Taiwan Allies Fund Act

(1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy of more than 23,000,000 people and an important contributor to peace and stability around the world. Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy of more than 23,000,000 people and an important contributor to peace and stability around the world.

(2) The People’s Republic of China has engaged in a years-long campaign to diplomatically isolate Taiwan on the world stage. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in a years-long campaign to diplomatically isolate Taiwan on the world stage.

(3) Since 2013, the Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Honduras, and, most recently in 2024, Nauru have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Since 2013, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Nicaragua, Honduras, and, most recently in 2024, Nauru have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

(4) The People’s Republic of China has used economic and diplomatic intimidation against countries pursuing unofficial relations with Taiwan, including Lithuania, Czechia, and the United States. The People’s Republic of China has used economic and diplomatic intimidation against countries pursuing unofficial relations with Taiwan, including Lithuania, Czechia, and the United States.

(5) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8) states that it is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96–8) states that it is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(6) The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) states that the United States Government should— The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) states that the United States Government should—

(A) support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world; and support Taiwan in strengthening its official diplomatic relationships as well as other partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world; and

(B) consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan. consider, in certain cases as appropriate and in alignment with United States interests, increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan.

(1) advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan’s presence on the global stage, including at international organizations; advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan’s engagement on the global stage, including at international organizations;

(2) promote the preservation and expansion of Taiwan’s official diplomatic relations with countries around the world; promote the preservation and expansion of Taiwan’s official diplomatic relations with countries around the world;

(3) expand Taiwan’s unofficial relations with countries around the world; expand Taiwan’s unofficial relations with countries around the world;

(4) encourage countries with unofficial relations with Taiwan to deepen their engagement; and encourage countries with unofficial relations with Taiwan to deepen their engagement; and

(5) advance the economic development of countries that support democratic partners like Taiwan. advance the economic development of countries that support Taiwan.

Of the amounts made available under the Countering PRC Influence Fund for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, there is authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for each such fiscal year to support Taiwan’s international space. Of the amounts made available under the Countering People’s Republic of China Influence Fund for each of fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, there is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each such fiscal year to support Taiwan’s international space.

Amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) may be used in countries that— Amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) may be used in countries that—

(1) maintain official relations with Taiwan or have meaningfully strengthened unofficial relations with Taiwan; maintain official relations with Taiwan or the Secretary of State certifies to Congress have meaningfully strengthened unofficial relations with Taiwan;

(2) have been subject to coercion or pressure by the People’s Republic of China due to their relations with Taiwan; and have been subject to coercion or pressure by the People’s Republic of China due to their relations with Taiwan; and

(3) lack the economic or political capability to effectively respond to such coercion or pressure by the People’s Republic of China without the support of the United States. lack the economic or political capability to effectively respond to such coercion or pressure by the People’s Republic of China without the support of the United States.

Amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) may be used to support any of the following activities in the countries described in subsection (b): Amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) may be used to support any of the following activities in the countries described in subsection (b) if such activities have a direct linkage to the goal of supporting Taiwan’s international engagement, are aligned with clear and justifiable United States counter-PRC strategic imperatives that guide all programs funded by the Counter PRC Influence Fund, and support United States national interests :

(1) To support health initiatives that provide alternatives to the Health Silk Road. To support initiatives that provide alternatives to the People’s Republic of China health, digital, and energy initiatives.

(2) To build the capacity and resilience of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countering the influence and propaganda of the People’s Republic of China. To build the capacity and resilience of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations in countering the malign influence of the People’s Republic of China.

(3) To diversify supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China. To diversify supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, particularly to mitigate vulnerabilities to PRC economic coercion.

(4) To provide alternatives to People’s Republic of China development assistance and project financing. To provide alternatives to People’s Republic of China development assistance and project financing and to expose the People’s Republic of China’s failure to deliver on development promises or other negative aspects of PRC development assistance.

(5) To advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international fora and multilateral organizations. To support Taiwan’s official or unofficial diplomatic presence abroad or advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international fora and multilateral organizations.

(6) To work with the private sector to provide United States or allied alternatives to People’s Republic of China information and communications technology infrastructure and components. To provide United States or allied alternatives to People’s Republic of China information and communications technology infrastructure and components, in coordination with the private sector, as appropriate.

A country described in subsection (b) may not receive more than $5,000,000 of funds made available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) during any fiscal year. A country described in subsection (b) may not receive more than $5,000,000 of funds made available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) during any fiscal year.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, and the heads other relevant Federal agencies, shall coordinate and carry out activities described in subsection (c). The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall coordinate and carry out activities described in subsection (c).

Amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) may be considered foreign assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for purposes of making available the administrative authorities in that Act and may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made available for any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to carry out the purposes of this section, except that such funds shall remain available until expended. Amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) may be considered foreign assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for purposes of making available the administrative authorities in that Act and may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made available for any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to carry out the purposes of this section, except that such funds shall remain available until expended.

In order to maximize cost efficiency and eliminate duplication, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, should work with the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan to ensure coordination with relevant parties of Taiwan, as appropriate. In order to maximize cost efficiency and eliminate duplication, the Secretary of State should ensure coordination with relevant counterparts in Taiwan, as appropriate.

The Secretary of State should convey to relevant parties of Taiwan, as appropriate, that Taiwan should contribute commensurate assistance to countries described in subsection (b). The Secretary of State shall, to the maximum extent practicable, encourage cost-sharing arrangements with Taiwan for the assistance described in subsection (b) or otherwise complementary assistance.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on activities described in this section that were carried out during the preceding fiscal year. Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on activities described in this section that were carried out during the preceding fiscal year.

Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include— Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include—

(i) with respect to each activity described in subsection (c)— with respect to each activity described in subsection (c)—

(I) the amount of funding for the activity; the amount of funding for the activity;

(II) the goal to which the activity relates; and the goal to which the activity relates; and

(III) an assessment of the success of the activity to meet the goal to which the activity relates; and an assessment of the success of the activity to meet the goal to which the activity relates; and

(ii) with respect to this subsection— with respect to this subsection—

(I) the amount of funding for the activity provided by Taiwan during the preceding year, if any; and the amount of funding for the activity provided by Taiwan during the preceding year, if any; and

(II) an assessment of whether the funding described in subclause (I) is commensurate with funding provided by the United States. an assessment of whether the funding described in subclause (I) is commensurate with funding provided by the United States.

Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance not provided using amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a). Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance not provided using amounts available pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a).

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(7) To strengthen the capacity of partner countries to address and reduce the impacts of foreign malign influence operations, propaganda, and other asymmetric informational activities originating from the People’s Republic of China.

(8) To mitigate a country’s specific vulnerabilities to the People’s Republic of China’s coercion over the country’s relationship with Taiwan.