

(B) any planned investment or divestment;

(C) a justification for the plan of any military department to replace service-managed components of the system, including a description of how the plan will enhance processing, exploitation, and dissemination capability; and

(D) an explanation of how proposed changes to the architecture of the system will improve the functionality or interoperability of the system; and

(2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of the strategies developed pursuant to paragraph (1).

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Not less frequently than once each year, each head of an element of the intelligence community specified in subsection (c) shall—

(1) conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the element of the head who are involved in the production of intelligence products; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the head with respect to the most recently completed survey under paragraph (1).

Each survey conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(1) for an element of the intelligence community shall cover the following:

(1) Perceptions of the officers and employees regarding the presence of bias or politicization affecting the intelligence cycle.

(2) Types of intelligence products perceived by the officers and employees as most prone to objectivity concerns.

(3) Whether objectivity concerns identified by responders to the survey were otherwise raised with an analytic ombudsman or appropriate entity.

The elements of the intelligence community specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) The National Security Agency.

(2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(3) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(4) Each intelligence element of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Space Force, and the Coast Guard.

(5) The Directorate of Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(6) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.

(7) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

(8) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.

(9) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.

Section 6312 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note; Public Law 117–263) is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:

Training required pursuant to the policy required by subsection (a) shall be a dedicated, stand-alone training that includes instruction on avoiding political bias.

(1) ; and

(2) in subsection (d)(1)—

(A) by striking number and themes of; and

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting, including the number and themes of such incidents and a list of each intelligence product reported during the preceding 1-year period to the Analytic Ombudsman of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence..

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an estimate of the amount of obligations expected to be incurred by the Federal Government after the date of the enactment of this Act to ensure that all sensitive compartmented information facilities of the intelligence community are compliant with Intelligence Community Directive 705.

The estimate submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The estimate described in subsection (a), disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.

(2) An implementation plan to ensure compliance described in such subsection.

(3) Identification of the administrative actions or legislative actions that may be necessary to ensure such compliance.

Section 104B(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3037(a)) is amended by inserting, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate after President.

The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the first date after the date of the enactment of this Act that the position of Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency becomes vacant.

Section 2 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3602) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(c) There is a Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Section 215(c) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b(c)) is amended to read as follows:

The head of the Office shall be the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director of the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.

The Director shall serve for a term of 6 years.

The Director shall be eligible for reappointment for one or more terms.

The Director shall—

(A) be an employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, considers appropriate; and

(B) have substantial expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

The amendment made by this section shall take effect on January 21, 2029.

Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056(b)(1)) is amended by striking President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting Director of National Intelligence.

Section 902(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 3382a)) is amended by striking President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting Director of National Intelligence.

Section 103C(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3028(a)) is amended by striking by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting by the Director of National Intelligence.

Section 20(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3520(a)) is amended by striking by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Section 311 of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

In this section, the terms counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, and intelligence community have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

There is established, within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security (in this section referred to as the Office), which, subject to the availability of appropriations, shall—

(1) be responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information relating to the operation and responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury and other Federal agencies executing economic statecraft tools that do not include any elements that are elements of the intelligence community;

(2) provide intelligence support and economic analysis to Federal agencies implementing United States economic policy, including for purposes of global strategic competition; and

(3) have such other related duties and authorities as may be assigned by the Secretary for purposes of the responsibilities described in paragraph (1), subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence.

The Office shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes.

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 3 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 311 and inserting the following:

Section 3(4)(J) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)(J)) is amended by striking Office of Intelligence and Analysis and inserting Office of Economic Intelligence and Security.

Any reference in a law, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury shall be deemed a reference to the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security of the Department of the Treasury.

In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

Subsection (a) shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date on which the Secretary of the Treasury submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a 3-year strategic plan detailing the resources required by the Department of the Treasury.

The strategic plan submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) shall include the following:

(A) Staffing and administrative expenses planned for the Department for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the submittal of the plan, including resourcing requirements for each office and division in the Department during such period.

(B) Structural changes and resources, including leadership structure and staffing, required to implement subsection (a) during the period described in subparagraph (A).

None of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available before the date of the enactment of this Act for the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the Office of International Affairs, the Office of Tax Policy, or the Office of Domestic Finance may be transferred or reprogrammed to support the Office of Economic Intelligence and Security established by section 311 of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

The head of the Office of Counterintelligence of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury shall implement policies and procedures that ensure counterintelligence support—

(1) to all entities of the Department of the Treasury responsible for safeguarding networks and systems; and

(2) for coordination between counterintelligence threat mitigation activities and cyber network and system defense efforts.

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head described in subsection (a) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the implementation of such subsection.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on personnel matters of the Director's Initiatives Group.

The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The process for hiring members of the Director's Initiatives Group.

(2) A list of personnel of such group, from the date of the creation of the group, including a description of responsibilities for each of the personnel.

(3) Funding sources for personnel of such group.

(4) A list of which personnel of such group received security clearances and the process for receiving such security clearances.

Not later than 30 days before taking any action affecting the resources of the National Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees notice of the intent of the Director to take such action.

In this section:

The term covered activity means—

(A) with respect to the Field Intelligence Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with any individual, including a United States person, who has been criminally charged, arraigned, or taken into the custody of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, but whose guilt with respect to such criminal matters has not yet been adjudicated, unless the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has obtained the consent of the interviewee following consultation with counsel;

(B) with respect to the Field Intelligence Program, any collection targeting journalists in the performance of their journalistic functions; and

(C) with respect to the Field Intelligence Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with a United States person where the Office of Intelligence and Analysis lacks a reasonable belief based on facts and circumstances that the United States person may possess significant foreign intelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

The term Field Intelligence Program means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to Policy Instruction 907 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on June 29, 2016, and subsequently renamed in a Policy Guidance Memorandum issued by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis on December 24, 2024.

The term Open Source Intelligence Collection Program means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis for the purpose of collecting intelligence and information for potential production and reporting in the form of Open Source Information Reports as reflected in Policy Instruction 900 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on January 13, 2015, or any successor program.

The term United States person means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;

(C) an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens; or

(D) a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

The term United States person information —

(A) means information that is reasonably likely to identify 1 or more specific United States persons; and

(B) may be either a single item of information or information that, when combined with other available information, is reasonably likely to identify 1 or more specific United States persons.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a covered activity.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to increase, above the staffing level in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31), the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or superseding the authority of any official within the Department of Homeland Security to conduct legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties oversight of the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to limit the authority of personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from sharing intelligence information with, or receiving information from—

(A) foreign, State, local, Tribal, or territorial governments (or any agency or subdivision thereof);

(B) the private sector; or

(C) other elements of the Federal Government, including the components of the Department of Homeland Security.

Section 135 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections (d) and (e), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

With respect to a member of a qualifying Federal service who is an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community, the term permanent duty station, as used in this section, shall exclude a permanent duty station that is within 50 miles of the headquarters facility of such element.

Section 30 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3531) is amended by adding at the end the following:

Not less frequently than once every 365 days, the Director shall—

(A) complete an Agency climate assessment—

(i) that does not request any information that would make an Agency employee or an Agency employee's position identifiable;

(ii) for the purposes of—

(I) preventing and responding to sexual assault and sexual harassment; and

(II) examining the prevalence of sexual assault and sexual harassment occurring among the Agency's workforce; and

(iii) that includes an opportunity for Agency employees to express their opinions regarding the manner and extent to which the Agency responds to allegations of sexual assault and complaints of sexual harassment, and the effectiveness of such response; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees the findings of the Director with respect to the climate assessment completed pursuant to subparagraph (A).

In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The term commercially available information means—

(A) any data or other information of the type customarily made available or obtainable and sold, leased, or licensed to members of the general public or to non-governmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes; or

(B) data and information for exclusive government use knowingly and voluntarily provided by, procured from, or made accessible by corporate entities on their own initiative or at the request of a government entity.

The term personally identifiable information means information that, alone or when combined with other information regarding an individual, can be used to distinguish or trace the identity of such individual.

The term sensitive activities means activities that, over an extended period of time—

(A) establish a pattern of life;

(B) reveal personal affiliations, preferences, or identifiers;

(C) facilitate prediction of future acts;

(D) enable targeting activities;

(E) reveal the exercise of individual rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of speech and of the press, to free exercise of religion, to peaceably assemble, including membership or participation in organizations or associations, and to petition the government; or

(F) reveal any other activity the disclosure of which could cause substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to the United States person who engaged in the activity.

The term sensitive commercially available information —

(A) means commercially available information that is known or reasonably expected to contain—

(i) a substantial volume of personally identifiable information regarding United States persons; or

(ii) a greater than de minimis volume of sensitive data;

(B) shall not include—

(i) newspapers or other periodicals;

(ii) weather reports;

(iii) books;

(iv) journal articles or other published works;

(v) public filings or records;

(vi) documents or databases similar to those described in clauses (i) through (v), whether accessed through a subscription or accessible free of cost; or

(vii) limited data samples made available to elements of the intelligence community for the purposes of allowing such elements to determine whether to purchase the full dataset and not accessed, retained, or used for any other purpose.

The term sensitive data means data that—

(i) captures personal attributes, conditions, or identifiers that are traceable to 1 or more specific United States persons, either through the dataset or by correlating the dataset with other available information; and

(ii) concerns the race or ethnicity, political opinions, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, gender identity, medical or genetic information, financial data, or any other data with respect to such specific United States person or United States persons the disclosure of which would have the potential to cause substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to the United States person or United States persons described by the data; or

(B) captures the sensitive activities of 1 or more United States persons.

The term United States person means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;

(B) an unorganized association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens; or

(C) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, with the exception of any such entity directed or controlled by a foreign government.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the access to, collection, processing, and use of sensitive commercially available information by the respective element.

For each dataset containing sensitive commercially available information accessed, collected, processed, or used by the element concerned for purposes other than research and development, a report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(i) A description of the nature and volume of the sensitive commercially available information accessed or collected by the element.

(ii) A description of the mission or administrative need or function for which the sensitive commercially available information is accessed or collected, and of the nature, scope, reliability, and timeliness of the dataset required to fulfill such mission or administrative need or function.

(iii) A description of the purpose of the access, collection, or processing, and the intended use of the sensitive commercially available information.

(iv) An identification of the legal authority for the collection or access, and processing of the sensitive commercially available information.

(v) An identification of the source of the sensitive commercially available information and the persons from whom the sensitive commercially available information was accessed or collected.

(vi) A description of the mechanics of the access, collection, and processing of the sensitive commercially available information, including the Federal entities that participated in the procurement process.

(vii) A description of the method by which the element has limited the access to and collection and processing of the sensitive commercially available information to the maximum extent feasible consistent with the need to fulfill the mission or administrative need.

(viii) An assessment of whether the mission or administrative need can be fulfilled if reasonably available privacy-enhancing techniques, such as filtering or anonymizing, the application of traditional safeguards, including access limitations and retention limits, differential privacy techniques, or other information-masking techniques, such as restrictions or correlation, are implemented with respect to information concerning United States persons.

(ix) An assessment of the privacy and civil liberties risks associated with accessing, collecting, or processing the data and the methods by which the element mitigates such risks.

(x) An assessment of the applicability of section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974), if any.

(xi) To the extent feasible, an assessment of the original source of the data and the method through which the dataset was generated and aggregated, and whether any element of the intelligence community previously accessed or collected the same or similar sensitive commercially available information from the source.

(xii) An assessment of the quality and integrity of the data, including, as appropriate, whether the sensitive commercially available information reflects any underlying biases or inferences, and efforts to ensure that any intelligence products created with the data are consistent with the standards of the intelligence community for accuracy and objectivity.

(xiii) An assessment of the security, operational, and counterintelligence risks associated with the means of accessing or collecting the data, and recommendations for how the element could mitigate such risks.

(xiv) A description of the system in which the data is retained and processed and how the system is properly secured while allowing for effective implementation, management, and audit, as practicable, of relevant privacy and civil liberties protections.

(xv) An assessment of security risks posed by the system architecture of vendors providing sensitive commercially available information or access to such sensitive commercially available information, access restrictions for the data repository of each such vendor, and the vendor's access to query terms and, if any, relevant safeguards.

(xvi) A description of procedures to restrict access to the sensitive commercially available information.

(xvii) A description of procedures for conducting, approving, documenting, and auditing queries, searches, or correlations with respect to the sensitive commercially available information.

(xviii) A description of procedures for restricting dissemination of the sensitive commercially available information, including deletion of information of United States persons returned in response to a query or other search unless the information is assessed to be associated or potentially associated with the documented mission-related justification for the query or search.

(xix) A description of masking and other privacy-enhancing techniques used by the element to protect sensitive commercially available information.

(xx) A description of any retention and deletion policies.

(xxi) A determination of whether unevaluated data or information has been made available to other elements of the intelligence community or foreign partners and, if so, identification of those elements or partners.

(xxii) A description of any licensing agreements or contract restrictions with respect to the sensitive commercially available information.

(xxiii) A data management plan for the lifecycle of the data, from access or collection to disposition.

(xxiv) For any item required by clauses (i) through (xxiii) that cannot be completed due to exigent circumstances relating to collecting, accessing, processing, or using sensitive commercially available information, a description of such exigent circumstances.

For each dataset containing sensitive commercially available information accessed, collected, processed, or used by the element concerned solely for research and development purposes, a report required by paragraph (1) may be limited to a description of the oversight by the element of such access, collection, process, and use.

The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the public, once every 2 years, a report on the policies and procedures of the intelligence community with respect to access to and collection, processing, and safeguarding of sensitive commercially available information.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the secure mobile communications systems available to employees and officers of the intelligence community, disaggregated by element of the intelligence community.

The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The number of employees and officers of the intelligence community using each secure mobile communications system, disaggregated by element of the intelligence community and by employee or officer level.

(2) An estimate of the expenditures incurred by the intelligence community to develop and maintain the systems described in subsection (a), disaggregated by system, element of the intelligence community, year, and number of mobile devices using or accessing the systems.

(3) A list of the capabilities of each system and the level of classification for each.

(4) For each system described in subsection (a), identification of the element of the intelligence community that developed and maintains the system and whether that element has service agreements with other elements of the intelligence community for use of the system.

(5) Identification of any secure mobile communications systems that are in development, the capabilities of such systems, how far along such systems are in development, and an estimate of when the systems will be ready for deployment.

The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall—

(1) develop a plan to implement an integrated tracking system that spans the intelligence community for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities to increase transparency, track the status of accreditation, and to reduce and minimize duplication of effort; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees the plan developed pursuant to paragraph (1).

The plan required by subsection (a)(1) shall include the following:

(1) An estimated cost of implementing the plan.

(2) A description for how applicants and cleared industry could monitor the status of their sensitive compartmented information facility accreditation.

(3) Guidelines for minimizing duplication of effort across the intelligence community and the Department of Defense in the accreditation process for sensitive compartmented information facilities.

(4) Creation of a mechanism to track compliance with Intelligence Community Directive 705 (relating to sensitive compartmented information facilities), or successor directive.

(5) Proposed measures for increasing security against adversary threats.

(6) A list of any administrative and legislative actions that may be necessary to carry out the plan.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the counterintelligence vulnerabilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) An assessment of the vulnerability of the security practices and facilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to efforts by nation-state and non-nation-state actors to acquire United States space technology.

(B) An assessment of the counterintelligence threat posed by nationals of the Russian Federation at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.

(C) Recommendations for how the National Aeronautics and Space Administration can mitigate any counterintelligence gaps identified under subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(D) A description of efforts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to respond to the efforts of state sponsors of terrorism, other foreign countries, and entities to illicitly acquire United States satellites and related items as described in reports submitted by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239).

(E) An evaluation of the effectiveness of the efforts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration described in subparagraph (D).

The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall cooperate fully with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in submitting the assessment required by paragraph (1).

The assessment required by paragraph (1) may be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.

In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives.

Section 1261(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239) is amended by inserting until December 31, 2026 after thereafter.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the head of the Office of Private Sector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall—

(A) develop an assessment of the counterintelligence risks to commercial spaceports; and

(B) distribute the assessment to—

(i) each field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the area of responsibility of which includes a federally licensed commercial spaceport;

(ii) the leadership of each federally licensed commercial spaceport; and

(iii) the congressional intelligence committees.

The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall be distributed at the lowest classification level possible, but may include classified annexes at higher classification levels.

Section 26 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3527) is amended to read as follows:

There is in the Agency a Chaplain Corps for the provision of spiritual and religious pastoral services.

The head of the Chaplain Corps shall be the Chief of Chaplains, who shall be appointed by the Director and report directly to the Director.

Chaplains of the Chaplain Corps shall—

(1) be located—

(A) at the headquarters building of the Agency; and

(B) outside the United States in each region of the regional mission centers of the Agency; and

(2) travel as necessary to provide services to personnel of the Agency where such personnel are located.

The Chaplain Corps—

(A) shall be staffed by full-time employees of the Agency; and

(B) shall not be staffed by any government contractor.

A member of the staff of the Chaplain Corps shall serve exclusively in the member's role in the Chaplain Corps.

Assignment to the Chaplain Corps shall not be a collateral duty.

The Director may appoint and fix the compensation of such staff of the Chaplain Corps as the Director considers appropriate, except that the Director may not provide basic pay to any member of the staff of the Chaplain Corps at an annual rate of basic pay in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.

The ratio of chaplains of the Chaplain Corps to personnel of the Agency shall be, to the extent practicable, equal to the ratio of chaplains of the Armed Forces to members of the Armed Forces.

Each chaplain of the Chaplain Corps shall—

(A) before being hired to the Chaplain Corps—

(i) have had experience in chaplaincy or the provision of pastoral care; and

(ii) be board certified and licensed as a chaplain by a national chaplaincy and pastoral care organization or equivalent; and

(B) maintain such certification while in the Chaplain Corps.

The Director shall—

(1) reimburse members of the staff of the Chaplain Corps for work-related travel expenses;

(2) provide security clearances, including one-time read-ins, to such members to ensure that personnel of the Agency can seek unrestricted chaplaincy counseling; and

(3) furnish such physical workspace at the headquarters building of the Agency, and outside the United States in each region of the regional missions centers of the Agency, as the Director considers appropriate.

The Director shall implement privacy standards with respect to the physical workspaces of the Chaplain Corps to ensure privacy for individuals visiting such spaces.

The Director may not require a chaplain of the Chaplain Corps to perform any rite, ritual, or ceremony that is contrary to the conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs of such chaplain.

Not less frequently than annually, the Director shall certify to Congress whether the chaplains of the Chaplain Corps meet the qualifications described in subsection (d)(5)(B).

The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (in this section referred to as the Inspectors General) shall jointly conduct a review of the processes, oversight, and management of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for special access programs and controlled access programs, regardless of funding source.

In carrying out paragraph (1), the Inspectors General shall jointly review the following:

(A) The processes the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence follow to create and maintain special access programs and controlled access programs for personnel of the Department and the intelligence community, respectively.

(B) Reforms to the oversight and management of special access programs and controlled access programs at the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, whether completed or underway.

(C) The extent to which the policies of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence related to the oversight and management of special access programs and controlled access programs ensure that individuals with an appropriate clearance and need-to-know gain access to the programs and information they need to conduct their missions while preventing unnecessary access.

(D) How integration and information sharing of special access programs and controlled access programs can be improved between compartmented systems, both within and among the Department of Defense and the intelligence community.

(E) Any challenges that may exist in the oversight and management of special access programs and controlled access programs.

(F) Any other matters related to the oversight and management of special access programs and controlled access programs the Inspectors General consider relevant.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General shall jointly—

(1) brief the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on the preliminary findings of the review required by subsection (a); and

(2) submit to such committees a report containing the results of the review.

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall provide the Inspectors General timely access to any documents and other information necessary to conduct the review required by subsection (a).

A contractor or subcontractor of an element of the intelligence community, as a condition on contracting with an element of the intelligence community, may not, while a contract or subcontract for an element of the intelligence community is effective—

(1) collect, retain, or knowingly or recklessly facilitate the collection or retention of location data from phones, wearable fitness trackers, and other cellular-enabled or cellular-connected devices located in any covered location, regardless of whether service for such device is provided under contract with an element of the intelligence community, except as necessary for the provision of the service as specifically contracted; or

(2) sell, monetize, or knowingly or recklessly facilitate the sale of, location data described in paragraph (1) to any individual or entity that is not an element of the intelligence community.

For purposes of subsection (a), a covered location is any location described in section 202.222(a)(1) of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community shall require each contractor and subcontractor of the element to submit to the head a certification as to whether the contractor or subcontractor is in compliance with subsection (a).

The veracity of a certification under subsection (c) shall be treated as material for purposes of section 3729 of title 31, United States Code.

Section 3(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3503(a)) is amended by striking 3069 and inserting 3066.

Section 413 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373a) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking makes such data and all that follows through the period and inserting make such data available immediately, in a manner that protects intelligence sources and methods, to the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office established under section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373).;

(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c); and

(3) by striking (a) Availability of data on unidentified aerial phenomena.—.

The heading of such section is amended by striking Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force and inserting All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and in consultation with the relevant heads of the elements of the intelligence community, as determined by the Directors, shall—

(1) brief the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on foreign threats to the Federal Reserve System; and

(2) work with the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to create and implement standardized security and classification measures for protecting information collected, generated, and stored by the Federal Reserve System.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the status of implementing the security measures described in subsection (a).

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to establish an office described in subsection (b).

An office described in this subsection is a co-located joint program management office for commercial geospatial intelligence data and services, the head of which shall be a representative from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the deputy head of which shall be a representative from the National Reconnaissance Office.

The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Milestones for implementation of the plan.

(2) An updated acquisition strategy that considers efficiencies to be gained from closely coordinated acquisitions of geospatial intelligence data and services.

In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a review of the adequacy of policies and procedures governing the use of commercial messaging applications by the intelligence community.

The review required by subsection (a) shall include an assessment of compliance by the intelligence community with chapter 31 of title 44, United States Code (commonly known as the Federal Records Act of 1950).

The review required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3602 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

The Director of the National Security Agency may correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security and provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to appropriate legislative and executive branch customers.

In this section:

The term baseline configuration means a set of specifications, relating to a network device operated by a covered provider, that—

(A) has been formally reviewed and agreed upon by the covered provider or by a system owner or operator acting on behalf of the covered provider;

(B) can be changed only through change control procedures established by the covered provider or by a system owner or operator acting on behalf of the covered provider; and

(C) is used as a basis for future products, deployments, releases, or changes.

The term configuration management means a collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of products and systems through control of the processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems to minimize security risks.

The term configuration management plan means a comprehensive description of the roles, responsibilities, policies, and procedures that apply when managing the configuration of products and systems, including scheduled, unscheduled, and unauthorized changes.

The term covered provider means an entity incorporated in the United States that provides telecommunications equipment, systems, or services to an element of the intelligence community.

The term Director means the Director of the National Security Agency.

The term network device means a physical device used to connect discrete parts of a network, or route network traffic, including a hub, router, gateway, firewall, or switch.

The term telecommunications, when used with respect to equipment, systems, or services, includes broadband equipment, systems, or services, respectively.

The term threat hunting means a proactive and iterative process of detecting indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques, and procedures, or anomalous behaviors beyond reliance on automated detection systems.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall develop and submit to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community standard contractual clauses relating to network security that mandate—

(1) the application of security updates on a timely basis for each network device, including customer-premises equipment, under the control and management of the covered provider;

(2) the timely decommissioning of any network device under the control and management of the covered provider that no longer receives updates by the original equipment manufacturer to address identified security vulnerabilities in the network device;

(3) the creation and maintenance of configuration management practices for the hardware, software, or firmware, or a combination thereof, of each network device under the control and management of the covered provider, including, at a minimum, a baseline configuration and configuration management plan that align with internal security policies and industry best practices;

(4) the implementation of multi-factor authentication, or identity control and access management measures deemed sufficiently equivalent by the Director for any system designated as high risk by the Director under subsection (d)(1);

(5) annual threat hunting pursuant to the criteria established by the Director under subsection (d)(2); and

(6) notification to the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer of a compromise of a network device that could reasonably be judged to be novel or implicate a sophisticated adversary.

Except as provided in paragraph (2), the head of an element of the intelligence community may not procure or obtain, or extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, any telecommunications equipment, system, or service unless the contract includes the clauses required to be circulated by the Director pursuant to subsection (b).

The head of an element of the intelligence community may waive the requirements of paragraph (1), on a case-by-case basis, in order to conduct lawfully authorized intelligence activities upon making a written determination that the inclusion of the contractual clauses required to be circulated by the Director pursuant to subsection (b) would impede the conduct of such lawfully authorized intelligence activities.

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in consultation with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, identify and designate systems of covered providers as high risk.

The Director may designate a system as high risk under subparagraph (A) only if access to the system by an unauthorized party would be reasonably likely to result in—

(i) compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system used for lawful intercept capabilities;

(ii) compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system used for or to support an intelligence purpose;

(iii) compromise of customer proprietary network information records that pose significant counterintelligence risks to the United States;

(iv) the unauthorized provision of sensitive administrative or network management functions in ways that pose significant counterintelligence risks for the United States; or

(v) catastrophic failure of core network functions and services.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, in coordination with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, publish minimum suggested criteria for threat hunting for purposes of subsection (b)(5).

Not less frequently than once every 2 years, the Director shall review and validate the high-risk systems desginated pursuant to paragraph (1) and the criteria published pursuant to paragraph (2).

Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is amended by adding at the end the following:

In this subsection, the term United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by 1 or more foreign governments.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage in the collection of information or intelligence targeting any United States person.

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit, or to limit the authority of, personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from sharing intelligence or information with, or receiving intelligence or information from, State, local, Tribal, or territorial governments, the private sector, or other elements of the Federal Government, including the components of the Department of Homeland Security.

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

The head of each element of the intelligence community, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop and maintain procedures for that element to respond to unmasking requests.

The procedures required by subsection (a) shall ensure, at a minimum, the following:

(1) Each unmasking request submitted to a disseminating element shall include, in writing—

(A) information that identifies the disseminated intelligence report containing the United States person identifying information requested;

(B) the date the unmasking request was submitted to the disseminating element;

(C) the name, title, and organization of the individual who submitted the unmasking request in an official capacity;

(D) the name, title, and organization of each individual who will receive the United States person identifying information sought by the unmasking request; and

(E) a fact-based justification describing why such United States person identifying information is required by each individual who will receive the information to carry out the duties of the individual.

(2) An unmasking request may only be approved by the head of the disseminating element or by officers or employees of such element to whom the head has specifically delegated such authority. When the disseminating element is not the originating element of the United States person identifying information, the head of the disseminating element shall obtain the concurrence of the head or designee of the originating element before approving the unmasking request.

(3) The head of the disseminating element shall retain records on all unmasking requests, including the disposition of such requests, for not less than 10 years.

(4) The records described in paragraph (3) shall include, with respect to each approved unmasking request—

(A) the name and title of the individual of the disseminating element who approved the request; and

(B) the fact-based justification for the request.

(5) The procedures shall include an exception that—

(A) allows for the immediate disclosure of United States person identifying information in the event of exigent circumstances or when a delay would likely result in the significant loss of intelligence; and

(B) requires that promptly after such disclosure, the recipient of the United States person identifying information make a written unmasking request with respect to such information.

(6) If an unmasking request is made during a period beginning on the date of a general election for President and ending on the date on which such President is inaugurated—

(A) the documentation required by paragraph (1) shall include whether—

(i) the requesting entity knows or reasonably believes that any United States person identifying information sought is of an individual who is a member of the transition team as identified by an apparent successful candidate for the office of President or Vice President; or

(ii) based on the intelligence report to which the unmasking request pertains, the disseminating element or the originating element knows or reasonably believes that any United States person identifying information sought is of an individual who is a member of the transition team as identified by an apparent successful candidate for the office of President or Vice President;

(B) the approval made pursuant to paragraph (2) of an unmasking request that contains United States person identifying information described in subparagraph (A) shall be subject to the concurrence of the general counsel of the disseminating element (or, in the absence of the general counsel, the principal deputy general counsel, or, as applicable, the senior Departmental legal officer supporting the disseminating element) that the dissemination of such United States person identifying information is in accordance with the procedures required by subsection (a); and

(C) consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of the disseminating element shall notify the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate of an approval described in subparagraph (B) not later than 14 days after the date of such approval.

(7) If an unmasking request concerns a nominee for or the holder of a Federal office, a member of a transition team as identified by an eligible candidate for the office of the President, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or an individual nominated by the President to be a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and such unmasking request is approved, the head of the disseminating element shall submit the documentation for the request to the congressional intelligence committees not later than 14 days after the date of such approval.

Not later than March 1 of each year, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report documenting, with respect to the year covered by the report—

(1) the total number of unmasking requests received by that element;

(2) of such total number, the number of requests approved;

(3) of such total number, the number of requests denied; and

(4) for each number calculated under paragraphs (1) through (3), the number disaggregated by requesting entity.

With respect to the dissemination of congressional identity information, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall carry out this section in accordance with annex A of Intelligence Community Directive 112, or successor annex or directive.

The requirements of this section are in addition to—

(1) any minimization procedures established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.);

(2) any procedures governing the collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning United States persons established under Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities) or successor order; and

(3) any other provision of statute or Executive order the Director of National Intelligence considers relevant.

In this section:

The term apparent successful candidate means any apparent successful candidate for the office of President or Vice President as determined pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).

The terms candidate and Federal office have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

The term congressional identity information means information that identifies, by name or by individually identifying titles or characteristics—

(A) any current Member of the Senate or the House of Representatives;

(B) any current staff officer for any Senator or Representative, whether paid or unpaid; or

(C) any current staff officer of any committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives, whether paid or unpaid.

The term disseminating element means an element of the intelligence community that disseminated an intelligence report subject to an unmasking request.

The term eligible candidate has the meaning given that term in section 3(h)(4) of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102 note).

The term originating element means an element of the intelligence community that originated information in a disseminated intelligence report subject to an unmasking request.

The term requesting entity means an entity of—

(A) the United State Government; or

(B) a State, local, Tribal, or territorial government.

The term United States person means a United States person as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) or section 3.5 of Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities).

The term United States person identifying information (commonly referred to as United States Person Information)—

(i) means information that is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons; and

(ii) includes a single item of information and information that, when combined with other information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons.

The determination of whether information is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons may require assessment by a trained intelligence professional on a case-by-case basis.

The term unmasking request means a request to gain access to nonpublic United States person identifying information concerning a known unconsenting United States person that was omitted from a disseminated intelligence report by the originating element.

The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 516 the following new item:

The head of each element of the intelligence community shall develop the procedures required by section 517(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), by not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the procedures for each element of the intelligence community required by section 517(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall revise all regulations, policies, procedures, manuals, circulars, courses, training, and guidance in the intelligence community such that all such materials are in compliance with and consistent with this section.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by any law for the National Intelligence Program shall be used for the purposes of implementing covered practices in the intelligence community.

In this section, the term covered practice means any practice that discriminates for or against any person in a manner prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq.), or any other Federal law.

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 512 the following:

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing data on cases of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.

Each report required by subsection (a) shall include, for the fiscal year covered by the report, the number of active cases, the number of unique cases, and the number of cases opened, for each of the following:

(1) Russia counterintelligence cases.

(2) China counterintelligence cases.

(3) Espionage or leak cases.

(4) All other counterintelligence cases.

(5) ISIS counterterrorism cases.

(6) Hizballah counterterrorism cases.

(7) Cartel and other transnational criminal organization counterterrorism cases.

(8) All other international counterterrorism cases.

(9) Russia cyber national security cases.

(10) China cyber national security cases.

(11) All other cyber national security cases.

Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The table of contents preceding section 2 of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the following:

This title may be cited as the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act of 2025.

Subsection (c)(7) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by striking (A) The Director and all that follows through (B) The Director and inserting The Director.

Such section is amended by striking subsection (e).

Subsection (f) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (2), by striking and may and all that follows through determines necessary; and

(B) in paragraph (3)(A)—

(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking consultation and inserting coordination;

(ii) in clause (iii)—

(I) by striking recruitment and retention and inserting recruitment, retention, and training; and

(II) by striking the semicolon at the end and inserting, including those with diverse ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds; and;

(iii) in clause (vi), by inserting on behalf of the Director of National Intelligence after matters;

(iv) by striking clauses (i), (ii), (iv), and (v); and

(v) by redesignating clauses (iii) and (vi) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively.

Paragraph (7) of such subsection is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking conduct and inserting direct;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting directed before under; and

(C) in subsection (C)(i), by striking conducted and inserting directed.

Paragraph (8)(A) of such subsection is amended by striking conduct and inserting direct independent.

Paragraph (8)(D) of such subsection is amended by striking carry out and inserting direct independent.

Such section is further amended by striking subsection (l).

Subsection (z) of such section is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)—

(A) by inserting, or the head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the Director has delegated such review or investigation, after for which the Director; and

(B) by inserting or such head after materials, the Director; and

(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting, or the head of an element of the intelligence community to whom the Director has delegated such review or investigation, after the Director.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with each head of an element of the intelligence community, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to reform the acquisition process of each element of the intelligence community so that, to the maximum extent practicable, the process uses existing authorities to expedite acquisitions and includes a preference for acquisition of commercial solutions, consistent with section 3453 of title 10, United States Code, and Executive Order 14265 (90 Fed. Reg. 15621; relating to modernizing defense acquisitions and spurring innovation in the defense industrial base).

The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include an itemization of major planned or pending acquisitions for each element of the intelligence community.

Such section is further amended—

(A) by redesignating subsections (f) through (k) as subsections (e) through (j), respectively;

(B) by redesignating subsections (m) through (z) as subsections (k) through (x), respectively;

(C) in subsection (e), as redesignated by subparagraph (A), in paragraph (7), by striking under subsection (m) and inserting under subsection (k); and

(D) in subsection (v)(3), as redesignated by subparagraph (B), by striking under subsection (f)(8) and inserting under subsection (e)(8).

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(i) in section 103(c)(15) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)(15)), by striking, including national intelligence centers; and

(ii) in section 313(1) (50 U.S.C. 3079(1)), by striking with section 102A(f)(8) and inserting with section 102A(e)(8).

Section 7(a)(1)(A) of the Reducing Over-Classification Act (50 U.S.C. 3344(a)(1)(A)) is amended by striking of section 102A(g)(1) and inserting of section 102A(f)(1).

Section 1019(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(a)) is amended by striking out section 102A(h) and inserting out section 102A(g).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to reduce the staff of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include a plan for reducing the staff of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to the maximum number of full-time equivalent employees, detailees, and individuals under contract with the Office that the Director requires for the optimized execution of the Director's statutory authorities and ensures—

(A) each Federal employee who is employed by, detailed to, or assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will be provided an opportunity to accept alternative employment, detail, or assignment within the United States Government; and

(B) no such Federal employee will be involuntarily terminated by the implementation of the plan required by paragraph (1).

On a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a)(1) is submitted, or 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the Director of National Intelligence shall initiate a process to reduce the staff of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, provided the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees a certification that—

(A) each Federal employee who is employed by, detailed to, or assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will be provided an opportunity to accept alternative employment, detail, or assignment within the United States Government; and

(B) no such Federal employee will be involuntarily terminated by the implementation of such process, except as provided in subsection (c)(1).

Not later than 60 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a)(1) is submitted, and every 60 days thereafter until the staff of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence does not exceed the number of full-time equivalent employees, detailees, and individuals under contract with the Office identified in the plan provided pursuant to subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written update identifying the positions of the employees, detailees, and individuals under contract with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who have been part of the reduction in staff.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting—

(1) the involuntarily termination of a Federal employee when there is—

(A) written documentation to support a security, counterintelligence, or other lawful basis for termination based on misconduct; or

(B) written documentation over a period of at least 180 days to support a performance basis for the termination; or

(2) the return of detailees to their home agencies 45 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a)(1) is submitted.

Subsection (f) of such section is amended by inserting, with facilities necessary to carry out the core intelligence mission of the Office before the period at the end.

Subsection (a) of section 103A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026) is amended—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking Principal; and

(B) by striking Principal each place it appears.

Subsection (c) of such section is amended—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking Principal; and

(B) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking Principal.

Such Act is further amended—

(i) in section 103(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)(2)), by striking Principal;

(ii) in section 103I(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 3034(b)(1)), by striking Principal;

(iii) in section 106(a)(2)(A) (50 U.S.C. 3041(a)(2)(A)), by striking Principal; and

(iv) in section 116(b) (50 U.S.C. 3053(b)), by striking Principal.

Section 6310 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3351b) is amended by striking Principal each place it appears.

Section 1683(b)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(b)(3)) is amended by striking Principal both places it appears.

Section 103A(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3026(b)) is amended—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking Deputy and inserting Assistant;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking may and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting the following: is an Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration and an Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Policy and Capabilities, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.; and

(C) in paragraph (2), by striking Deputy and inserting Assistant.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(A) in section 102A(l)(4)(F) (50 U.S.C. 3024(l)(4)(F)), as redesignated by section 402(g)(1)(B), by striking a Deputy and inserting an Assistant; and

(B) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by striking paragraph (3).

Any reference in law to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence shall be treated as a reference to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

Section 103A of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3026) is further amended, in the section heading, by striking Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and inserting Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 103A and inserting the following:

Subsection (c)(1) of section 103B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3027) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by adding or coordinate the production of after produce; and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking and the requirements and resources of such collection and production.

Subsection (f) of such section is amended by striking The and inserting Subject to section 103(d)(1), the.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to achieve the transfer of—

(1) the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(2) the duties of the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Counterintelligence.

On a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a) is submitted, or 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the Director of National Intelligence shall initiate the transfer of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including such staff and resources of the Center as the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, determines appropriate and as is consistent with the provisions of this section.

On a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a) is submitted, or 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the Director of National Intelligence shall initiate the transfer to the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Counterintelligence of such duties of the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center as the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, determines appropriate and as is consistent with the provisions of this section.

Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete the transfers initiated under paragraphs (1) and (2).

Any reduction in staff of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall comply with the requirements of section 403(b).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until the date specified in subsection (h), the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the implementation of this section, including—

(1) the missions and functions of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center that have been transferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(2) the missions and functions of such Center that have been retained at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;

(3) the missions and functions of such Center that have been transferred to another department or agency; and

(4) the missions and functions of such Center that have been terminated.

Section 103F of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3031) is repealed.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 103F.

Section 902 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3382) is amended—

(A) in the section heading, by striking Director and inserting Head;

(B) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

The head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Counterintelligence or the Assistant Director's designee.

(C) in subsection (b), by striking the Director and inserting the individual serving as the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and

(D) in subsection (c)—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking Subject to the direction and control of the Director of National Intelligence, the duties of the Director and inserting The duties of the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and

(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking Director of National Intelligence and inserting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Section 904 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amended—

(A) in subsection (a), by inserting in the Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation before the period at the end;

(B) in subsection (b), by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and inserting Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Counterintelligence or the Assistant Director's designee;

(C) in subsection (c), by striking Office of the Director of National Intelligence and inserting Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(D) in subsection (e)—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking Director of and inserting head of; and

(ii) in paragraphs (2)(B), (4), and (5), by striking Director of National Intelligence each place it appears and inserting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(E) in subsection (f)(3), by striking Director and inserting head;

(F) in subsection (g)(2), by striking Director and inserting head; and

(G) in subsection (i), by striking Office of the Director of National Intelligence and inserting Counterintelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(A) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by striking paragraph (9);

(B) in section 1107 (50 U.S.C. 3237)—

(i) in subsection (a), by striking the Director and inserting the head; and

(ii) in subsection (c), by striking the Director shall and inserting the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall; and

(C) in section 1108 (50 U.S.C. 3238)—

(i) in subsection (a), by striking the Director and inserting the head; and

(ii) in subsection (c), by striking the Director shall and inserting the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall.

The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92) is amended—

(A) in section 6306(c)(6) (50 U.S.C. 3370(c)(6)), by striking the Director and inserting the head; and

(B) in section 6508 (50 U.S.C. 3371d), by striking Director of National Intelligence both places it appears and inserting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Section 811 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3381) is amended—

(A) by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center each place it appears and inserting head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; and

(B) in subsection (b), by striking appointed.

Section 7318 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3384) is amended—

(i) in subsection (c)—

(I) in paragraph (1), by striking, acting through the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center,; and

(II) in paragraph (3), by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and inserting Director of National Intelligence, as the Security Executive Agent,; and

(ii) in subsection (d)—

(I) in paragraph (1)—

(aa) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and inserting Director of National Intelligence; and

(bb) in subparagraph (B), by striking National Counterintelligence and Security Center both places it appears and inserting Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(II) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and inserting Director of National Intelligence.

Section 7334(c)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3385(c)(2)) is amended by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and inserting head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.

The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

On and after the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, any reference to the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center in law shall be treated as a reference to the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Counterintelligence or the Assistant Director’s designee acting on behalf of the Assistant Director as the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.

Nothing in this section shall preclude the Director of National Intelligence from determining that—

(1) certain coordinating functions of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be retained at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence consistent with the authorities of the Director under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024), transferred to another department or agency, or terminated; or

(2) certain missions or functions of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be transferred to another department or agency, or terminated.

Subsection (e) of section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3056) is amended to read as follows:

The Center may, consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive and retain intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code) to enable the Center to collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining only to international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code).

Such section is further amended—

(A) in the section heading, by striking National Counterterrorism Center and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center;

(B) in subsection (b), in the subsection heading, by striking National Counterterrorism Center and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center; and

(C) by striking National Counterterrorism Center each place it appears and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 119 and inserting the following:

Section 102A(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(g)(3)) is amended by striking National Counterterrorism Center and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended—

(A) in section 201(d)(1) (6 U.S.C. 121(d)(1)), by striking National Counterterrorism Center and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center; and

(B) in section 210D (6 U.S.C. 124k)—

(i) in subsections (b), (c), (d), (f)(1), (f)(2)(A), and (f)(2)(C), by striking National Counterterrorism Center each place it appears and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center; and

(ii) in subsection (f)(2)—

(I) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking Pursuant to section 119(f)(E) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o(f)(E)), the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and inserting The Director of the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center; and

(II) in subparagraph (B), by striking 119(f)(E) and inserting 119(f).

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458) is amended by striking National Counterterrorism Center each place it appears and inserting National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center.

Section 1299F of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (22 U.S.C. 2656j) is amended by striking Director of the National Counterterrorism Center each place it appears and inserting Director of the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center.

Section 1079 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (50 U.S.C. 3307) is amended by striking Director of the National Counterterrorism Center both places it appears and inserting Director of the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center.

The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, any reference to the National Counterterrorism Center in law shall be treated as a reference to the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center, as redesignated by subsection (c).

On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, any reference to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in law shall be treated as a reference to the Director of the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to achieve the transfer of—

(1) the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center to the Central Intelligence Agency; and

(2) the duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

On a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a) is submitted, or 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the Director of National Intelligence shall initiate the transfer of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center to the Central Intelligence Agency, including such missions, objectives, staff, and resources of the Center as the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, determines appropriate and as is consistent with the provisions of this section.

On a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan required by subsection (a) is submitted, or 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the Director of National Intelligence shall initiate the transfer to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of such duties and responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center as the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, determines appropriate and as is consistent with the provisions of this section.

Not later than 455 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete the transfers initiated under paragraphs (1) and (2).

Any reduction in staff of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall comply with the requirements of section 403(b).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until the date specified in subsection (i), the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status of the implementation of this section, including—

(1) the missions and functions of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center that have been transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) the missions and functions of such Center that have been retained at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;

(3) the missions and functions of such Center that have been transferred to another department or agency; and

(4) the missions and functions of such Center that have been terminated.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 103(c) (50 U.S.C. 3025(c)), by striking paragraph (13); and

(2) in subsection (a) of section 119A (50 U.S.C. 3057)—

(A) in paragraph (2), by striking the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence and inserting the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Director's designee;

(B) in paragraph (3), by striking Office of the Director of National Intelligence and inserting Central Intelligence Agency; and

(C) by striking paragraph (4).

Such section is further amended by striking subsection (c).

Such section is further amended by striking subsection (d).

Such section is further amended by striking subsection (e).

The amendments made by this section shall take effect 455 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

On and after the date that is 455 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, any reference to the Director of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center in law shall be treated as a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency acting as the head of the National Counterproliferation Center or the Director's designee pursuant to section 119A(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3057(a)(2)), as amended by subsection (e)(2).

Nothing in this section shall preclude the Director of National Intelligence from determining that—

(1) certain coordinating functions of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be retained at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence consistent with the authorities of the Director under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024), transferred to another department or agency, or terminated; or

(2) certain missions or functions of the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be transferred to another department or agency, or terminated.

Section 119B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3058) is amended to read as follows:

The Director of National Intelligence may convene 1 or more national intelligence task forces, as the Director considers necessary, to address intelligence priorities.

Pursuant to the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, a national intelligence task force convened under subsection (a) may—

(1) be comprised of select employees of elements of the intelligence community, other than the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence to be necessary and appropriate for the task force;

(2) convene at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a limited time in support of a specific intelligence matter recognized by the Director; and

(3) be dissolved by the Director of National Intelligence not later than 540 days after the conclusion of support to a specific intelligence matter.

If the specific intelligence matter a national intelligence task force has been convened to support has not concluded within 540 days after the establishment of the task force, the Director shall transfer responsibility for supporting the intelligence matter to a specific element of the intelligence community.

Employees of elements of the intelligence community participating in a national intelligence task force pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall continue to receive compensation from their agency of employment.

In any case in which a national intelligence task force convened under subsection (a) is in effect for a period of more than 60 days, the Director of National Intelligence shall, not later than 61 days after the date of the convening of the task force, submit to the congressional intelligence committees notice regarding the task force.

A notice regarding a national intelligence task force submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The number of personnel of the intelligence community participating in the task force.

(B) A list of the elements of the intelligence community that are employing the personnel described in subparagraph (A).

(C) Identification of the specific intelligence matter the task force was convened to support.

(D) An approximate date by which the task force will be dissolved.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 119B and inserting the following:

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 103K (50 U.S.C. 3034b).

Section 103G of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3032) is amended by striking subsection (d).

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 103K.

The Director of National Intelligence shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Intelligence Community Innovation Unit before the date specified in paragraph (3).

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 103L (50 U.S.C. 3034c).

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 103L.

The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to achieve the termination of the Foreign Malign Influence Center.

On a date that is at least 90 days after the date on which the plan required by paragraph (1) is submitted, or 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the Director of National Intelligence shall begin taking such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Foreign Malign Influence Center.

Not later than 455 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete the termination of the Foreign Malign Influence Center.

Any reduction in staff of the Foreign Malign Influence Center shall comply with the requirements of section 403(b).

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 119C (50 U.S.C. 3059).

Section 499A(n) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 290c(n)) is amended—

(i) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking (as defined in section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059)); and

(ii) by adding at the end the following:

In this subsection, the term covered foreign country means the government, or any entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services of, the following foreign countries:

(A) The People's Republic of China.

(B) The Russian Federation.

(C) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(D) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

(E) Such other countries as the Director considers appropriate.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is amended—

(i) in section 507(a) (50 U.S.C. 3106(a)), by striking paragraph (6); and

(ii) in section 1111(d) (50 U.S.C. 3241(d)), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:

The term foreign malign influence means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the government of a covered foreign country with the objective of influencing, though overt or covert means—

(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies or activities of the United States Government or State or local governments, including any election within the United States; or

(B) public opinion within the United States.

Section 5323(h) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369(h)) is amended—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking Definitions.— and inserting Definitions.—In this section:;

(ii) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(iii) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraphs:

The term covered foreign country means the government, or any entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services of, the following foreign countries:

(A) The People's Republic of China.

(B) The Russian Federation.

(C) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(D) The Islamic Republic of Iran.

(E) Such other countries as the Director considers appropriate.

The term foreign malign influence means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, the government of a covered foreign country with the objective of influencing, through overt or covert means—

(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies or activities of the United States Government or State or local governments, including any election within the United States; or

(B) public opinion within the United States.

The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is amended, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, by striking the item relating to section 119C.

The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 455 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the Director of National Intelligence from determining that—

(A) certain coordinating functions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center shall be retained at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence consistent with the authorities of the Director under section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024), transferred to another department or agency, or terminated; or

(B) certain missions or functions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center shall be transferred to another department or agency, or terminated.

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 120 (50 U.S.C. 3060).

Section 331 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:

(2) The term climate security means the effects of climate change on the following:

(A) The national security of the United States, including national security infrastructure.

(B) Subnational, national, and regional political stability.

(C) The security of allies and partners of the United States.

(D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 120.

The Director of National Intelligence shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Office of Engagement before the date specified in paragraph (3).

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is further amended by striking section 122 (50 U.S.C. 3062).

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 122.

The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Subtitle A of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking section 1002 (50 U.S.C. 3192).

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the item relating to section 1002.

The Director of National Intelligence shall take such actions as may be necessary to terminate and wind down the operations of the Foreign Languages Program before the date specified in paragraph (5).

Subtitle B of such title (50 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 1011 (50 U.S.C. 3201, relating to program on advancement of foreign languages critical to the intelligence community), 1012 (50 U.S.C. 3202, relating to education partnerships), and 1013 (50 U.S.C. 3203, relating to voluntary services).

Such subtitle is further amended by striking sections 1014 (50 U.S.C. 3204, relating to regulations) and 1015 (50 U.S.C. 3205, relating to definitions).

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by striking the items relating to subtitle B of title X.

The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The Joint Intelligence Community Council is terminated.

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by striking section 101A (50 U.S.C. 3022).

Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council,.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 101A.

Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

Amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account may not be obligated or expended to provide financial or in-kind support for the purposes of analytic collaboration, including for any study, research, or assessment, to—

(1) an entity that is a federally funded research and development center as defined in section 35.017 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, or successor regulation, that has received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance;

(2) an entity that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or otherwise describes itself as a think tank in any public document, that has received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance; or

(3) an entity that is organized for research or for engaging in advocacy in areas such as public policy or political strategy that has received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support from a government, or an entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services, of—

(A) the People’s Republic of China;

(B) the Russian Federation;

(C) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;

(D) the Islamic Republic of Iran;

(E) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; or

(F) the Republic of Cuba.

Section 103B(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3027(e)) is amended by inserting and subject to section 314 after control of the Director of National Intelligence.

The table of contents for such Act, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 313 the following:

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National Defense University described in section 2165 of title 10, United Stats Code.

Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by striking subtitle D (50 U.S.C. 3227 et seq.).

Section 2151(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (3).

Section 105(d)(2) of title 17, United States Code, is amended—

(A) by striking subparagraph (M); and

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (M).

The Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92) is amended by striking section 5324 (50 U.S.C. 3334a).

The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002 et seq.) is amended, in the matter preceding section 2 of such Act, by striking the items relating to subtitle D of title X.

The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, declassify, with any redactions necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods, any information relating to whether foreign government officials have assisted or facilitated any citizen or national of their country in departing the United States while the citizen or national was under investigation or awaiting trial or sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United States.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a policy for streamlining the declassification or downgrading and sharing of intelligence information relating to biotechnological developments and threats in order to counter efforts by foreign adversaries to weaponize biotechnologies and biological weapons, including threats relating to military, industrial, agricultural, and health applications of biotechnology.

The plan required by subsection (a) shall include mechanisms for sharing the information described in such subsection—

(1) with allies and partners;

(2) with private sector partners; and

(3) across the Federal Government.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 2 years, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on progress sharing information with recipients under subsection (b).

This section may be cited as the Border Drone Threat Assessment Act.

In this section:

The term at or near the international borders of the United States means at or within 100 air miles of an international land border or coastal border of the United States.

The term Director means the Director of National Intelligence.

The term foreign malign influence has the meaning given such term in section 119B(f) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059(f)).

The term malign actor means any individual, group, or organization that is engaged in foreign malign influence, illicit drug trafficking, or other forms of transnational organized crime.

The term transnational organized crime has the meaning given such term in section 284(i) of title 10, United States Code.

The term Under Secretary means the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.

The terms unmanned aircraft and unmanned aircraft system have the meanings given such terms in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director, the Under Secretary, and the heads of the other elements of the intelligence community, shall complete an assessment of the threat regarding unmanned aircraft systems at or near the international borders of the United States.

The threat assessment required under paragraph (1) shall include a description of—

(A) the malign actors operating unmanned aircraft systems at or near the international borders of the United States, including malign actors who cross such borders;

(B) how a threat is identified and assessed at or near the international borders of the United States, including a description of the capabilities of the United States Government to detect and identify unmanned aircraft systems operated by, or on behalf of, malign actors;

(C) the data and information collected by operators of unmanned aircraft systems at or near the international borders of the United States, including how such data is used by malign actors;

(D) the tactics, techniques, and procedures used at or near the international borders of the United States by malign actors with regard to unmanned aircraft systems, including how unmanned aircraft systems are acquired, modified, and utilized to conduct malicious activities, including attacks, surveillance, conveyance of contraband, and other forms of threats;

(E) the guidance, policies, and procedures that address the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of persons who lawfully operate unmanned aircraft systems at or near the international borders of the United States; and

(F) an assessment of the adequacy of current authorities of the United States Government to counter the use of unmanned aircraft systems by malign actors at or near the international borders of the United States, including an accounting of the delineated responsibilities of Federal agencies to counter, contain, trace, or defeat unmanned aircraft systems at or near such international borders.

Not later than 180 days after completing the threat assessment required under subsection (c), the Director and the Under Secretary shall jointly submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees containing findings with respect to such assessment.

The report required under paragraph (1) shall include a detailed description of the threats posed to the national security of the United States by unmanned aircraft systems operated by malign actors at or near the international borders of the United States.

The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, as appropriate.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Intelligence Council shall—

(1) conduct an assessment of the potential effect of expanding partnerships among countries in the western hemisphere; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the findings of the National Intelligence Council regarding the assessment conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).

The assessment required by subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the potential effect of expanding such partnerships on—

(1) the illicit drug trade, human smuggling networks, and corruption in Latin America; and

(2) the efforts of China to control global manufacturing.

The report submitted pursuant to subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form and made available to the public, but may include a classified annex.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the National Security Council, shall develop an interagency strategy to counter the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party to expand its economic, military, and ideological influence in Europe.

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the current efforts by the intelligence community to brief members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on intelligence and influence activities by the Chinese Communist Party in Europe, including the following:

(A) Any support by the Chinese Communist Party to the economy and defense industrial base of the Russian Federation.

(B) Any provision of lethal assistance to the Russian army by the Chinese Communist Party.

(C) Any cyber operations by the Chinese Communist Party to gain the ability to remotely shut down critical infrastructure in Europe.

(D) Any influence operations by the Chinese Communist Party to sway European public opinion.

(E) Any use by the Chinese Communist Party of economic coercion and weaponization of economic ties to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for political gain.

(2) A strategic plan to counter the influence of the Chinese Communist Party in Europe that includes proposals for actions by the United States, including the following:

(A) Robust intelligence sharing with European allies in the areas described in paragraph (1), and an identification of additional capabilities and resources needed for such intelligence sharing.

(B) Actions required by the United States Government to support United States and allied country businesses to provide competitive alternatives to Chinese bids in the following European sectors:

(i) Energy

(ii) Telecommunications.

(iii) Defense

(iv) Finance.

(v) Ports and other critical infrastructure.

(C) Assistance to European governments in passing legislation or enforcing regulations that protect European academic institutions, think tanks, research entities, and nongovernmental organizations from efforts by the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party to normalize talking points and propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party.

(D) Any other action the President determines is necessary to counter the Chinese Communist Party in Europe.

Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President completes development of the strategy required by subsection (a), the President shall submit the strategy to the appropriate committees of Congress.

In this subsection, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

In this section:

The term 1260H list means the list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States most recently submitted under section 1260H(b)(1) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116–283).

The term affiliate means an entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another entity.

The term biotechnology means the use of biological processes, organisms, or systems for manufacturing, research, or medical purposes, including genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and bioinformatics.

Subject to subsections (d) and (e), a head of an element of the intelligence community may not enter into, renew, or extend any contract for a good or service with—

(1) any entity listed on the 1260H list that is engaged in biotechnology research, development, manufacturing, or related activities;

(2) any entity that is an affiliate, subsidiary, or parent company of a biotechnology company included on the 1260H list;

(3) any entity that has a known joint venture, partnership, or contractual relationship with a biotechnology company included on the 1260H list, where such relationship presents a risk to national security as determined by the Director of National Intelligence; or

(4) any entity that is engaged in biotechnology research, development, manufacturing, or related activities and deemed to be a threat to national security as determined by the Director.

The Director of National Intelligence shall—

(1) establish guidelines for determining affiliation and contractual relationships under this section;

(2) maintain a publicly available list of biotechnology companies and affiliates with whom contracting is prohibited under subsection (b);

(3) require that each head of an element of the intelligence community ensure that the contractors and subcontractors engaged by the element certify that they are not engaged in a contract for a good or service with an entity included on the 1260H list that is engaged in biotechnology research, development, manufacturing, or a related activity; and

(4) conduct regular audits to ensure compliance with subsection (b).

The Director of National Intelligence may waive the prohibition under subsection (b) for a procurement on a case-by-case basis if the Director determines, in writing, that—

(A) the procurement is essential for national security and no reasonable alternative source exists; and

(B) appropriate measures are in place to mitigate risks associated with the procurement.

For each waiver for a procurement issued under subsection (b), the Director shall, not later than 30 days after issuing the waiver, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notice of the waiver, which shall include a justification for the waiver and a description of the risk mitigation measures implemented for the procurement.

The prohibitions under subsection (b) shall not apply to—

(1) the acquisition or provision of health care services overseas for—

(A) employees of the United States, including members of the uniformed services (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code), whose official duty stations are located overseas or who are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or

(B) employees of contractors or subcontractors of the United States—

(i) who are performing under a contract that directly supports the missions or activities of individuals described in subparagraph (A); and

(ii) whose primary duty stations are located overseas or who are on permissive temporary duty travel overseas; or

(2) the acquisition, use, or distribution of human multiomic data, lawfully compiled, that is commercially or publicly available.

This section shall take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The provisions of this section shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 270 days following the appointment of a new Central Committee within the Chinese Communist Party, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall post on a publicly available website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A detailed assessment of the personal wealth, financial holdings, and business interests of the following foreign persons, including the immediate family members of such persons:

(A) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.

(B) Members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

(C) Members of the full Politburo.

(2) Evidence of physical and financial assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such officials and their immediate family members, including, at a minimum—

(A) real estate holdings inside and outside the People’s Republic of China, including the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau;

(B) any high-value personal assets; and

(C) business holdings, investments, and financial accounts held in foreign jurisdictions.

(3) Identification of financial proxies, business associates, or other entities used to obscure the ownership of such wealth and assets, including as a baseline those referenced in the March 2025 report issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence entitled, Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

(4) Nonpublic information related to the wealth of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to the extent possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

The Director of National Intelligence may delay the posting and submission of a report required under subsection (a) for one or more 60-day periods upon providing to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives notification of the delay, together with a justification for the delay.

The report posted and submitted under subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form, but the version submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives may include a classified annex as necessary.

This section shall have no force or effect 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

In this section:

The term immediate family member, with respect to a foreign person, means—

(A) the spouse of the person;

(B) the natural or adoptive parent, child, or sibling of the person;

(C) the stepparent, stepchild, stepbrother, or stepsister of the person;

(D) the father-, mother-, daughter-, son-, brother-, or sister-in-law of the person;

(E) the grandparent or grandchild of the person; and

(F) the spouse of a grandparent or grandchild of the person.

the term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall assess the extent of investment by the People's Republic of China in the agriculture sector of Brazil.

The assessment shall consider the following:

(A) The extent to which President Xi Jinping has engaged in or directed engagement with Brazilian leadership with regard to the agriculture sector of Brazil.

(B) The extent of engagement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the agriculture sector of Brazil.

(C) The strategic intentions of the engagement or direction of President Xi, if any, to invest in the agriculture sector of Brazil.

(D) The number of entities based in or owned by the People's Republic of China invested in the agriculture sector of Brazil, including joint ventures with Brazilian-owned companies.

(E) The impacts to the supply chain, global market, and food security of investment in or control of the agriculture sector in Brazil by the People's Republic of China.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report detailing the assessment required by subsection (a).

The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

In this section, the term agriculture sector means any physical infrastructure, energy production, or land associated with the production of crops.

The Director of National Intelligence shall identify the businesses, academic and research institutions, and other entities in the People’s Republic of China that provide support to the People’s Liberation Army, including—

(1) for national defense or military modernization, including the development, application, or integration of civilian capabilities for military, paramilitary, or security purposes;

(2) for the development, production, testing, or proliferation of weapons systems, critical technologies, or dual-use items, as defined under applicable United States law (including regulations); or

(3) academic, scientific, or technical collaboration that materially contributes to or supports any of the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (3).

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a list of each entity identified under subsection (a).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis (referred to in this section as the Assistant Secretaries) shall establish a joint cell to be known as the China Economics and Intelligence Cell.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the China Economics and Intelligence Cell, in coordination with other elements of the intelligence community and Federal agencies, as the Assistant Secretaries determine appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on economic and technological developments involving the People's Republic of China.

The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the economic goals and strategies, financial capabilities, and current and future technological developments used by the People's Republic of China to become the dominant economic, technological, and military power in the world.

(2) An assessment of efforts by the People's Republic of China during the preceding year to acquire technology from the United States and United States allies, to increase dependence of the United States on the economy of the People's Republic of China, and to distort global markets and harm the economy of the United States through predatory, non-market practices.

(3) An assessment of plans and efforts by the People's Republic of China to leverage and weaponize the economic power of the country, including access to markets, manufacturing capacity, and use of trade and investment ties, to coerce the United States and United States allies to make concessions on economic security and national security matters.

(4) An appendix that lists any Chinese entity that is—

(A) included on the Entity List maintained by the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations;

(B) included on the Unverified List maintained by the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 6 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations;

(C) included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury (commonly known as the SDN list);

(D) included on the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury pursuant to Executive Order 13959 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to addressing the threat from securities investments that finance communist Chinese military companies);

(E) designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);

(F) identified by the Secretary of Defense under section 1260H(a) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) as a Chinese military company operating directly or indirectly in the United States; or

(G) included on a list maintained under clause (i), (ii), (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of the Act entitled An Act to ensure that goods made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China do not enter the United States market, and for other purposes, approved December 23, 2021 (Public Law 117–78; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) (commonly referred to as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act).

In preparing the report required by subsection (b), the Assistant Secretaries, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall use all available source intelligence and strive to declassify information included in the report.

The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (b) shall be made available to the public.

Section 1107 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3237) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and inserting Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other head of an element of the intelligence community the Director of National Intelligence considers relevant,;

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (12); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:

(10) A listing of provincial, municipal, or other law enforcement institutions, including police departments, in the People’s Republic of China associated with establishing or maintaining a Chinese police presence in the United States.

(11) A listing of colleges and universities in the People’s Republic of China that conduct military research or host dedicated military initiatives or laboratories.

(3) by striking subsection (c); and

(4) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

Section 1234(b) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 134 Stat. 3936) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(27) An assessment of the efforts by Russia to undermine or destabilize the national or economic security of the United States or members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including plans or attempts by Russia to conduct—

(A) sabotage, including damage to infrastructure, or acts of arson or vandalism;

(B) critical infrastructure attacks or intrusions;

(C) cyber attacks;

(D) malign influence operations;

(E) assassinations;

(F) use of economic levers; or

(G) interference with or influence of democratic elections or election infrastructure.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until the date that the President rescinds Executive Order 14024 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation), the Secretary of the Navy, operating through the Office of Naval Intelligence, shall publish in the Federal Register a list of—

(1) all vessels determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to have shipped petroleum products of the Russian Federation in violation of sanctions imposed with respect to the energy sector of the Russian Federation pursuant to Executive Order 14024;

(2) all oil tankers owned by fleet operators based in the Russian Federation; and

(3) all vessels that have engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with vessels listed pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2).

For each vessel not subject to sanctions at the time such vessel is included on a list published pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of the Navy shall refer such vessel to—

(1) the Secretary of the Treasury for referral for sanctions required by Executive Order 14024; and

(2) the Secretary of State to notify the governments of the countries under the flags of which such vessels operate.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence the following:

(1) A description and assessment of the intelligence community element’s direct relationship, if any, with any element of the Government of Mexico, including an assessment of the counterintelligence risks of such relationship.

(2) A strategy to enhance counternarcotics cooperation and appropriate coordination with each element of the Government of Mexico with which the intelligence community element has a direct relationship.

(3) Recommendations and a description of the resources required to efficiently and effectively implement the strategy required by paragraph (2) in furtherance of the national interest of the United States.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the following:

(1) The submissions received by the Director pursuant to subsection (a).

(2) An action plan to enhance counternarcotics collaboration, coordination, and cooperation with the Government of Mexico, including recommendations or requests for any changes in authorities or resources in order to effectuate the plan effectively in fiscal year 2026.

The submissions required by subsection (b)(1) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in the same form in which they were submitted to the Director of National Intelligence.

The submission required by subsection (b)(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall, in coordination with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, develop a plan—

(1) to share relevant intelligence, if any, relating to foreign adversary efforts to influence the conflict in Sudan, with regional allies and partners of the United States, including to downgrade or declassify such intelligence as needed; and

(2) to counter foreign adversary efforts to influence the conflict in Sudan in order to protect national and regional security.

Section 6413(e) of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):

(3) Evaluate which lessons should be shared with Taiwan to assist Taiwan’s acquisitions decisions and capability development.

Paragraph (1) of section 7413(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31; 22 U.S.C. 8701 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking assesses that the Islamic Republic of Iran has produced or possesses any amount of uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity or has engaged in significant enrichment activity, and inserting makes a finding described in paragraph (2) pursuant to an assessment,; and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:

A finding described in this paragraph is a finding that the Islamic Republic of Iran has—

(A) produced or possesses any amount of uranium-235 enriched to greater than 60 percent purity;

(B) engaged in significant enrichment activity; or

(C) made the decision to produce a nuclear weapon from highly enriched uranium.

Upon collecting or acquiring credible and specific information indicating an impending threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping directed at a United States person by the Islamic Republic of Iran or an Iranian proxy, an element of the intelligence community must immediately notify the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of such information.

Not later than 48 hours after receiving a notification pursuant to subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall—

(1) warn the intended victim, or any persons responsible for protecting the intended victim, of the impending threat; and

(2) provide the information received pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees, consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

The term Iranian proxy means any entity receiving support from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, including—

(A) Hizballah;

(B) Ansar Allah;

(C) Hamas; and

(D) Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria.

The term United States person means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) a national of the United States; or

(C) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States.

In this section, the term nonprofit organization means an organization that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that is exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code.

There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the Intelligence Community Technology Bridge Fund (in this subsection referred to as the Fund) to assist in the transitioning of products or services from the research and development phase to the prototype or production phase.

The Fund shall consist of amounts appropriated to the Fund, and amounts in the Fund shall remain available until expended.

Subject to paragraph (3), amounts in the Fund shall be available to the Director of National Intelligence to make available to the heads of the elements of the intelligence community to provide assistance to a business or nonprofit organization that is transitioning a product or service to the prototype or production phase, as a means of advancing government acquisitions of the product or service.

Assistance provided under paragraph (1) may be distributed as funds in the form of a grant, a payment for a product or service, or a payment for equity.

Assistance may be provided under paragraph (1) to a business or nonprofit organization that is transitioning a product or service only if—

(A) the business or nonprofit organization is under contract, agreement, or other engagement with an element of the intelligence community for research and development; and

(B) the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community attests that the product or service will be utilized by an element of the intelligence community for a mission need, such as because it would be valuable in addressing a needed capability, fill or complement a technology gap, or increase the supplier base or price competitiveness for the Federal Government.

In providing assistance under paragraph (1), the Director shall limit the provision of assistance to small business concerns (as defined under section 3(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632(a))) and nontraditional defense contractors (as defined in section 3014 of title 10, United States Code).

The Fund shall be administered by the Director of National Intelligence.

In administering the Fund, the Director—

(A) shall consult with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community; and

(B) may consult with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, National Laboratories intelligence community laboratories, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Investment Fund, the Defense Innovation Unit, and such other entities as the Director deems appropriate.

Not later than September 30, 2026, and each fiscal year thereafter, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the Fund.

Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include, for the period covered by the report, information about the following:

(A) How much was expended or obligated using amounts from the Fund.

(B) For what the amounts were expended or obligated.

(C) The effects of such expenditures and obligations.

(D) A summary of annual transition activities and outcomes of such activities for the intelligence community.

Subject to paragraph (2), there is authorized to be appropriated to the Fund $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2026 and for each fiscal year thereafter.

The amount in the Fund shall not exceed $75,000,000 at any time.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish a policy for how existing and future funding and resources of the intelligence community can be directed to ensure the intelligence community has sufficient cleared personnel, including private sector experts, to identify and respond to biotechnology threats.

The policy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The exact number of personnel dedicated to biotechnology issues apart from biological weapons, including military, industrial, agricultural, and healthcare threats, in each element of the intelligence community as of the date on which the report is submitted, including staff breakdowns by position function.

(2) An assessment on the following:

(A) Where additional full-time employees or detailees are appropriate.

(B) How to increase partnerships with other government and private sector organizations, including the National Laboratories (as defined in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801)), including how existing funding and resources of the intelligence community can be directed to secure such expertise, including appropriate security clearances.

(C) How to better use special hiring authorities to accomplish the goal described in subsection (a).

(D) How to increase recruitment and retention of biotechnology talent.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the establishment of the policy required by subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence shall—

(1) direct the funding and resources described in subsection (b)(2)(B) towards securing sufficient expertise to identify and respond to biotechnology threats; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on additional funding and resources needed to carry out subsection (b)(2).

The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall provide support to and consult with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and other government agencies as appropriate when reviewing transactions relating to the acquisition of covered entities by foreign entities, including attempts by the Government of the People's Republic of China—

(1) to leverage and acquire biological and genomic data in the United States; and

(2) to leverage and acquire biological and genomic data outside the United States, including by providing economic support to the military, industrial, agricultural, or healthcare infrastructure of foreign countries of concern.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on—

(1) a formal process for ensuring intelligence community support to Federal agencies relating to adversary acquisition of genomic data, in compliance with Executive Order 14117 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to preventing access to Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data and United States Government-related data by countries of concern), or any successor order; and

(2) any additional resources or authorities needed to conduct subsequent intelligence assessments under such subsection.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

The term biological data means information, including associated descriptors, derived from the structure, function, or process of a biological system, that is either measured, collected, or aggregated for analysis, including information from humans, animals, plants, or microbes.

The term covered entity means a private entity involved in genomic data (including genomic data equipment, technologies, sequencing, or synthesis), including a biobank or other private entity that holds large amounts of genomic or biological data.

The term foreign entity of concern has the meaning given that term in section 10612(a) of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (42 U.S.C. 19221(a)).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a policy to ensure that elements of the intelligence community may not contract with Chinese biotechnology suppliers that are determined by the Director to pose a security threat.

The policy required by subsection (a) shall include that an element of the intelligence community may not procure or obtain any product made using synthetic DNA or RNA unless—

(1) the final assembly or processing of the product occurs in the United States;

(2) all significant processing of the product occurs in the United States; and

(3) all or nearly all ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the United States.

The Director of National Intelligence may waive the application of the policy required by subsection (a) to allow purchases prohibited by such policy if the purpose of such a purchase fulfills a national security need.

In this section:

The term Chinese biotechnology supplier means a supplier of biotechnology that is organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the People's Republic of China.

The term synthetic DNA or RNA means any nucleic acid sequence that is produced de novo through chemical or enzymatic synthesis.

Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall coordinate such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence considers necessary, in coordination with efforts of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, to identify one or more sites that could benefit from secure, resilient energy through the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies, ranging from 1 to 100 megawatts, at minimum, which deployment would be to serve in whole or in part the facility, structure, infrastructure, or part thereof for which a head of an element of the intelligence community has financial or maintenance responsibility.

In each case in which a site is identified pursuant to subsection (a), if such site is selected for nuclear deployment, the head of the element of the intelligence community who has financial or maintenance responsibility for the facility, structure, infrastructure, or part thereof to be served by the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and, as the head considers necessary, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and any head of a Federal agency to whom such head of the element of the intelligence community may report, prioritize early site preparation and licensing activities for such deployment of advanced nuclear technologies with a goal of beginning advanced nuclear technology deployment at the site not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

To ensure continuous and resilient operations, the head of an element of the intelligence community carrying out prioritizing and licensing activities under subsection (b) for deployment of advanced nuclear technology for a site identified under subsection (a) may authorize such site to interconnect with the commercial electric grid if the head of the element determines that such interconnection enhances national security.

The head of an element of the intelligence community carrying out prioritizing and licensing activities under subsection (b) for deployment of advanced nuclear technology for a site identified under subsection (a) shall ensure that fuel for the advanced nuclear technologies operated at such site is not subject to obligations (as defined in section 110.2 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulations).

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the officials specified in paragraph (2), shall submit to the President and the congressional intelligence committees a strategy for addressing intelligence gaps relating to—

(A) investment activity by the People’s Republic of China in the biotechnology sector of the United States;

(B) acquisition of intellectual property relating to United States-origin biotechnology by entities of the People’s Republic of China; and

(C) any authorities or resources needed to address the gaps outlined in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

The officials specified in this paragraph are the following:

(A) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(B) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis.

(C) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(D) The Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.

(E) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

(F) The heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.

Concurrent with the submission of the report required by subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a recommendation with respect to whether part 850 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, should be expanded to cover biotechnology.

Section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (division F of Public Law 118–159) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):

(3) Making available a research test bed to private sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment to proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the models.

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

The Director shall establish terms of usage governing researcher access to the test bed made available under subsection (c)(3), with limitations on researcher publication only to the extent necessary to protect classified information or proprietary information concerning third-party models provided through the consent of model vendors.

The Director shall ensure that the test bed made available under subsection (c)(3) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis.

In carrying out subsection (c)(3), the Director shall coordinate with the Secretary of Energy to leverage existing infrastructure and other resources associated with the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource.

In carrying out this section, the Director shall establish such mechanisms as the Director considers appropriate, including potential contractual incentives, to ensure the provision of access to proprietary models by qualified independent third-party researchers if commercial model vendors have voluntarily provided models and associated resources for such testing.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, identify commonly used artificial intelligence systems or functions that have the greatest potential for re-use by intelligence community elements.

Except as explicitly prohibited by a contractual obligation, and to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, for any artificial intelligence system or function identified pursuant to subsection (a), each Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of an element of the intelligence community shall adopt a policy to promote the sharing of any custom-developed code, including models and model weights, whether agency-developed or procured, with other elements of the intelligence community that rely on common artificial intelligence systems or functions.

Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall take such steps as the Chief Information Officer of the element determines appropriate, to ensure that contracts to which the element is a party provide for the retention of sufficient rights to all Federal data and the retention of the rights to any improvement to that data, including the continued design, development, testing, and operation of an artificial intelligence system.

Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall consider contractual terms that protect Federal information used by vendors in the development and operation of artificial intelligence products and services procured by the element, including limitations on the re-use of derived information for products or services sold to foreign governments by such vendors.

Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall include terms in the contracts in which the elements are parties to protect intelligence community data from being used to train or improve the functionality of a vendor’s commercial offerings without express permission from the head.

The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall provide the elements of the intelligence community with model contractual terms for consideration by the heads of those elements to prevent vendor lock-in, as well as the adoption of procurement practices that encourage competition to sustain a robust marketplace for artificial intelligence products and services, including through contractual preferences for interoperable artificial intelligence products and services.

Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall track and evaluate performance of procured and element-developed artificial intelligence by—

(1) documenting known capabilities and limitations of the artificial intelligence system and any guidelines on how the artificial intelligence is intended to be used;

(2) documenting provenance of the data used to train, fine-tune, or operate the artificial intelligence system;

(3) conducting ongoing testing and validation on artificial intelligence system performance, the effectiveness of vendor artificial intelligence offerings, and associated risk management measures, including by testing in real-world conditions;

(4) assessing for overfitting to known test data, ensuring that artificial intelligence developers or vendors are not directly relying on the test data to train their artificial intelligence systems;

(5) considering contractual terms that prioritize the continuous improvement, performance monitoring, and evaluation of effectiveness of procured artificial intelligence;

(6) stipulating conditions for retraining or decommissioning artificial intelligence models; and

(7) requiring sufficient post-award monitoring and evaluation of effectiveness of the artificial intelligence system, where appropriate in the context of the product or service acquired.

In this section, the term use case, with respect to an artificial intelligence system, means the specific mission being performed through the use of an artificial intelligence system.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue guidance to the heads of elements of the intelligence community to ensure consistency and accuracy in each element’s interpretation of the definition of high-impact artificial intelligence systems and high-impact artificial intelligence use cases to apply to each element’s respective missions.

Each head of an element of the intelligence community shall maintain an annual inventory of high-impact artificial intelligence use cases, including detailed information on the specific artificial intelligence systems associated with such uses.

Not less frequently than once each year, each head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the inventory maintained by the head pursuant to paragraph (1).

The Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, issue guidance to ensure elements of the intelligence community utilizing high-impact artificial intelligence systems or executing high-impact artificial intelligence use cases maintain minimum standards for the following:

(1) Whistleblower protections.

(2) Risk management practices and policies.

(3) Performance expectations to ensure high-impact artificial intelligence systems or high-impact artificial intelligence use cases are subject to policies that ensure they continue to perform as expected over time or be discontinued, including—

(A) continuous monitoring;

(B) independent testing by a reviewer or team of reviewers within the element that have not been involved in the development or procurement of such artificial intelligence system; and

(C) cost analyses, supported by a summary of direct costs associated and expected savings, if applicable, relative to existing or feasible human-led alternatives.

(4) Pre-deployment requirements to ensure high-impact artificial intelligence systems or high-impact artificial intelligence use cases document—

(A) the advantages and risks of using such capability, to include appropriate legal and policy safeguards;

(B) the cost of operating such a capability;

(C) a schedule to ensure such capability is periodically reevaluated for efficacy and performance; and

(D) the oversight and compliance mechanisms in place for reviewing the use and output of such capability.

(5) Policies to ensure appropriate human oversight and training.

Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (e);

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

In carrying out subsections (a) and (b), the Director shall ensure that the policies established under such subsections apply to the greatest extent possible to artificial intelligence models generally available to the public in any context in which they are used for an intelligence purpose and hosted in classified environments.

The Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community, or any provider of common concern designated by the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish standards for testing of artificial intelligence models, including common benchmarks and methodologies for the performance of artificial intelligence models across common use cases, including targeting, machine translation, object detection, and object recognition. Benchmarks and methodologies shall establish higher performance standards for any high-impact artificial intelligence use case, including any artificial intelligence system task whose output (directly or indirectly) could serve as an input for a lethal application.

The Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer of the Intelligence Community shall convene the Intelligence Community Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer Council to identify an appropriate computing environment, at a level (or multiple levels) of classification deemed appropriate, for elements of the intelligence community to engage in testing and evaluation of models prior to acquisition.

(2) ; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

In this section, the term intelligence purpose means the collection, analysis, or other mission-related intelligence activity.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence shall issue guidance to the heads of elements of the intelligence community to ensure consistency and accuracy in each element’s interpretation of the definition of high-impact artificial intelligence systems and high-impact artificial intelligence use cases to apply to each element’s respective missions.

The Director shall make such revisions to Intelligence Community Directive 505 (relating to Artificial Intelligence) and other relevant documents as the Director considers necessary to ensure compliance with subsection (c) of section 6702 of such Act, as added by subsection (a).

It is the sense of Congress that the evaluation of training data, methods of labeling data, and model weights pertaining to artificial intelligence systems being considered for use by an element of the intelligence community does not constitute collection by such element of the intelligence community.

The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall revise the interim guidance of the intelligence community entitled Regarding the Acquisition and Use of Foundation Models to include the following:

(1) Guidance stipulating that the consideration by an element of the intelligence community of acquisition of a foundation model should involve consideration of the data upon which the model was trained on. Any element of the intelligence community evaluating whether to acquire a foundation model for a potential intelligence use shall request or otherwise lawfully gather pertinent information on sources of training data and methods of data labeling, including any functions carried out by third party vendors, in order to make informed decisions on what mitigation practices or other relevant dissemination, usage, or retention measures may be applicable to that element’s future adoption of the foundation model under consideration.

(2) Guidance stipulating that each element of the intelligence community shall to the greatest extent practicable avoid use of publicly available models found to contain information obtained unlawfully by a model vendor.

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop a strategy for—

(1) coordinating the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence relating to critical and emerging technologies across the intelligence community; and

(2) the appropriate sharing of such intelligence with other Federal departments and agencies with responsibilities for regulation, innovation and research, science, public health, export control and screenings, and Federal financial tools.

Not later than 30 days after the development of the strategy required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of the strategy.

Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

Immediately upon declassifying, downgrading, or directing the declassification or downgrading of information or intelligence relating to intelligence sources, methods, or activities pursuant to section 3.1(c) of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or any successor order, the Director of National Intelligence, or the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, as delegated by the Director of National Intelligence, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the United States in writing of such declassification, downgrading, or direction.

Each notification required by paragraph (1) shall include a copy of the information that has been, or has been directed to be, declassified or downgraded.

Immediately upon the declassification of information pursuant to section 3.1(d) of Executive Order 13526, or any successor order, the head, or senior official, of a relevant element of the intelligence community, shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the Archivist of the United States in writing of such declassification.

Each notification required by paragraph (1) shall include a copy of the information that has been declassified.

The table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 805 the following:

Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is amended, in the second sentence, by striking not to exceed $300,000.

Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:

Subject to clause (iii), in determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was violated if the individual has demonstrated that a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual.

An individual under clause (i) may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that—

(I) the official making the determination knew of the disclosure; and

(II) the determination occurred within a period such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the determination.

In determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was violated if, after a finding that a disclosure was a contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same security clearance or access determination in the absence of such disclosure.

The Director of National Intelligence shall review and evaluate the feasibility of updating personnel security standards and procedures governing eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information and other controlled access program information and security adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information and other controlled access program information to determine whether individuals who have been retired or otherwise separated from employment with the intelligence community for a period of not more than 5 years and who was eligible to access classified information on the day before the individual retired or otherwise separated, could, as a matter of policy, be granted eligibility by the Director to access classified information as long as—

(1) there is no indication the individual no longer satisfies the standards established for access to classified information;

(2) the individual certifies in writing to an appropriate security professional that there has been no change in the relevant information provided for the last background investigation of the individual; and

(3) an appropriate record check reveals no unfavorable information.

The Director shall conduct an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of subjecting inactive security clearances to continuous vetting and due diligence.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees the findings from the assessment conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).

Chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than September 30, 2028, each covered official shall ensure that the department or agency of the official uses secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified information, including with respect to the location at which the system is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities of the department or agency:

(1) Formulating, developing, and submitting the budget of the department or agency (including the budget justification materials submitted to Congress) under the National Intelligence Program.

(2) Apportioning, allotting, issuing warrants for the disbursement of, and obligating and expending funds under the National Intelligence Program.

(3) Carrying out Federal financial management service functions or related activities of the intelligence community.

The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, may issue a waiver to a head of an element of the intelligence community with respect to a requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of National Intelligence certifies to the congressional intelligence committees that—

(1) one or more of the Federal financial management service functions or related activities of the element under the National Intelligence Program—

(A) are appropriately carried out using a system that does not meet the requirements to protect classified information; and

(B) such use does not represent a significant counterintelligence risk; or

(2) complying with a specified requirement under subsection (a) would result in an increased counterintelligence threat to a classified program or activity.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in making public a report or other information relating to expenditures by an element of the intelligence community, a covered official may modify or omit information relating to such expenditures in a manner necessary to ensure the protection of classified information.

In this section:

The term covered official means the following:

(A) The Secretary of the Treasury.

(B) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(C) Each head of an element of the intelligence community.

(D) Any other head of a department or agency of the Federal Government carrying out a function specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a).

In this section, the term Federal financial management service functions means standard functions, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, that departments and agencies of the Federal Government perform relating to Federal financial management, including budget execution, financial asset information management, payable management, revenue management, reimbursable management, receivable management, delinquent debt management, cost management, general ledger management, financial reconciliation, and financial and performance reporting.

The terms congressional intelligence committees, intelligence community, and National Intelligence Program have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 11 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1126 the following new item:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Director of National Intelligence under the Intelligence Community Management Account that are available until September 30, 2028, the Director may reimburse a covered official for amounts that the official incurred to implement section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a detailed cost estimate associated with the implementation of the requirements under section 1127(a) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

In this subsection, the term covered official has the meaning given that term in section 1127(d) of title 31, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).

Section 7 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–282; 31 U.S.C. 6101 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking or at the end;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting; or; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(3) information that the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines would result in the exposure of classified programs or activities, including such information that could, when combined with other publicly available information, reveal classified programs or activities.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on approvals of interim security clearances or other access to classified intelligence information that does not satisfy the investigative and adjudicative standards established under Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access to classified information) for covered individuals issued during the preceding calendar year. The first report under this paragraph shall include information for each of the calendar years 2017 through the calendar year in which this Act is enacted.

Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) the number of such approvals, disaggregated by sponsoring agency, duration of access, and level of security clearance or access, including access to special access programs or controlled access programs;

(B) the investigative and adjudicative process conducted, if any, for each such level of security clearance or access;

(C) a categorization of the justifications supporting such approvals, and the number of approvals in each category; and

(D) the disposition of such approvals, disaggregated by the number of instances in which access was terminated, continued, or resulted in completion of a process satisfying investigative and adjudicative standards required by Executive Order 12986.

In this section, the term covered individual means an individual who—

(1) is an employee or contractor of the intelligence community; or

(2) has been granted access to the facilities or information of the intelligence community.

Subparagraph (J) of section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended to read as follows:

(J) In this paragraph, the term employee includes a former employee or former contractor if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.

Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(1), by striking or a member of a congressional intelligence committee and inserting a member of a congressional intelligence committee, or, for the purpose of communicating with Congress, the office of legislative affairs or congressional affairs of the employing agency; and

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by striking or a member of a congressional intelligence committee and inserting a member of a congressional intelligence committee, or, for the purpose of communicating with Congress, the office of legislative affairs or congressional affairs of the employing or contracting agency.

Section 3001(j)(1)(A) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)(A)) is amended—

(1) by striking or a supervisor in and inserting, a supervisor in;

(2) by striking or a supervisor of and inserting a supervisor of; and

(3) by inserting, or, for the purpose of communicating with Congress, the office of legislative affairs or congressional affairs of the employing agency, after (or employee designated by the head of that agency for such purpose).

Section 1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (3)—

(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking; or and inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K); and

(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following:

(J) an unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure; or

(C) ; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

The term unauthorized whistleblower identity disclosure means, with respect to an employee or a contractor employee described in paragraph (3), a knowing and willful disclosure revealing the identity or other personally identifiable information of the employee or contractor employee so as to identify the employee or contractor employee as an employee or contractor employee who has made a lawful disclosure described in subsection (b) or (c), but does not include such a knowing and willful disclosure that meets any of the following criteria:

(A) Such disclosure was made with the express consent of the employee or contractor employee.

(B) Such disclosure was made during the course of reporting or remedying the subject of the lawful disclosure of the whistleblower through management, legal, or oversight processes, including such processes relating to human resources, equal opportunity, security, or an Inspector General.

(C) An Inspector General with oversight responsibility for the relevant covered intelligence community element determines that such disclosure—

(i) was unavoidable under section 103H(g)(3)(A)(i) of this Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)(i)), section 17(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)(A)(i)), section 407(b) of title 5, United States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such title;

(ii) was made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; or

(iii) was required by statute or an order from a court of competent jurisdiction.

Subsection (f) of such section is amended to read as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of this section.

To the fullest extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement of this section in a manner that is consistent with the enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.

Subject to paragraph (4), in a case in which an employee of an agency takes a personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) against an employee of a covered intelligence community element as a reprisal in violation of subsection (b) or in a case in which an employee or contractor employee takes a personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) against another contractor employee as a reprisal in violation of subsection (c), the employee or contractor employee against whom the personnel action was taken may, consistent with section 1221 of title 5, United States Code, bring a private action for all appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount not to exceed $250,000, against the agency of the employee or contracting agency of the contractor employee who took the personnel action, in a Federal district court of competent jurisdiction.

Before the employee or contractor employee may bring a private action under paragraph (3), the employee or contractor employee shall exhaust administrative remedies by—

(i) first, obtaining a disposition of their claim by requesting review by the appropriate inspector general; and

(ii) second, if the review under clause (i) does not substantiate reprisal, by submitting to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a request for a review of the claim by an external review panel under section 1106.

The employee or contractor employee may bring a private right of action under paragraph (3) during the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the employee or contractor employee is notified of the final disposition of their claim under section 1106.

Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) in clause (i), by striking Upon and inserting Subject to subparagraph (C)(ii), upon; and

(B) in clause (ii), by striking who reported and all that follows through that complaint or information. and inserting who has submitted an initial written complaint or information under subparagraph (A) confirms that the employee has submitted to the Inspector General the material the employee intends to submit to Congress under such subparagraph.;

(2) in subparagraph (C)—

(A) by inserting (i) after (C); and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

(ii) Upon request of the employee, the Inspector General shall submit the complaint or information directly to the congressional intelligence committees and without transmittal to the Director, within 7 calendar days of the Inspector General making the determination under subparagraph (B), or, if the request is submitted subsequent to that time period, within 7 calendar days of the request.

(B) ; and

(3) in subparagraph (D)—

(A) in clause (ii)—

(i) by inserting (aa) after (I);

(ii) by striking (II) and inserting (bb);

(iii) by striking practices. and inserting practices; or; and

(iv) by adding at the end the following:

(aa) informs the Inspector General that the employee wishes to contact the congressional intelligence committees without furnishing to the Director the statement and notice described in subclause (I)(aa); and

(bb) obtains and follows direction from the Inspector General on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.

(B) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and

(C) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:

(iii) The direction provided to the employee by the Director pursuant to clause (ii)(I)(bb) and by the Inspector General pursuant to clause (ii)(II)(bb) shall be provided within 7 calendar days of the employee expressing the employee’s intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly.

Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) in clause (i), by striking Upon and inserting Subject to subparagraph (C)(ii), upon; and

(B) in clause (ii), by striking who reported and all that follows through that complaint or information. and inserting who has submitted an initial written complaint or information under subparagraph (A) confirms that the employee has submitted to the Inspector General the material the employee intends to submit to Congress under such subparagraph.;

(2) in subparagraph (C)—

(A) by inserting (i) after (C); and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

(ii) Upon request of the employee, the Inspector General shall submit the complaint or information directly to the congressional intelligence committees and without transmittal to the Director, within 7 calendar days of the Inspector General making the determination under subparagraph (B), or, if the request is submitted subsequent to that time period, within 7 calendar days of the request.

(B) ; and

(3) in subparagraph (D)—

(A) in clause (ii)—

(i) by inserting (aa) after (I);

(ii) by striking (II) and inserting (bb);

(iii) by striking practices. and inserting practices; or; and

(iv) by adding at the end the following:

(aa) informs the Inspector General that the employee wishes to contact the congressional intelligence committees without furnishing to the Director the statement and notice described in subclause (I)(aa); and

(bb) obtains and follows direction from the Inspector General on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.

(B) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and

(C) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:

(iii) The direction provided to the employee by the Director pursuant to clause (ii)(I)(bb) and by the Inspector General pursuant to clause (ii)(II)(bb) shall be provided within 7 calendar days of the employee expressing the employee’s intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly.

Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking Upon and inserting Subject to subsection (d)(2), upon; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking who reported and all that follows through that complaint or information. and inserting who has submitted an initial written complaint or information under subsection (b) confirms that the employee has submitted to the Inspector General the material the employee intends to submit to Congress under such subparagraph.;

(2) in subsection (d)—

(A) by striking Upon and inserting the following:

Upon

(A) ; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

Upon request of the employee, the Inspector General shall submit the complaint or information directly to the congressional intelligence committees and without transmittal to the head of the establishment, within 7 calendar days of the Inspector General making the determination under subsection (b), or, if the request is submitted subsequent to that time period, within 7 calendar days of the request.

(B) ; and

(3) in subsection (e)—

(A) in paragraph (2)—

(i) in subparagraph (A), by inserting (i) after (A);

(ii) by striking (B) and inserting (ii);

(iii) by striking practices. and inserting practices; or; and

(iv) by adding at the end the following:

(i) informs the Inspector General that the employee wishes to contact the congressional intelligence committees without furnishing to the head of the establishment the statement and notice described in subparagraph (A)(i); and

(ii) obtains and follows direction from the Inspector General on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.

(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4);

(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

The direction provided to the employee by the head of the establishment pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)(ii) and by the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B)(ii) shall be provided within 7 calendar days of the employee expressing the employee’s intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly.

(C) ; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

Nothing in this subsection may be construed to revoke or diminish any right of an individual provided by section 2303 or 7211 of this title to make a protected disclosure to any congressional committee.

Section 1104(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)(3)), as amended by section 803(a)(1), is further amended—

(1) in subparagraph (J), by striking; or and inserting a semicolon;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (L); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following:

(K) a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination; or

The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to matters arising under section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, develop and issue standard guidelines for personnel of the intelligence community to report and properly document anomalous health incidents.

In developing the standard guidelines required by subsection (a), the Director shall ensure that such standard guidelines are as similar as practicable to guidelines issued by the Secretary of Defense for personnel of the Department of Defense to report and properly document anomalous health incidents.

Not later than 10 days after the date on which the Director issues the standard guidelines required by subsection (a), the Director shall provide the congressional intelligence committees with the standard guidelines, including a statement describing the implementation of such standard guidelines, how the standard guidelines differ from those issued by the Secretary, and the justifications for such differences.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall initiate a review of holdings of the intelligence community regarding anomalous health incidents.

The review initiated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall cover the following:

(A) Reports of anomalous health incidents affecting personnel of the United States Government and dependents of such personnel.

(B) Reports of other incidents affecting personnel of the United States Government that have known causes that result in symptoms similar to those observed in anomalous health incidents.

(C) Information regarding efforts by foreign governments to covertly develop or deploy weapons and technology that could cause any or all symptoms observed in reported anomalous health incidents.

(D) Assessment of the success of the intelligence community in detecting clandestine weapons programs of foreign governments.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall perform a declassification review of all intelligence relating to anomalous health incidents reviewed pursuant to subsection (a).

The Director shall provide for public release of a declassified report that contains all information declassified pursuant to the declassification review required by subsection (b) on the website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The report required by paragraph (1) may include only such redactions as the Director determines necessary to protect sources and methods and information of United States persons.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate—

(1) perform a declassification review of intelligence relating to research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other medical or scientific research center within the People’s Republic of China, on coronaviruses, including—

(A) information relating to Gain of Function research and the intention of this research;

(B) information relating to sources of funding or direction for research on coronaviruses, including both sources within the People’s Republic of China and foreign sources; and

(C) the names of researchers who conducted research into coronaviruses, as well as their current locations of employment;

(2) perform a declassification review of intelligence relating to efforts by government officials of entities of the People’s Republic of China—

(A) to disrupt or obstruct information sharing or investigations into the origins of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic;

(B) to disrupt the sharing of medically significant information relating to the transmissibility and potential harm of SARS–CoV–2 to humans, including—

(i) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United States Government;

(ii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the governments of allies and partners of the United States; and

(iii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United Nations and World Health Organization;

(C) to obstruct or otherwise limit the sharing of information between national, provincial, and city governments within the People’s Republic of China and between subnational entities within the People's Republic of China and external researchers;

(D) to deny the sharing of information with the United States, allies and partners of the United States, or multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization;

(E) to pressure or lobby foreign governments, journalists, medical researchers, officials of the United States Government, or officials of multilateral organizations (including the United Nations and the World Health Organization) with respect to the source, scientific origins, transmissibility, or other attributes of the SARS–CoV–2 virus or the COVID–19 pandemic;

(F) to disrupt government or private-sector efforts to conduct research and development of medical interventions or countermeasures for the COVID–19 pandemic, including vaccines; and

(G) to promote alternative narratives regarding the origins of COVID–19 as well as the domestic Chinese and international response to the COVID–19 pandemic;

(3) provide for public release a declassified report that contains all appropriate information described under paragraphs (1) and (2) and which includes only such redactions as the Director determines necessary to protect sources and methods and information of United States persons; and

(4) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an unredacted version of the declassified report required under paragraph (3).

In this section:

The term covered individual has the meaning given such term in section 989(h) of title 10, United States Code.

The term governments or companies of concern means a government described in subparagraph (A) of section 989(h)(2) of title 10, United States Code, or a company, entity, or other person described in subparagraph (B) of such section.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct counterintelligence briefings for members of the Armed Forces as part of the process required by section 989(c) of title 10, United States Code.

Each briefing provided under subsection (b) shall provide members of the Armed Forces—

(1) with awareness of methods commonly used by governments and companies of concern to solicit and learn from covered individuals sensitive military techniques, tactics, and procedures of the Armed Forces;

(2) recommended practices for covered individuals to avoid a covered activity that could subject the members to civil or criminal penalties;

(3) the contact information for the counterintelligence authorities to whom covered individuals should report attempted recruitment or a related suspicious contact; and

(4) an overview of the prohibition and penalties under subsections (a) and (c) of section 989 of title 10, United States Code.

The Under Secretary may provide the briefings required by subsection (b) during the trainings required by Department of Defense Directive 5240.06 (relating to counterintelligence awareness and reporting), or successor document.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The term covered nation means—

(A) the People’s Republic of China;

(B) the Russian Federation;

(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;

(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

(E) the Republic of Cuba.

The term national has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).

Notwithstanding the Joint Resolution of August 4, 1947 (61 Stat. 756, chapter 482; 22 U.S.C. 287 note), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to a national of a covered nation to be accredited to a United Nations mission or other multilateral international organization in the United States, if the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence, determines that the national—

(1) has committed known or suspected intelligence activities or espionage activities, including activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by the national against the United States or foreign countries that are allies or partners of the United States; or

(2) is a known or suspected intelligence officer.

Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985 (Public Law 98–618; 98 Stat. 3303) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking It is the sense of the Congress and inserting It is the policy of the United States;

(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (d) as subsections (d) through (f), respectively; and

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsections:

(b) The Secretary of State, in negotiating agreements with foreign governments regarding reciprocal privileges and immunities of United States diplomatic personnel, shall consult with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence in achieving the statement of policy in subsection (a).

(c) Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on each foreign government that—

(1) engages in intelligence activities within the United States harmful to the national security of the Untied States; and

(2) possesses numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel accommodations, and facilities within the United States that exceed the respective numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel accommodations, and facilities within such country of official representatives of the United States to such country.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The term covered nation means—

(A) the People’s Republic of China;

(B) the Russian Federation;

(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;

(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

(E) the Republic of Cuba.

Accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of covered nations in the United States may not—

(1) receive diplomatic privileges and immunities for more than 3 consecutive years;

(2) receive diplomatic privileges and immunities for a second 3-year period until after living outside of the United States for not less than 2 years; or

(3) receive diplomatic privileges and immunities for more than 6 total years.

Section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115–31; 22 U.S.C. 254a note) is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The term covered nations means—

(A) the People’s Republic of China;

(B) the Russian Federation;

(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;

(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and

(E) the Republic of Cuba.

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) by striking consular personnel of the Russian Federation and inserting consular personnel of covered nations; and

(B) by striking Russian consular personnel and inserting covered nation personnel;

(3) in subsection (c)(1), by striking consular personnel of the Russian Federation and inserting consular personnel of covered nations;

(4) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);

(5) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection:

In establishing the advance approval requirements described in subsection (c), the Secretary of State shall—

(1) ensure that covered nations request approval from the Secretary of State at least 2 business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of covered nations in the United States;

(2) immediately provide such requests to the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(3) not later than 10 days after approving such a request, certify to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) personnel traveling on the request are not known or suspected intelligence officers; and

(B) the requested travel will not be used for known or suspected intelligence purposes; and

(4) establish penalties for noncompliance with such requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of covered nations in the United States, including loss of diplomatic privileges and immunities.

(5) ; and

(6) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4)—

(A) by inserting for 5 years after the date of the enactment of subsection (d) after quarterly thereafter;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking the number of notifications submitted under the regime required by subsection (b) and inserting the number of requests submitted under the regime required by subsection (b) and the number of such requests approved by the Secretary; and

(C) in paragraph (2), by striking consular personnel of the Russian Federation and inserting consular personnel of covered nations.

Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment may be found or an information may be instituted at any time without limitation for—

(1) a violation of section 951 or a conspiracy to violate such section;

(2) a violation of section 794 or a conspiracy to violate such section; or

(3) a violation of section 1425, if the offense was committed to facilitate a violation of section 951.

The table of sections for chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

Section 19 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note; 64 Stat. 1005) is amended by striking, 793, or 794 and inserting or 793.

Section 113 of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923) is amended—

(1) in subsection (h)(7)(A)—

(A) in clause (i), by redesignating subclauses (I) and (II) as items (aa) and (bb), respectively, and adjusting the margins accordingly;

(B) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subclauses (I) and (II), respectively, and adjusting the margins accordingly;

(C) by striking If any of the information and inserting the following:

If a portion of the information

(C) ; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

Notwithstanding paragraphs (5) and (6), if the classification of information required to be included in the transition plan of a Federal entity prohibits even the public release of a redacted transition plan, as determined by the head of the Federal entity, the Federal entity shall—

(I) notify the NTIA that the entire transition plan must be classified and that even a redacted version cannot be made public; and

(II) classify the transition plan in accordance with the levels of materials contained in the transition plan.

(D) ; and

(2) in subsection (l)—

(A) by striking For purposes of and inserting the following:

For purposes of

(A) ; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or any other provision of this part, each element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) shall be considered a Federal entity and shall be eligible to receive payment from the Spectrum Relocation Fund for any auction-related relocation or sharing costs incurred by the element regardless of the existence of a Government station license.

Section 106 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4336) is amended by adding at the end the following:

In this subsection:

The term congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

The term covered intelligence community elements means the elements described in subparagraphs (A) through (K) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

The President may waive the requirement of a covered intelligence community element to prepare an environmental document with respect to a proposed agency action if—

(A) the President determines that a waiver of such requirement is necessary to protect the United States from a direct national security threat, as identified by the intelligence community; and

(B) the proposed agency action is intended to advance the collection of foreign intelligence or support a covert action of which Congress was previously notified pursuant to section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3093).

Before issuing a waiver under paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification that includes—

(A) the covered intelligence community element for which the waiver is to be issued;

(B) the proposed agency action for which the waiver is to be applied;

(C) the purpose of the proposed agency action; and

(D) a justification of how preparation of an environmental document for the proposed agency action would unduly affect the national security of the United States.

Section 106(a) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4336(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (3), by striking or at the end;

(2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting; or; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

(5) the President issues a waiver with respect to the proposed agency action under subsection (c).

Section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is amended by striking subsections (c) and (d).

Section 6312(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3364 note) is amended by striking In conjunction with each briefing provided under section 1019(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364(c)) and inserting Not later than February 1 each year.

Section 506B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3098) is repealed.

The table of contents of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 506B.

Section 1261 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239) is amended by striking subsection (e).

Section 1033 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3227b) is repealed.

The table of contents of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 1033.

Section 7003 of the Energy Act of 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3372) is repealed.

The table of contents of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 7003.

Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (division M of Public Law 114–113) is repealed.

The table of contents of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 501.

Section 7231 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2331) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (c); and

(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).

Section 7507 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3334s) is amended by striking subsection (e).

Section 108 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6038) is repealed.

The table of contents of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 108.

Section 6705 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by striking and annual briefing; and

(2) by striking subsection (b).

Section 1110 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3240) is repealed.

The table of contents of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 1110.

Section 721(a)(4) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(4)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA), by inserting, facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community, after military installation; and

(2) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by inserting, facility owned or operated by an element of the intelligence community, after military installation.

The amendments made by subsection (a) apply with respect to transactions proposed or pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by the Commission based on accredited laboratories under this section.

The Commission shall develop a program for the acceptance of the results of penetration testing on election systems. The penetration testing required by this subsection shall be required for Commission certification. The Commission shall vote on the selection of any entity identified. The requirements for such selection shall be based on consideration of an entity’s competence to conduct penetration testing under this subsection. The Commission may consult with the National Institute of Standards and Technology or any other appropriate Federal agency on lab selection criteria and other aspects of this program.

Subtitle D of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new part:

The Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall establish an Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Pilot Program for Election Systems (VDP–E) (in this section referred to as the program) to test for and disclose cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election systems.

The program shall be conducted for a period of 5 years.

In carrying out the program, the Commission, in consultation with the Secretary, shall—

(A) establish a mechanism by which an election systems vendor may make their election system (including voting machines and source code) available to cybersecurity researchers participating in the program;

(B) provide for the vetting of cybersecurity researchers prior to their participation in the program, including the conduct of background checks;

(C) establish terms of participation that—

(i) describe the scope of testing permitted under the program;

(ii) require researchers to—

(I) notify the vendor, the Commission, and the Secretary of any cybersecurity vulnerability they identify with respect to an election system; and

(II) otherwise keep such vulnerability confidential for 180 days after such notification;

(iii) require the good faith participation of all participants in the program; and

(iv) require an election system vendor, within 180 days after validating notification of a critical or high vulnerability (as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology) in an election system of the vendor, to—

(I) send a patch or propound some other fix or mitigation for such vulnerability to the appropriate State and local election officials, in consultation with the researcher who discovered it; and

(II) notify the Commission and the Secretary that such patch has been sent to such officials;

(D) in the case where a patch or fix to address a vulnerability disclosed under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I) is intended to be applied to a system certified by the Commission, provide—

(i) for the expedited review of such patch or fix within 90 days after receipt by the Commission; and

(ii) if such review is not completed by the last day of such 90-day period, that such patch or fix shall be deemed to be certified by the Commission, subject to any subsequent review of such determination by the Commission; and

(E) not later than 180 days after the disclosure of a vulnerability under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the vulnerability for inclusion in the database of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures.

Participation in the program shall be voluntary for election systems vendors and researchers.

When conducting research under this program, such research and subsequent publication shall be—

(i) authorized in accordance with section 1030 of title 18, United States Code (commonly known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act), (and similar State laws), and the election system vendor will not initiate or support legal action against the researcher for accidental, good faith violations of the program; and

(ii) exempt from the anti-circumvention rule of section 1201 of title 17, United States Code (commonly known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), and the election system vendor will not bring a claim against a researcher for circumvention of technology controls.

Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to limit or otherwise affect any exception to the general prohibition against the circumvention of technological measures under subparagraph (A) of section 1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code, including with respect to any use that is excepted from that general prohibition by the Librarian of Congress under subparagraphs (B) through (D) of such section 1201(a)(1).

In this subsection:

The term cybersecurity vulnerability means, with respect to an election system, any security vulnerability that affects the election system.

The term election infrastructure means—

(i) storage facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation locations used to support the administration of elections for public office; and

(ii) related information and communications technology, including—

(I) voter registration databases;

(II) election management systems;

(III) voting machines;

(IV) electronic mail and other communications systems (including electronic mail and other systems of vendors who have entered into contracts with election agencies to support the administration of elections, manage the election process, and report and display election results); and

(V) other systems used to manage the election process and to report and display election results on behalf of an election agency.

The term election system means any information system that is part of an election infrastructure, including any related information and communications technology described in subparagraph (B)(ii).

The term election system vendor means any person providing, supporting, or maintaining an election system on behalf of a State or local election official.

The term information system has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.

The term Secretary means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

The term security vulnerability has the meaning given the term in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).

The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following:

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (in this section referred to as the Church Committee) investigated and identified intelligence abuses by certain intelligence community agencies.

(2) In accordance with Senate Resolution 474, 96th Congress, agreed to December 1, 1980, certain Church Committee records are to be made available for public use when such files and records have been in existence for 50 years.

(3) Prior to such public release, the records must undergo archival processing and declassification.

(4) Executive Order 14176 (90 Fed. Reg. 8641) directed the declassification and release of records concerning the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Release of the Church Committee records is similarly consistent with the public interest.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall, in coordination with the heads of such other Federal agencies as the Director deems appropriate and the heads of other entities that have physical access to such records, take steps to prepare for and expedite the required declassification in 2026 of the Church Committee archival files that meet the requirements of Senate Resolution 474, 96th Congress, agreed to December 1, 1980.

The Secretary of Energy may, acting through the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, enter into contracts or other arrangements for goods and services, through the National Laboratories, plants, or sites of the Department of Energy, for the purpose of foreign material acquisition in support of existing national security requirements.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until the date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the use by the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the authority provided by subsection (a).

Section 4502 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2652) is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

The Secretary of Energy, the Administrator, and the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy (referred to in this section as the Director)—

(1) may not admit to any facility described in subsection (c)(3) other than areas accessible to the general public any individual who is a citizen or agent of a covered foreign nation unless the Secretary, the Administrator, or the Director first completes a background review with respect to that individual; and

(2) may not admit to any facility described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (c)(3) other than areas accessible to the general public any individual who is a citizen or agent of a nation on the current sensitive countries list unless the Secretary, the Administrator, or the Director first completes a background review with respect to that individual.

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking the Secretary and all that follows through not, and inserting the Secretary, the Administrator, and the Director may not,;

(B) in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting or the Director after Administrator; and

(C) in paragraph (3)—

(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking Administration (as described in this Act) and inserting Department of Energy;

(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), respectively; and

(iii) by inserting before subparagraph (B), the following new subparagraph:

(A) a national laboratory;

(iii) ; and

(3) in subsection (d)—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting, the Director, after the Secretary; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking Administration (as described in this Act) and inserting Department of Energy.

Section 111(a) of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1510(a)) is amended by striking September 30, 2025 and inserting September 30, 2035.