FLEETS Now Act

(1) The People’s Republic of China (hereafter in this section referred to as the PRC) has deployed unfair and non-market-oriented practices in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors to achieve a long-term dominant position in the shipbuilding ecosystem. In response, the United States Trade Representative launched an investigation under title III of the Trade Act of 1974 in April 2024, and reaffirmed its allegations in a notice of proposed actions in February 2025.

(2) The PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy uses the opacity of China’s business ecosystem to channel commercial activities—including foreign shipbuilding orders—into upgrading its naval industrial base. By integrating commercial and military production at shared shipyards, the PRC enables the transfer of capital, technology, personnel, and supply chains to China’s defense industrial base, strengthening military capabilities through civilian contracts.

(3) The PRC frames its shipbuilding and maritime sectors as strategic industries that must be targeted to build economic, technological and military power. This targeting necessarily means the displacement of foreign firms from existing markets, and taking new markets as they present, which diminishes competition. The United States has not taken sufficient action to counter the PRC and protect United States enterprises.

(4) By achieving dominant market positions, the PRC exercises increasing influence over global supply, pricing, and access to goods and services.

(5) The PRC’s targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors creates dependencies on China, increasing risk and reducing supply chain resilience. The PRC seeks to displace foreign competitors throughout the maritime value chain in domestic and foreign markets, increasing the world’s dependence on the PRC for products, services, and technology.

(6) International dependencies on the PRC increases risks (potential disruptions, whether natural, accidental, or politically motivated) for individual firms and their workers, for economic sectors, and supply chain resilience. The PRC has demonstrated its willingness to weaponize dependencies for the purpose of economic coercion.

(7) The PRC’s control over Chinese economic actors in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors enables China to direct and influence commercial behavior in pursuit of market dominance in ways that run counter to fair competition and market-oriented principles.

(8) The PRC’s industrial plans identify a matrix of mechanisms that are used to achieve market dominance, including government financial support, barriers for foreign firms, consolidation policies, measures associated with forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft, state-led investments, and government procurement.

(9) As a result of the PRC’s market distortion, Chinese maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors accrue a wide range of non-market advantages, such as artificially low costs or preferential supply from China’s non-market excess capacity, including in steel, China’s lack of effective labor rights, and China’s control over digital logistics services.

(10) The PRC’s direct intervention in the shipbuilding market makes ships built in the United States and elsewhere commercially less competitive. Less than one percent of new commercial ships are built in the United States and domestic shipbuilding is almost exclusively for military use.

(11) In 2024, the PRC accounted for 53.3 percent of the global shipbuilding industry and the China State Shipbuilding Corporation built more commercial ships by tonnage in 2024 than the entire United States shipbuilding industry has built since the end of World War II.

(12) The state-owned shipbuilding conglomerates like China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and China State Shipbuilding Corporation are China’s largest commercial shipbuilding corporations and the primary entities responsible for the buildup of the People’s Liberation Army Navy into the world’s largest navy enabling the PRC to increase its capacity to undermine United States national security interests.

(13) The shipbuilding capacity of the United States has been weakened by decades of neglect, leading to a contraction of a once vibrant domestic maritime workforce while simultaneously empowering our adversaries, eroding United States national security, and reducing American jobs in the maritime sector.

(14) Increasing domestic shipbuilding capacity is essential to restoring America’s maritime strength and self-sufficiency. This will require coordinated action across procurement policy, capital investment, supplier resilience, and workforce development.

(15) According to America’s Maritime Action Plan from February 2026, the United States does not have the capacity necessary to scale up the domestic shipbuilding industry to the rate required to meet national priorities.

(16) For decades, the United States strategic position and shipbuilding industrial capacity have been weakened, in part, by cumbersome Government procurement processes, a lack of strategic support for construction of commercial vessels in domestic shipyards, and the degradation of Federal financial investment in the Maritime Industrial Base.

(17) Strengthening the United States maritime sector requires leveraging international and industry partnerships to align trade policies to enhance investment in the United States maritime sector. By creating clear pathways for foreign direct investments in United States shipyards, suppliers, and maritime infrastructure, the United States can expand domestic capacity while reinforcing relationships abroad.

(18) Currently, foreign firms are severely disadvantaged in competing with the resources of the Chinese state, resulting in lost sales, under-investment in capacity, diminished ability to attract financing, and lost jobs and lower wages.

(19) Foreign companies, including firms based in many United States-allied countries purchase 75 percent of the ships built at China’s dual-use shipyards, funneling billions of dollars in revenue and transferring key technologies into the People’s Liberation Army naval industrial base.

(20) The United States does not have a single agency or department charged with designing and implementing industrial shipbuilding policy. As a result, there is no single official charged with protecting and expanding the domestic shipbuilding industry in the United States. This creates inefficiency in reinvigorating the United States shipbuilding industry and confusion when engaging international partners about joint strategies for diversifying shipbuilding supply chains.

(21) The President’s Maritime Action Plan outlines a strategy for reclaiming America’s maritime strength, ensuring the Nation can defend its interests and ferry its trade. In implementing the Maritime Action Plan, the United States will modernize its procurement processes and streamline regulations to accelerate shipbuilding and reduce costs.

The term allied country has the meaning given such term in section 2350f(d) of title 10, United States Code.

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

The term deck-plate professional means a skilled worker who operates directly on the production floor as a skilled tradesperson with specialized expertise related to a ship’s systems and functionality.

The term foreign country of concern has the meaning given the term covered nation in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.

The term unreasonable refusal to deal has the meaning given that term for purposes of section 7(d) of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (46 U.S.C. 41104 note).

The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 is amended—

(1) in section 1402(3) (22 U.S.C. 9601(3))—

(A) by striking subparagraph (A); and

(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) through (G) as subparagraphs (A) through (F), respectively; and

(2) in section 1412(f) (22 U.S.C. 9612(f)), by adding at the end the following:

(4) Harbors or ports (as such terms are defined in section 3 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153)) and related infrastructure.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal agencies and departments the Secretary determines relevant, shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on—

(1) companies or entities with formal or informal financial relationships with—

(A) the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry; or

(B) the China State Shipbuilding Corporation; and

(2) the business practices of such companies and entities.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the following:

(1) A description of each current and former subsidiary of the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry and the China State Shipbuilding Corporation.

(2) Any trading practices of any such entities that are subject to review by the United States Trade Representative for being unreasonable, discriminatory, or violating trade agreements.

(3) The degree and extent of direct involvement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China in the governance, strategic direction, planning, and commercial operations of—

(A) the China Ocean Shipping Company Shipping Heavy Industry;

(B) the China State Shipbuilding Corporation; and

(C) the Chinese shipbuilding industry.

(4) A description of each shipyard in China that is producing warships for the People’s Liberation Army Navy or producing dual-use commercial ships, including ferries and barges, that may be used by the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

(5) An indication of which such shipyards are conducting business with non-People’s Republic of China foreign entities and potentially thereby facilitating the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

It is the policy of the United States to develop a domestic capacity to produce ships for both commercial and military application independent of supply chains that include materials sourced from the People’s Republic of China. Such policy shall be given effect, among other things, through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with allies and partners of the United States where appropriate, that includes—

(1) relevant knowledge transfer to and skillset development of a shipbuilding labor force in the United States;

(2) securing direct investment in United States shipyards by allies and partners; and

(3) the development of a coherent long-term strategy to diversify shipbuilding supply chains and expand domestic shipbuilding capacity, incorporating all relevant Federal agencies and departments.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall designate an individual as the primary point of contact in the United States Government for purposes of—

(1) attracting international shipbuilding investment opportunities in the United States;

(2) leading cooperation with the governments of foreign countries on international shipbuilding supply chain diversification; and

(3) leading engagement on behalf of the United States Government for coordination of international shipbuilding industries in a manner that creates supply chain resilience and protects the national security interests of the United States.

Section 9 of the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973 (22 U.S.C. 2655a) is amended to read as follows:

There is authorized to be in the Department of State an Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space Affairs, who shall be responsible to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs for matters pertaining to space, oceans and maritime diplomacy, polar affairs, environmental quality, freshwater, fisheries, wildlife and wildlife trafficking, conservation, and such other related duties as the Secretary may from time to time designate.

In addition to the responsibilities described under subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space Affairs shall maintain continuous observation and coordination of all matters pertaining to oceans and maritime diplomacy, fisheries, natural resource conservation, and outer space in the conduct of foreign policy, including, as appropriate, the following:

(1) Developing United States policy on global environmental security issues with respect to oceans, fisheries, the Antarctic region, waste and global pollution, and water and other natural resource management and conservation.

(2) Representing the Department in bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving the law of the sea, including—

(A) freedom of navigation, overflight, and other lawful uses of the ocean;

(B) maritime security;

(C) United States maritime zones, including the United States extended continental shelf;

(D) marine science;

(E) the sustainable management and protection of marine habitats and resources;

(F) marine pollution; and

(G) maritime claims and boundaries.

(3) Leading United States engagement on Antarctica and in international oceans agreements and conventions with foreign governments and international organizations, to promote solutions that advance United States national security, economic, and environmental interests.

(4) Coordinating the development of policies and programs to conserve and manage economically important ecosystems, including, forests, wetlands, drylands, and coral reefs.

(5) Developing policies and programs to address international threats to natural resources, such as illicit trade, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, wildlife trafficking, and illegal logging and associated trade.

(6) Developing and implementing United States foreign policy related to air, water and soil pollution and risks to human health and the environment caused by the transboundary movement of hazardous chemicals and waste and other forms of pollution to promote environmental security, with trade partners and in multilateral institutions.

(7) Representing the Department in bilateral and multilateral engagements including organizations, institutions, and negotiation of international agreements on related issues.

(8) Developing policies and programs, in coordination with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Commerce, and other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, to support partnerships between the United States and international and private industry partners in the development of infrastructure and policies that expand economic growth in outer space, including—

(A) countering malign efforts by foreign adversaries and other actors that threaten United States interests in civil and commercial space; and

(B) expanding access to foreign markets for United States commercial industry, including by encouraging reforms that reduce barriers to trade and cooperation with United States civil and commercial space actors.

(9) Leading bilateral and multilateral engagements related to civil and commercial space activities, resilient space services, burden sharing, and other matters related to international space law and diplomacy and other United States international obligations and commitments.

(10) Leading United States Government engagement with international Global Navigation Satellite Systems providers to ensure compatibility and encourage interoperability of civil global navigation satellite services on United States-based global positioning systems, including through the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems.

(11) Leading Department efforts to implement international arrangements and promote cooperation on Earth observation satellite systems.

(12) Leading Department engagement in multilateral and bilateral forums on international space policy, space law, and commercial and civil treaties or agreements.

(13) Leading Department efforts on transparency in space by maintaining the official United States space object registry and promoting best practices for safe operations in space, preservation of the space environment, space traffic coordination, and space situational awareness.

(14) Leading Department efforts to align foreign space law, regulatory, and policy frameworks with United States-endorsed models, approaches, and best practices.

(15) At the direction of the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and the Secretary of State, represent the United States in international maritime diplomacy matters, including—

(A) the creation and operation of the Allied Maritime Framework under section 206 of the FLEETS Now Act;

(B) the development of the report under section 103; and

(C) leading United States engagement in the Maritime Group of Nations under section 207 of the FLEETS Now Act.

(16) Authoring any reports produced by the Department which examine the maritime claims and boundaries of coastal countries and assessing their consistency with international law.

(17) Performing such other duties as the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs may from time to time designate.

On the date of the enactment of the FLEETS Now Act, the individual serving as the Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs on the day before such date of enactment shall be the Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space Affairs.

Any subsequent appointment of an individual to the position of Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space Affairs shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Secretary shall establish a Bureau of Water, Environment, and Space Affairs, which shall perform such functions related to space, oceans, environmental quality, fisheries, wildlife, wildlife trafficking, and conservation affairs as the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs may prescribe.

The Assistant Secretary for Water, Environment, and Space Affairs shall be the head of the Bureau of Water, Environment, and Space Affairs.

It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State should initiate an exchange visitor program of technical shipbuilding expertise to increase shipbuilding knowledge, training, experience, and expertise in the American shipbuilding workforce.

Section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (11), by striking and at the end;

(2) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting; and; and

(3) by inserting at the end the following:

(13) interchanges and visits between the United States and other countries of marine engineers, naval architects, electrical engineers, deck-plate professionals, marine surveyors, shipyard infrastructure analysts, quality assurance and quality control personnel, shipyard project managers, and other experts related to the shipbuilding industry until the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this paragraph.

The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Chair of the Federal Maritime Commission, detail to countries described in subsection (b) personnel from the Division for Trade Policy and Negotiations of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs for the purpose of investigating—

(1) unfair shipping practices, including price-fixing, market manipulation, or unreasonable refusal to deal;

(2) specific actions by foreign governments to deny port of entry to United States-flagged vessels;

(3) flags of convenience to determine if lower safety, labor, and environmental standards in foreign countries create unfavorable shipping conditions for United States trade;

(4) anticompetitive agreements between ocean carriers and marine terminal operators for potential antitrust issues; and

(5) mapping the financial relationships of shipping companies of the People’s Republic of China, including the Ocean Alliance.

The personnel described in subsection (a) shall be detailed to diplomatic and consular posts in countries that meet each of the following criteria:

(1) The country is among the top 5 countries globally by ship registry size and maintains an open registry, allowing foreign-owned vessels to register under the flag of such country without a residency requirement (also known as a flag of convenience policy).

(2) The country is among the top 15 countries globally with respect to not less than 2 of the following criteria:

(A) Shipbuilding, as measured by tonnage as a percentage of global total.

(B) Number of citizens or nationals who are merchant mariners.

(C) Number of commercially owned ships greater than 1,000 gross weight tonnage.

Section 707(b) of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9903) is amended by inserting after paragraph (11) the following new paragraph:

(12) Information about unfair business practices in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors in each applicable country or region, including—

(A) price-fixing;

(B) market manipulation;

(C) unreasonable refusal to deal (as such term is defined for purposes of section 7(d) of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (46 U.S.C. 41104 note)); and

(D) anticompetitive agreements between ocean carriers and marine terminal operators.

Section 7031(b)(2) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 510) is amended by inserting and investments in maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors after allocation practices).

The President, acting through the individual designated pursuant to section 202 and in coordination with other relevant agencies and departments, shall engage allied countries to develop a shared framework to enhance collective capacity to design, produce, and maintain military and civilian ships, through—

(1) enhancing information exchange between such countries regarding such design, production, and maintenance;

(2) expanding procompetitive industrial collaboration with respect to such ships; and

(3) strengthening the marine industries and the shipbuilding industries in allied countries.

The framework required in subsection (a) shall include—

(1) the establishment of a mechanism to—

(A) ensure countries participating in the framework can access reciprocal ports and shipping support during crises and conflicts;

(B) co-develop best-in-class design principles for the construction of ships;

(C) collaborate, on a reciprocal basis, on the construction, repair, interoperability, and other capabilities of new ships to reduce costs;

(D) establish guiding principles for production line sequencing and supply chain management;

(E) coordinate Cabinet or Minister-level recommendations to drive down the production costs of ships and accelerate the delivery of ships, consistent with relevant laws in the relevant countries;

(F) establish a process for determining specific ship types or industry niches that are best suited for allied cooperation, including icebreakers, support ships, oilers, tankers, liquified natural gas carriers, undersea vessels, research vessels, and dual-fuel ships; and

(G) develop a mechanism to incentivize financial investments from foreign sources and remove barriers to foreign direct investment in shipbuilding;

(2) the establishment of a joint workforce-development program between participating shipyards and partner networks engaged in the production of ships for the purpose of training, information sharing, and the exchange of technical advisors;

(3) the establishment of a mechanism to develop and share research and development and leverage innovation to promote sustainability and mutual benefit;

(4) an agreement among countries participating in the framework to procure ships and ship components from shipyards identified by the participants as shipyards with specialized capabilities and experience in ship production; and

(5) an agreement among countries participating in the framework to prevent leakage of dual-use technologies to companies connected to the military of the People’s Republic of China.

The Secretary of State shall seek to establish a group, to be known as the Maritime Group of Nations, to coordinate regulatory and commerce policies to facilitate a new maritime multimodalism for commercial shipping.

The Secretary of State should invite to the Maritime Group of Nations appropriate counterparts from the governments of countries that meet each of the following criteria:

(A) The country is of significant importance for the purposes of establishing and advancing the objectives of the Maritime Group of Nations, as determined by the Secretary of State.

(B) The country additionally is among the top 15 countries globally with respect to at least two of the following criteria:

(i) Shipbuilding, as measured by tonnage as a percentage of global total.

(ii) Number of citizens or nationals who are merchant mariners.

(iii) Number of commercially owned ships greater than 1,000 gross weight tonnage.

The Maritime Group of Nations established under subsection (a) may not include a foreign country of concern.

The Maritime Group of Nations established under subsection (a) should consider the following:

(1) Supporting the establishment of maritime prosperity zones across a diverse geography, including areas outside traditional coast shipbuilding and ship repair centers, to—

(A) incentivize and leverage national private capital and investment by allied countries in the maritime industries and waterfront communities; and

(B) strengthen industrial base capacity and readiness through shipbuilding, workforce development, and expanded manufacturing incentives.

(2) Supporting the implementation of a coordinated, reciprocal fee on foreign-built vessels, to—

(A) provide consistent funding to strengthen the merchant marine enterprise; and

(B) support investments in commercial shipbuilding, fleet expansion, industrial base resilience, and maritime workforce development.

(3) Developing standardized reciprocal trade agreements that—

(A) would ensure fair competition; and

(B) reduce dependency on adversarial supply chains.

(4) Coordinating a collective position with respect to regulations and guidelines issued by the International Maritime Organization that protects domestic shipbuilding industries.

(5) Implementing and contributing to the exchange visitor program authorized by the amendments made by section 204.

The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Ambassador to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States mission to the United Nations to urge the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations, and the members of its Council, to—

(1) revise the International Maritime Organization’s Net-Zero Framework, specifically to—

(A) exclude any limits on conventional crude or diesel, liquified natural gas, or any other type of marine propulsion technology and instead champion an energy all approach that does not restrict or constrain current or breakthrough fuel types;

(B) remove any financial penalties, carbon taxes, or multilateral funds which are used to help nations decarbonize;

(C) eliminate penalties on liquified natural gas, recognize biofuels as viable marine fuels, and support industry-led advances in alternative fuels and other technologies without creating undue advantage or disadvantage to certain fuels or technologies through regulation;

(D) withdraw or phase out of any regional shipping emissions reduction schemes, including the Emissions Trading System of the European Union;

(E) support an opt-in model with respect to the rules of such organization; and

(F) remove any net-zero 2050 targets the President determines unreasonable;

(2) advance the candidacy of United States citizens into senior-level positions within the—

(A) International Maritime Organization Assembly;

(B) International Maritime Organization Council; and

(C) main committees of the International Maritime Organization, including—

(i) the Maritime Safety Committee;

(ii) the Marine Environment Protection Committee;

(iii) the Legal Committee;

(iv) the Technical Cooperation Committee;

(v) the Facilitation Committee; and

(vi) any Sub-Committee;

(3) advance the candidacy of a United States citizen to fill the position of Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization;

(4) combat the anti-competitive practices of the People’s Republic of China by investigating and regulating the deliberate use of policies and practices to give domestic shipbuilding industries a competitive advantage over foreign rivals (also known as industrial targeting);

(5) advocate for the consistent enforcement of existing safety and technical rules to ensure foreign-flagged vessels meet International Maritime Organization standards without requiring unilateral United States regulations; and

(6) de-link United States domestic environmental requirements from international certificates to reduce compliance friction for United States shipyards.