(a) Short title
This Act may be cited as the STRATEGIC Act of 2024.
(b) Table of contents
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Section 2. Definitions
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
Except as provided in sections 125(b), 210, 211, 303, 313, 323, 411, and 452, part IV of subtitle B of title IV, and title VI, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) PRC
The term PRC means the People’s Republic of China.
(3) Secretary
The term Secretary means the Secretary of State.
Section 101. Definitions
Section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 611) is amended—
(1) by striking the matter preceding subsection (a) and inserting the following: In this Act:;
(2) in each of subsections (a), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (k), (l), (m), (n), and (o), by striking the semicolon at the end and inserting a period;
(3) in subsection (b), by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C);
(4) by striking subsections (c) and (d);
(5) by redesignating subsections (a), (b), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) as paragraphs (11), (6), (7), (5), (16), (15), (8), (17), (2), (18), (14), (12), and (13), respectively, arranging such paragraphs in numerical order, and moving each such paragraph 2 ems to the right;
(6) by inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated, the following:
(1) The term agent of a foreign principal —
(A) means any person who—
(I) acts as an agent, representative, employee, servant, or in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of—
(aa) a foreign principal; or
(bb) a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal; and
(II) directly or through any other person—
(aa) engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal;
(bb) acts within the United States as a public relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee, or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal;
(cc) within the United States, solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal; or
(dd) within the United States represents the interests of such foreign principal before any agency or official of the Government of the United States; or
(ii) agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds himself or herself out to be, whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship, a person described in clause (i); and
(B) does not include—
(i) any news or press service or association organized under the laws of the United States or of any State or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States if such entity—
(I) is at least 80 percent beneficially owned by, and its officers and directors, if any, are, citizens of the United States; and
(II) is not owned, directed, supervised, controlled, subsidized, or financed, and none of its policies are determined, by any foreign principal or by any agent of a foreign principal required to register under this Act; or
(ii) any newspaper, magazine, periodical, or other publication for which there is on file with the United States Postal Service information in compliance with section 3685 of title 39, United States Code, published in the United States, solely by virtue of any bona fide news or journalistic activities, including the solicitation or acceptance of advertisements, subscriptions, or other compensation if it meets the conditions set forth in subclause (I) and (II) of clause (i).
(7) by inserting after paragraph (2), as redesignated, the following:
(3) The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(4) The term documentary material includes the original or any copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, chart, or other document, or data compilations stored in or accessible through computer or other information retrieval systems, together with instructions and all other materials necessary to use or interpret such data compilations, and any product of discovery.
(8) by inserting after paragraph (8), as redesignated, the following:
(9) The term investigation means any inquiry conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in any violation of this Act.
(10) The term Lobbying Disclosure Act exemption means the exemption set forth in section 3(h).
(a) In general
Section 3 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 613) is amended—
(1) in the matter preceding subsection (a), by inserting, except as provided in subsection (i) after principals -; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
(1) In general
The exemptions under subsections (d)(1), (d)(2), and (h) shall not apply to any agent of a foreign principal that is organized under the law of or has its principal place of business or residence in 1 of the identified countries listed in paragraph (2).
(2) Identified countries
The countries described in this paragraph are:
(A) the People’s Republic of China.
(B) the Russian Federation.
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(1) In general
The Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General of the United States, may propose the addition or deletion of countries listed in section 3(i)(2) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, as added by subsection (a).
(2) Submission
Any proposal described in paragraph (1)—
(A) shall be submitted to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) shall become effective upon enactment of a joint resolution of approval as described in subsection (c).
(1) In general
For purposes of subsection (b), the term joint resolution of approval only means a joint resolution—
(A) that does not have a preamble;
(B) that includes in the matter after the resolving clause the following: That Congress approves the modification of countries relating to the treatment of certain exemptions under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, as submitted by the Secretary on ____; and section 3(i) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 613) is amended by ______., the blank spaces being appropriately filled in with the appropriate date and the amendatory language required to add or delete 1 or more countries from the list of countries described in section 3(i) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, as added by subsection (a)(2), respectively; and
(C) the title of which is as follows: Joint resolution approving modifications to countries relating to the treatment of certain exemptions under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended..
(A) Senate
A resolution described in paragraph (1) that is introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) House of Representatives
A resolution described in paragraph (1) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(d) Sunset
This section and the amendments made by this section shall terminate on October 1, 2028.
(a) Increased criminal penalties
Section 8 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 618) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, except that in the case of a violation of subsection (b), (e), or (f) of section 4 or of subsection (g) or (h) of this section the punishment shall be a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months and inserting $200,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, except that in the case of a violation of subsection (b), (e), or (f) of section 4 or of subsection (g), (h), or (i) of this section the punishment shall be a fine of not more than $15,000 or imprisonment for not more than 6 months; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
(i) Congressional notification
It shall be unlawful for any agent of a foreign principal registered under this Act to willfully fail to disclose before or during any meeting with a Member of Congress (as defined in section 3 of the Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1602) or a member of the staff of a Member or committee of Congress that such agent is registered under this Act.
Section 104. Foreign agents registration civil enforcement
Section 8 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 618), as amended by section 103, is further amended by adding at the end the following:
(i) In general
Any person who is required to register under this Act and fails to file a timely or complete registration statement in accordance with section 2(a) shall be subject to a civil fine of not more than $10,000 for each such violation, without regard to the state of mind of such person.
(ii) No fines paid by foreign principals
If a person is subject to a civil fine under clause (i), the civil fine may not be paid, directly or indirectly, by a foreign principal.
(B) Supplements
Any person who is required to file a supplement to a registration statement under section 2(b) and fails to file a timely or complete supplement in accordance with such section shall be subject to a civil fine of not more than $1,000 for each such violation, without regard to the state of mind of such person.
(C) Failure to remedy deficient filings
Any person who is required to file a registration statement under this Act, receives notice pursuant to subsection (g) that the registration statement filed by the person is deficient, and knowingly fails to remedy the deficiency within 60 days after receiving such notice shall, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of such knowing failure to remedy the deficiency, be subject to a civil fine of not more than $200,000, depending on the extent and gravity of the violation.
(D) Other violations
Any person who knowingly fails to comply with any other provision of this Act shall, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of such knowing failure to comply, be subject to a civil fine of not more than $200,000, depending on the extent and gravity of the violation.
(2) Use of fines
All fines collected under this subsection shall be used to defray the cost of enforcing this Act.
Section 106. Effective date
The amendments made by this subtitle shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress
The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(2) Contract
The term contract means any agreement to acquire, by purchase, lease, or barter, property or services for the direct benefit or use of either of party to the agreement.
(3) Covered PRC person
The term covered PRC person means a person that, according to unclassified or publicly available information—
(A) is a current or former member of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China;
(B) is currently, or was formerly, employed in any security or intelligence service of the People’s Republic of China;
(C) is, or is affiliated with, an entity identified by the Secretary of Defense under section 1260H(a) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) as a Chinese military company operating directly or indirectly in the United States;
(D) is, or is affiliated with, any entity that is included in the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of by the Department of the Treasury;
(E) is, or is affiliated with, the United Front Work Department of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or any subsidiary or affiliate organization, or is otherwise involved in activities that support the goals of the United Front Work Department;
(F) is an employee of any entity owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(G) is or was an employee of any entity on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations;
(H) is or was an employee of an entity organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China that—
(i) is in noncompliance with the auditing rules and standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; or
(ii) has been sanctioned by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;
(I) is a think tank directed or funded by the Chinese Communist Party or any entity of the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(J) is any state key laboratory, including any defense science and technology state key laboratory identified in the 2022 report of the China Aerospace Studies Institute of the Department of the Air Force entitled The PRC State & Defense Laboratory System Part Two: Defense S&T Key Lab Directory that is—
(i) working on critical emerging technologies, including advanced computing, advanced engineering materials, advanced gas turbine engine technologies, advanced manufacturing, advanced and networked sensing and signature management, advanced nuclear energy technologies, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and robotics, biotechnologies, communication and networking technologies, directed energy, financial technologies, human-machine interfaces, hypersonics, networked sensors and sensing, quantum information technologies, renewable energy generation and storage, semiconductors and microelectronics, or space technologies and systems; and
(ii) affiliated with, controlled, or administratively managed by an agency of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, or the Polar Research Institute of China; or
(K) is, or was affiliated with, any entity owned or controlled by an agency or instrumentality of any person described in any of subparagraphs (A) through (J).
(4) Covered united states institution
The term covered United States institution means any public or private institution or, if a multicampus institution, any single campus of such institution, in any State—
(A) that is legally authorized within such State to provide a program of education beyond secondary school;
(B) that provides a program for which the institution awards a bachelor’s degree (or provides not less than a 2-year program which is acceptable for full credit toward such a degree) or a more advanced degree;
(C) that is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association; and
(D) to which the Federal Government extends Federal financial assistance (directly or indirectly through another entity or person), or that receives support from the extension of Federal financial assistance to any of the institution’s subunits.
(5) Critical technologies
The term critical technologies has the meaning given such term in section 721(a)(6) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)(6)).
(6) Foreign source
The term foreign source means—
(A) a foreign government, including an agency of a foreign government;
(B) a legal entity, governmental or otherwise, created solely under the laws of a foreign state or states;
(C) an individual who is not a citizen or a national of the United States or a trust territory or protectorate thereof; and
(D) an agent, including a subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign legal entity, acting on behalf of a foreign source.
(7) Freely associated states
The term Freely Associated States means the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.
(8) Gift
The term gift means any gift of money or property.
(9) Restricted or conditional gift or contract
The term restricted or conditional gift or contract means any endowment, gift, grant, contract, award, present, or property of any kind that includes provisions regarding—
(A) the employment, assignment, or termination of faculty;
(B) the establishment of departments, centers, research or lecture programs, or new faculty positions;
(C) the selection or admission of students; or
(D) the award of grants, loans, scholarships, fellowships, or other forms of financial aid restricted to students of a specified country, religion, sex, ethnic origin, or political opinion.
(10) State
The term State includes, in addition to the several States of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Freely Associated States.
(11) State key laboratory
The term state key laboratory means an institution in the People’s Republic of China that has been categorized as a national laboratory or state key laboratory by, and receives funding, policy, developmental guidance, or administrative support from, the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(1) In general
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall prescribe regulations to prohibit a covered United States institution from accepting a gift from, or entering into a contract with, a covered PRC person if—
(i) the value of the gift or contract equals or exceeds $1,000,000; or
(ii) including the gift or contract, the institution would receive, directly or indirectly, more than 1 gift from or enter into more than 1 contract, directly or indirectly, with the same covered PRC person, the aggregate of which, during a period of 2 consecutive calendar years, would equal or exceed $1,000,000; and
(B) the gift or contract—
(i) relates to research, development, or production of critical technologies and provides the covered PRC person making the gift or providing the contract—
(I) access to regulated or unregulated United States-developed information, technology, or data in the possession of the institution; or
(II) rights, including early access, to intellectual property created by or in the possession of the institution; or
(ii) except as provided under paragraph (2), is a restricted or conditional gift or contract.
(2) Exception for operating agreements for branches of covered united states institutions
The Secretary shall include, in the regulations prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1), an exception to the prohibition under such paragraph for a contract between a covered United States institution and a branch of such institution located in the People’s Republic of China that provides funding for the operation of such branch.
(A) In general
A covered United States institution that accepts a gift or enters into a contract in violation of subsection (b) shall be fined—
(i) for the first such violation, not more than $250,000;
(ii) for the second such violation, not more than $500,000; and
(iii) for the third such violation or a subsequent such violation, not more than the greater of—
(I) $1,000,000; or
(II) the total value of the gift or contract, as the case may be.
(i) Establishment of fund
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund, consisting of such amounts as may be transferred to the fund pursuant to clause (ii).
(ii) Transfer of amounts
The Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer to the fund established under clause (i), from the general fund of the Treasury, an amount determined by the Secretary to be equivalent to the amount received in the general fund and attributable to fines collected under subparagraph (A) during fiscal year 2024 and during each fiscal year thereafter.
(iii) Availability and use of amounts
Amounts in the fund established under clause (i) shall be available, as provided in advance in appropriations Acts, to the Secretary for fiscal year 2025 and for each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this section.
(2) Requirement to return gift or terminate contract
A covered United States institution that accepts a gift or enters into a contract in violation of subsection (b) shall return the gift or terminate the contract, as the case may be.
(A) In general
A covered United States institution that accepts a gift or enters into a contract in violation of subsection (b) is ineligible to receive any grant or other funding from the Department of State during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which the institution accepts such gift or enters into such contract, as the case may be.
(B) Restriction on grantees doing business with violators
A person that receives a grant or other funding from the Department of State may not, as a condition of the grant or funding, conduct any business with a covered United States institution that accepts a gift or enters into a contract in violation of subsection (b) during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which the institution accepts such gift or enters into such contract, as the case may be.
(B) Elements
Each report submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii) shall—
(i) be accompanied by materials submitted by the covered United States institution that accepted a gift or entered into a contract in violation of subsection (b) disclosing—
(I) the covered PRC person that provided the gift or with which the contract was entered into;
(II) the nature of the gift or contract; and
(III) the purpose of the gift or contract; and
(ii) include a detailed justification for why the gift or contract does not result in—
(I) harm to the national security of the United States; or
(II) any restrictions on academic freedom or freedom of expression within the United States.
(d) Guidance
The regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall—
(1) provide guidance to covered United States institutions with respect to complying with this section; and
(2) provide a specific point of contact through which covered United States institutions can communicate with the Department of State on matters relating to compliance with this section.
(1) In general
A covered United States institution shall submit to the Secretary a disclosure report relating to any gift or contract received from or entered into with a foreign source described in paragraph (5) that includes—
(A) the aggregate dollar amount or value of the gift or contract;
(B) a detailed description of the nature and purpose of the gift or contract, including—
(i) whether such gift or contract relates to the research, development, or production of critical technologies and, if so, a description of the nature of such relationship; and
(ii) whether it is a restricted or conditional gift or contract and, if so, a description of the restrictions or conditions on the gift or contract;
(C) in the case of a gift or contract that relates to the research, development, or production of critical technologies or that is a restricted or conditional gift or contract, a justification for why the gift or contract does not result in—
(i) harm to the national security of the United States; or
(ii) any restrictions on academic freedom or freedom of expression within the United States;
(D) the name and verified address of the foreign source;
(E) a description of any due diligence conducted by such institution before accepting the gift or entering into the contract; and
(F) an assurance that such institution will—
(i) maintain a true copy of the gift or contract agreement until the later of—
(I) the date that is 4 years after the date on which such institution entered into such agreement; or
(II) the date on which such agreement terminates;
(ii) produce a true copy of the gift or contract agreement upon the request of the Secretary during an audit of the compliance of the institution with this section or another institutional investigation; and
(iii) ensure that all gifts and contracts from the foreign source are translated into English by a third party that is unaffiliated with the foreign source or institution.
(A) In general
The Secretary shall provide the information described in subparagraph (B) to the chairperson or ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not later than 15 days after receiving a request from the chairperson or ranking member for such information.
(B) Information described
The information described in this subparagraph, with respect to any disclosure report submitted under paragraph (1) is—
(i) any information required to be included in the report; and
(ii) a justification for any decision by the Secretary with respect to the gift or contract that is the subject of the report.
(3) Public information
The Secretary shall make public, in a searchable database, with respect to each gift or contract that is the subject of a disclosure report submitted under paragraph (1)—
(A) the aggregate dollar amount or value of the gift or contract;
(B) a summary of the purpose of the gift or contract, including—
(i) whether the gift or contract relates to the research, development, or production of critical technologies and, if so, a description of the nature of such relationship; and
(ii) whether it is a restricted or conditional gift or contract and, if so, a description of the restrictions or conditions on the gift or contract; and
(C) with respect to the foreign source from which the gift was received or with which the contract was entered into—
(i) in the case of a foreign source that is an individual, the primary professional affiliation of the individual; and
(ii) in the case of a foreign source that is an entity, the name and verified address of the entity.
(4) Condition
A gift received from, or a contract entered into with, a foreign source described in paragraph (5) may not be disclosed to the Department of State or to the chairperson or ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, or publicly reported, as anonymous.
(5) Foreign sources described
A foreign source described in this paragraph is a foreign source that is—
(A) the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including an agency of such government;
(B) a legal entity (governmental or otherwise) created solely under the laws of the People’s Republic of China;
(C) an individual who is a citizen or a national of the People’s Republic of China; or
(D) an agent, including a subsidiary or affiliate of a foreign legal entity, acting on behalf of—
(i) the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic of China; or
(ii) an entity or individual described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
(1) In general
Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of 7 years, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—
(A) describes steps taken during the period described in paragraph (2) to implement this section;
(B) includes information or recommendations to improve the implementation of this section; and
(C) includes any other information the Secretary considers relevant.
(2) Period described
The period described in this paragraph is—
(A) in the case of the first report required by paragraph (1), the 2-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) in the case of any subsequent such report, the 1-year period preceding submission of the report.
(A) In general
The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but (subject to subparagraph (B)) may include a classified annex.
(B) Material required to be unclassified
The Secretary shall include all information on foreign donations received by covered United States institutions in the unclassified portion of the report required by paragraph (1).
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered organization
The term covered organization means any United States think tank that—
(A) receives at least $2,500 in funding from the Department in a single fiscal year;
(B) has significant participation in more than 3 Department-hosted events in a fiscal year that relate to a subject or purpose for which the covered source of funding was provided to the covered organization; or
(C) hosts an event, panel, presentation, or meeting with any Department official at the Office Director level or above more than 3 times in a fiscal year on a subject or purpose for which the covered source of funding was provided to the covered organization.
(2) Foreign governmental entity
The term foreign governmental entity means—
(A) any department, agency, or other entity of a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level;
(B) any governing party or coalition of a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level;
(C) any entity majority-owned or majority-controlled by a foreign government at the national, regional, or local level; or
(D) any company, economic project, cultural organization, exchange program, or nongovernmental organization that is more than 33 percent owned or controlled by the government of such country, or their advisors, consultants, or representatives.
(3) Think tank
The term think tank means a stand-alone institution, organization, corporation, or group that studies public policy issues with the primary objective of providing information, ideas, and recommendations to United States Government entities regarding the development and implementation of policy.
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and promulgate regulations requiring covered organizations to submit an annual disclosure to the Under Secretary of State for Management that describes—
(A) any funding, cooperative research or staffing agreements, or joint projects received from or executed with the covered sources of funding specified in paragraph (2) the purpose or subject of which relates to a topic such covered organizations engage on with the Department; and
(B) any practices or processes undertaken by a covered organization to ensure that its research agenda or products are not influenced by foreign donors.
(2) Covered sources of funding
The sources of funding referred to in paragraph (1) are foreign governmental entities and political parties from the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the Russian Federation.
(c) Report
Not later than 120 days after the effective date of the regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (b), the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes—
(1) the status of implementing such regulations and any challenges or obstacles to implementation;
(2) the offices within the Department responsible for implementing the regulations; and
(3) any recommendations to improve upon such regulations.
(a) Exclusion of Government of the People’s Republic of China from certain cultural exchanges; required reviews
Section 108A of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:
(3) For purposes of this section, the term foreign government does not include the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(1) ; and
(2) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:
(1) In general
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the STRATEGIC Act of 2024, and every 3 years thereafter, subject to the exception in paragraph (3), the Secretary shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that contains a review of each educational or cultural exchange program approved in accordance with this section to ensure such programs continue to adhere to the purposes set forth in section 101.
(2) Contents
The report required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) information, including agendas or itineraries, of activities carried out pursuant to programs authorized under this section during the covered reporting period; and
(B) with respect to each cultural exchange program, a written assessment and determination by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State of the regional bureau responsible for the country or countries in which the educational or cultural exchange takes place regarding whether the program continues to adhere to the purposes set forth in section 101, based on the information collected pursuant to subparagraph (A) and other relevant information jointly submitted by such officials.
(A) In general
For any program that takes place within a country that is a United States ally or close strategic partner and has been approved in accordance with this section, the Department of State, following the submission of the second report required under paragraph (1), may place such program on a list of programs authorized under this Act that the Secretary determines, in 2 consecutive reports submitted pursuant to this subsection, have demonstrated a track record of full compliance with the purposes set forth in section 101. The list identifying such programs shall be referred to in this paragraph as the MECEA White List.
(B) MECEA white list requirements
The MECEA White List shall be—
(i) submitted as an addendum to the review required under this section; and
(ii) reviewed not less frequently than every 6 years.
(C) Exception to review
The review requirement described in paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to any program that is included on the MECEA White List.
(D) Countries ineligible for white list
The MECEA White List shall not include trips or exchanges to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Nicaragua, or the Russian Federation.
(4) Rule of construction
The Secretary is not required to provide advanced approval of a specific or individual trip or activity if such trip or activity is undertaken as part of a program reviewed and approved in accordance with this section.
(d) Remediation and termination
If the Secretary determines that a program is no longer in compliance with the purposes set forth in section 101, the Secretary—
(1) shall make all efforts to work with the foreign government with whom the agreement for such program has been made on remediation to ensure the program is in full compliance with the purposes set forth in section 101; and
(2) if the efforts described in paragraph (1) fail to ensure such compliance, is authorized to suspend or terminate such program.
(b) Reporting requirements with respect to participation by United States entities in cultural exchange programs involving the People’s Republic of China
The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108A the following:
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that State and local entities in the United States and other organizations and individuals in the United States who sponsor, carry out, or otherwise participate in cultural, educational, or economic exchange programs with the People’s Republic of China should adopt measures to facilitate rigorous oversight of such programs and corresponding activities conducted pursuant to such programs, including compliance with the oversight requirements described in this section, as applicable.
(b) Initial certification to Congress
Not later than 30 days before entering into an agreement to establish or reestablish any exchange program that involves the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Secretary shall certify to the appropriate congressional committees that—
(1) establishing or reestablishing such program is in the national interests of the United States;
(2) such program will adhere to the purposes set forth in section 101; and
(3) the Department of State has established mechanisms requiring each United States entity supporting or carrying out such program to submit to the Department of State, not later than October 30 of each year, a report that includes, with respect to all programs in which executive branch employees or nongovernmental employees participated in the most recently concluded fiscal year—
(A) the total number of cultural exchange activities conducted by such entity pursuant to section 108A;
(B) a description and purpose of each such activity;
(C) a detailed agenda or itinerary for each such activity;
(D) the total number and agency affiliations of the participants of each such activity;
(E) any indication of whether any of the participants during the reporting period participated in another activity authorized under section 108A that involves the People’s Republic of China during the preceding 2-year period; and
(F) a summary of any feedback that was collected on a voluntary basis from participants in an activity authorized under section 108A, including any actions or behavior by the People’s Republic of China that potentially undermine the purposes of set forth in section 101; and
(4) the Department of State has established mechanisms requiring each United States entity supporting or carrying out such program to submit to the Department of State, not less frequently than annually, a report that includes, with respect to all programs in which legislative branch employees participate—
(A) the total number of cultural exchange activities conducted by the entity pursuant to section 108A;
(B) a description and purpose of each such activity;
(C) a detailed agenda or itinerary for each such activity;
(D) the total number and congressional affiliations of the participants of each such activity;
(E) any indication of whether any of the participants during the reporting period participated in another activity authorized under section 108A that involves the People’s Republic of China during the preceding 2-year period; and
(F) a summary of any feedback that was collected on a voluntary basis from participants in, or observers of, an activity authorized under section 108A, including any actions or behavior by the People’s Republic of China that potentially undermines the purposes set forth in section 101.
(1) In general
Not later than 1 year after establishing or reestablishing a cultural exchange program described in subsection (b), and annually thereafter through September 30, 2029, the Secretary shall submit a certification to the appropriate congressional committees that indicates whether—
(A) the continuation of such exchange program is in the national interests of the United States, including a justification for such assessment;
(B) the program is adhering to the purposes set forth in section 101, including a justification for such assessment; and
(C) the mechanisms described in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) provide the Department of State sufficient transparency and oversight of such program and its activities, and an explanation of such mechanisms.
(2) Failure to certify
If the Secretary fails to certify that all of the requirements described under paragraph (1) have been met with respect to a cultural exchange program described in subsection (b), the Secretary shall—
(A) suspend such program until the Secretary is able make such a certification; or
(B) terminate the corresponding agreement described in subsection (b).
(1) In general
The Secretary shall include, with the annual certification required under subsection (c), a detailed summary of the reports received pursuant to paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (b) from United States entities that are carrying out or otherwise participating in a cultural exchange program that involves the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(2) Matters to be included
The summary required under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the reporting period—
(A) the total number of cultural exchange programs conducted;
(B) the total number of participants in such cultural exchange programs;
(C) a list of the agency that employs each such participant;
(D) an overview of such cultural exchange programs, including the inclusion of not fewer than 3 sample itineraries or agendas and illustrative examples of activities in which participants engaged;
(E) an assessment of whether such cultural programs comply with purposes set forth in section 101, including a description of any noticeable deviations from such purposes;
(F) a description of all actions taken by the Department of State to remediate deviations from such purposes; and
(G) a detailed rationale for continuing each such program despite any deviations described in such summary.
(3) Form of report
The summary required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
(e) Failure of United States entity To report
The Secretary shall promulgate regulations to disqualify any United States entity from carrying out any activities associated with a cultural exchange program described in subsection (b) if such entity fails to comply with the reporting requirements described in subsection (b)(4) until the sooner of—
(1) 1 year after the first day of such disqualification; or
(2) the date on which such entity is in full compliance with the reporting requirements described in subsection (b)(4).
(1) Notification requirement
Any legislative branch employee who participates in an activity covered by an agreement described in subsection (b) with the People’s Republic of China shall notify the congressional entities listed in paragraph (2)—
(A) not later than 10 days before the beginning of such activity, of the dates of travel, the agenda or itinerary of such activity as of the date of submission, and an indication of whether the employee has participated in an activity covered by such an agreement during either of the preceding 2 calendar years; and
(B) not later than 10 days after the end of such activity, of the final agenda or itinerary relating to such activity.
(2) Congressional entities described
The congressional entities listed in this paragraph are—
(A) the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate;
(B) the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(D) the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives;
(E) the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives; and
(F) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(3) Monitoring
In order to monitor and evaluate activities covered by an agreement described in subsection (b) to ensure compliance with the purposes set forth in section 101, United States diplomats shall be permitted to observe activities in which—
(A) executive branch employees participate; or
(B) legislative branch employees participate, with the concurrence of such legislative branch employees.
(g) Rulemaking
The Secretary shall promulgate regulations to carry out this section.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) CCP
The term CCP means the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) Fund
The term Fund means the Countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund established under subsection (b).
(3) Malign influence
The term malign influence, with respect to the Government of the PRC and the CCP, includes acts conducted by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, that—
(A) undermine a free and open international order;
(B) advance an alternative, repressive international order that—
(i) bolsters the hegemonic ambitions of the Government of the PRC and the CCP; and
(ii) is characterized by coercion and dependency;
(C) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the United States or of other countries; or
(D) undermine the economic security of the United States or of other countries, including by promoting corruption and advancing coercive economic practices.
(1) Establishment
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund, which—
(A) shall be known as the Countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund; and
(B) shall consist of such amounts as may be appropriated or otherwise made available to the Fund pursuant to paragraph (2).
(c) Notification; consultation
Amounts in the Fund—
(1) shall be subject to the notification requirements under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1); and
(2) may not be obligated without prior consultation with—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(1) Coordinator
The Secretary shall designate an existing senior official of the Department of State at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b)(2).
(2) Duties
The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—
(A) annually identify specific strategic priorities for using amounts in the Fund, such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming within which such amounts are to be concentrated, in accordance with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this section;
(B) coordinate and approve all programming conducted using amounts in the Fund, based on an assessment that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Government of the PRC and the CCP (including specific activities or policies advanced by the Government of the PRC or the CCP), pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies;
(C) ensure that all approved programming—
(i) bears a sufficiently direct nexus to acts by the Government of the PRC or the CCP described in subsection (a)(3); and
(ii) adheres to the requirements described in subsection (e); and
(D) conduct oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (b)(2) to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, to advance activities that align with the efforts described in subsection (e).
(3) Interagency coordination
The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1), in coordinating and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), shall seek—
(A) to conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and
(B) to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming functions in concert with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence and activities of the Government of the PRC or the CCP.
(4) Assistant coordinator
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate a senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist and consult with the senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1), particularly with respect to such assistance handled by USAID.
(e) Countering malign influence
In this section, countering malign influence through the use of amounts in the Fund shall include efforts—
(1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP;
(2) to support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of, and increase transparency regarding, the negative impact of activities and initiatives of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, and entities acting on their behalf, including the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative, associated initiatives, and other economic initiatives with strategic or political purposes, and coercive economic practices;
(3) to counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf;
(4) to encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
(5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the PRC;
(6) to expose foreign influence operations and propaganda of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, and entities acting on their behalf;
(7) to counter efforts by the CCP to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models, including its model of a state-dominated cyber and digital ecosystem;
(8) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to silence, intimidate, or exact reprisal against individuals outside of the PRC’s internationally recognized sovereign borders, including members of diaspora populations, such as political opponents, repressed religious or spiritual practitioners, marginalized ethnic community members, civil society activists, human rights defenders, researchers, and journalists;
(9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC technology offerings which could provide the Government of the PRC undue access to, or influence over, global data flows or sensitive information and compete with problematic PRC efforts to leverage or make gains in the development of advanced and emerging technologies;
(10) to counter PRC activities that directly enable critical supply chain monopolization or other monopolistic practices;
(11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make inroads into the nuclear energy sectors of countries to the detriment of United States national security, strategic, and nonproliferation interests; and
(12) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, and entities acting on their behalf to undermine the democratic processes and institutions of United States allies and partners.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Officials
The term officials means 1 or more individuals who are employed directly or through a contractual arrangement by the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development.
(2) Private event
The term private event means any organized workshop, conference, forum, summit, or other gathering that is primarily organized and financially sponsored by an organization, business, or other entity that is not part of the United States Government, a foreign government, or a multilateral institution.
(b) Notification requirement
Not later than 15 days before officials attend a private event held outside the United States involving the participation of an individual or entity on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Secretary or the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a notification to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(1) the name, position, and relevant department or agency of such officials;
(2) the name, organizers, and dates of the private event;
(3) the names of all specially designated nationals who will be attending the private event; and
(4) a certification and associated justification that the participation of the officials in a private event alongside specially designated nationals is in the national interest of the United States.
(c) Limitation on use of funds
No Federal funds may be used to support any private event held outside the United States that—
(1) promotes commercial engagement, including with the United States private sector; and
(2) includes the participation of specially designated nationals or blocked persons.
(a) Appropriate committees of Congress
In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(8) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
(9) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
(10) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a determination, including a detailed justification, of whether the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party, or any component or official of such Department, meets the criteria for the application of sanctions pursuant to—
(A) section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 10102);
(B) section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note);
(C) section 7 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76);
(D) Executive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain persons engaged in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities); or
(E) Executive Order 13848 (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; relating to foreign interference in United States elections).
(2) Form
The determination required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(a) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall compile and publish in the Federal Register a list of foreign talent recruitment programs of the People’s Republic of China.
(b) Annual review and revision
Not less frequently than annually, the Secretary shall—
(1) review and revise the list compiled pursuant to subsection (a); and
(2) publish such revised list in the Federal Register.
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes United States climate-related engagements with the PRC, including—
(A) all dialogues, working groups, and bilateral or multilateral climate-related engagements with the PRC;
(B) all United States and PRC entities participating in collaborative projects on climate-related issues resulting from United States climate-related diplomatic engagements, agreements, or initiatives with the PRC;
(C) all joint economic projects related to United States-PRC diplomatic engagements, agreements, or initiatives related to climate; and
(D) all subnational climate-related diplomacy facilitated by the United States Government or resulting from United States-PRC climate-related diplomatic engagements, agreements, or initiatives, including—
(i) the United States, States, local governments, academic or research institutions, think tanks, commercial entities, or other organizations participating in such initiatives; and
(ii) PRC national or provincial government entities, academic or research institutions, think tanks, commercial entities, or other organizations participating in such initiatives.
(2) Form of report
The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
(b) Prohibition on climate-Related exemptions from application of United States sanctions, export controls, FARA registration, and other regulations and statues
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, climate-related engagement may not, on its own, form the basis of any decision to grant an exemption, approval, allowance, or exception from—
(1) any statutory or regulatory actions or requirements related to sanctions, export controls, foreign agent registration or lobbying disclosure requirements; or
(2) any other United States statutory and regulatory requirements pertaining to the PRC.
(a) Restrictions for senior PRC officials and members of the People’s Liberation Army
The Secretary may not issue a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall deny entry to, the United States of—
(1) senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party, including the Politburo, the Central Committee, and delegates to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party;
(2) spouses and children of any senior official described in paragraph (1);
(3) members of the cabinet of the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(4) active duty members of the People’s Liberation Army of China; or
(5) applicants from PRC universities that have a Memorandum of Understanding (referred to in this paragraph as MOU) or other research or academic exchange agreement with a United States institution of higher education, and are seeking to study or work in the United States pursuant to such an agreement, unless—
(A) the United States university has submitted such MOU or similar agreement for a security review by the Secretary of State and other relevant Federal agencies; and
(B) the Secretary of State, in coordination with other relevant agencies, has determined such MOU or similar agreement—
(i) has sufficient safeguards against illicit knowledge and technology transfer to the PRC; and
(ii) does not facilitate foreign malign influence.
(b) Applicability
The restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply during any fiscal year in which the Director of National Intelligence certifies to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the Government of the PRC has ceased sponsoring, funding, facilitating, and actively working to support efforts to infringe on the intellectual property rights of citizens and companies of the United States.
(a) International narcotics control strategy report
Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended—
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking March 1 and inserting June 1; and
(2) in paragraph (8)(A)(i), by striking pseudoephedrine and all that follows through chemicals) and inserting chemical precursors used in the production of methamphetamine that significantly affected the United States.
(1) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) Appropriate committees of congress
The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(i) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(iii) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(B) China
The term China means the People’s Republic of China.
(C) DEA
The term DEA means the Drug Enforcement Administration.
(2) China’s class scheduling of fentanyl and synthetic opioid precursors
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Attorney General shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an unclassified written report, with a classified annex, that includes—
(A) a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of China to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors, such as 4–Aminopyridine, to controls;
(B) a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge the Government of China to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in China;
(C) a detailed description of cooperation by the Government of China to address the role of the Chinese financial system and Chinese money laundering organizations in the trafficking of fentanyl and synthetic opioid precursors;
(D) an assessment of expected impact that the designation of principal corporate officers of Chinese financial institutions for facilitating narcotics-related money laundering would have on Chinese money laundering organizations; and
(E) an assessment of whether the Trilateral Fentanyl Committee, which was established by the United States, Canada, and Mexico during the January 2023 North American Leaders’ Summit, is improving cooperation with law enforcement and financial regulators in Canada and Mexico to combat the role of Chinese financial institutions and Chinese money laundering organizations in narcotics trafficking.
(3) Establishment of dea offices in china
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Attorney General shall jointly provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified briefing regarding—
(A) outreach and negotiations that have been undertaken by the United States Government with the Government of China aimed at securing the approval of the Government of China to establish United States Drug Enforcement Administration offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou, China; and
(B) additional efforts that have been undertaken to establish new partnerships with provincial-level authorities in China to counter the illicit trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and their precursors.
(c) Prioritization of identification of persons from the People’s Republic of China
Section 7211 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2311) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
(A) Defined term
In this paragraph, the term person of the Peoples Republic of China means—
(i) an individual who is a citizen or national of the People’s Republic of China; or
(ii) an entity organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(B) In general
In preparing the report required under paragraph (1), the President shall prioritize, to the greatest extent practicable, the identification of persons of the People’s Republic of China involved in the shipment of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, fentanyl precursors, precursors for fentanyl analogues, pre-precursors for fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, and equipment for the manufacturing of fentanyl and fentanyl-laced counterfeit pills to Mexico or any other country that is involved in the production of fentanyl trafficked into the United States, including—
(i) any entity involved in the production of pharmaceuticals; and
(ii) any person that is acting on behalf of any such entity.
(C) Termination of prioritization
The President shall continue the prioritization required under subparagraph (B) until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the People’s Republic of China is no longer the primary source for the shipment of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, fentanyl precursors, precursors for fentanyl analogues, pre-precursors for fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, and equipment for the manufacturing of fentanyl and fentanyl-laced counterfeit pills to Mexico or any other country that is involved in the production of fentanyl trafficked into the United States.
(B) ; and
(2) in subsection (c), by striking the date that is 5 years after such date of enactment and inserting December 31, 2030.
(d) Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act
Section 7212 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2312) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking or at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
(3) the President determines has knowingly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, an activity or transaction that has materially contributed to opioid trafficking; or
(4) the President determines—
(A) has received any property or interest in property that the foreign person knows—
(i) constitutes or is derived from the proceeds of an activity or transaction described in paragraph (1); or
(ii) was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate such an activity or transaction;
(B) has knowingly provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, including through the provision of goods or services in support of—
(i) any activity or transaction described in paragraph (1); or
(ii) any foreign person described in paragraph (1); or
(C) is or has been owned, controlled, or directed by any foreign person described in paragraph (1) or subparagraph (A) or (B), or has knowingly acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, such a foreign person.
(e) Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states
The President shall—
(1) impose one or more of the sanctions described in section 7213 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2313) with respect to each agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code) that the President determines—
(A) has engaged in, or attempted to engage in, an activity or transaction that has materially contributed to opioid trafficking; or
(B) has provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, (including through the provision of goods or services in support of) any activity or transaction described in subparagraph (A); or
(2) impose the sanction described in section 7213(a)(6) of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2313(a)(6)) on each foreign person the President determines—
(A) is a senior official of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state described in paragraph (1); or
(B) is or has been owned, controlled, or directed by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state described in paragraph (1), or has knowingly acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, such a foreign state.
Section 121. Report on violations of American Diplomatic Corps privileges and immunities
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(1) a detailed description of each case when United States diplomats had their privileges and immunities (as set forth in the Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961) were violated while serving in the PRC; and
(2) a review of efforts undertaken by the Department of State to mitigate or otherwise respond to such violations of United States diplomats’ privileges and immunities.
(a) In general
Not later than March 1, 2024, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that details all official meetings, conferences, events, activities, or travel within the United States organized or participated in by PRC diplomatic missions in the United States that were approved by or notified to the Office of Foreign Missions.
(b) Elements
The report required under subsection (a) shall include—
(1) the date, time, and location of the engagement;
(2) the purpose and nature of the engagement, including any official meetings, conferences, events, or activities organized or participated in by the PRC diplomatic missions;
(3) the format of the engagement, including in-person, on-site, virtually, or any other format that was approved by or notified to the Office of Foreign Missions;
(4) the identities and official positions of all individuals involved in the engagement, including members of the PRC diplomatic missions and host organizations;
(5) a detailed description of the topics, matters, or issues discussed or addressed during the engagement;
(6) any agreements, arrangements, or memoranda of understanding reached during the engagement;
(7) any security or legal concerns raised or addressed as a result of the engagement;
(8) a summary of the Department of State’s evaluation of the potential impact of the engagement on United States national security, foreign policy, and economic interests;
(9) any actions or measures taken by the Department of State to address concerns or mitigate risks related to the engagement; and
(10) any other relevant information deemed necessary by the Secretary.
(c) Form
The report required under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered school
The term covered school means a public or private elementary school or secondary school in the United States that receives Federal funds.
(2) Elementary school; secondary school
The terms elementary school and secondary school have the meanings given such terms in section 8101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).
(b) In general
A foreign mission of the PRC in the United States may not engage in any activity described in subsection (c) with a covered school unless United States missions in the PRC have comparable access to educational institutions in the PRC.
(c) Activities described
Activities described in this subsection are—
(1) providing financial support to a covered school;
(2) offering educational materials, textbooks, or curriculum resources to a covered school;
(3) organizing a seminar, lecture, or other event at a covered school;
(4) conducting political propaganda or promoting the interests of the Chinese Communist Party, the Government of the PRC, or affiliated groups in any form at a covered school;
(5) establishing or funding a Confucius Institute or similar language or cultural entity at a covered school;
(6) coordinating a visit or exchange of students, teachers, or administrators of a covered school to the PRC or with the Government of the PRC or entities or members of the Chinese Communist Party; and
(7) any other activity that may compromise the academic independence and objectivity of elementary and secondary school education in the United States.
(1) Reporting
Any covered school that discovers any attempt by a foreign mission of the PRC to engage in an activity described in subsection (c) at the covered school shall immediately report such attempt to the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(A) In general
The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, may impose appropriate sanctions, including the sanctions described in subparagraph (B), with respect to any foreign mission of the PRC that has engaged in an activity described in subsection (c) with a covered school.
(B) Sanctions described
The sanctions described in this paragraph—
(i) diplomatic protests;
(ii) restrictions on the travel and activities of diplomatic personnel of the PRC;
(iii) revocation or restriction of diplomatic privileges and immunities for such personnel;
(iv) expulsion of such personnel; and
(v) any other measures that the Secretary deems necessary to protect the academic independence and objectivity of elementary and secondary school education in the United States.
(e) Congressional oversight
Not later than 14 days after any attempt by a foreign mission of the PRC to engage in an activity described in subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit a report describing such attempted engagement to the appropriate congressional committees, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(a) Defined term
In this section, the term critical and emerging technologies means the technologies listed on the critical and emerging technologies list published by the National Science and Technology Council at the Office of Science and Technology Policy, as amended by subsequent updates to such list.
(b) Establishment
The Secretary shall establish an Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (referred to in this section as the Office), which shall be located within the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
(c) Leadership
The Office shall be headed by a Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (referred to in this section as the Special Envoy), who shall—
(1) be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;
(2) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
(3) report to the Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
(d) Membership
The Office may include representatives, or expert detailees from key Federal agencies or research and technology-focused fellowship programs, as determined by the Special Envoy and with the consent of the Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, in coordination with appropriate senior officials of such agencies.
(e) Functions
The Office shall—
(1) establish, in coordination with relevant bureaus, offices, and other Federal agencies, an interagency security review process for proposals regarding United States Government-funded international collaboration on critical and emerging technologies and associated research;
(2) establish and coordinate an interagency strategy to facilitate international cooperation with United States allies and partners regarding the development, use, and deployment of critical and emerging technologies and associated standards and safeguards for research security, intellectual property protection, and illicit knowledge transfer;
(3) facilitate technology partnerships, particularly with countries and relevant political and economic unions that are committed to—
(A) the rule of law and respect for human rights, including freedom of speech and expression;
(B) the safe and responsible development and use of critical and emerging technologies and the establishment of related norms and standards, including for research security and the protection of sensitive data and technology;
(C) a secure internet architecture governed by a multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized government control;
(D) robust international cooperation to promote open and interoperable technological products and services that are necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency, and privacy; and
(E) multilateral coordination, including through diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other activities, to defend the principles described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) against efforts by state and non-state actors to undermine them;
(4) support efforts to harmonize technology governance regimes with partners by—
(A) coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research and development initiatives; and
(B) collaborating to pursue such opportunities in certain critical and emerging technologies;
(5) coordinate with other technology partners regarding export control policies for critical and emerging technologies by countering illicit knowledge and data transfer relating to critical and emerging technology research;
(6) conduct diplomatic engagement, in coordination with other bureaus, offices, and relevant Federal departments and agencies, with allies and partners to develop standards and coordinate policies designed to counter illicit knowledge and data transfer in academia relating to critical and emerging technology research;
(7) coordinate with allies, partners, and other relevant Federal agencies to prevent the exploitation of research partnerships related to critical and emerging technologies;
(8) in coordination with the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy’s Digital Freedom Unit, share information regarding—
(A) the threat posed by the transfer of critical and emerging technologies to authoritarian governments, including the PRC and the Russian Federation; and
(B) the ways in which autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies; and
(9) collaborate with private companies, trade associations, and think tanks to carry out the functions described in paragraphs (1) through (8).
(f) Report
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report, with a classified index, if necessary, regarding—
(1) the activities of the Office described in subsection (e), including—
(A) any cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States allies and partners; and
(B) the results of such activities, initiatives, and partnerships; and
(2) the activities of the Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Russian Federation in sectors related to certain critical and emerging technologies and the threats they pose to the United States; and
(3) an inventory of all international research and development programs for critical and emerging technologies funded by the United States Government that include participation by institutions or organizations that are affiliated with or receive support from the Government of the PRC or the Government of the Russian Federation.
(a) Notification required
Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Science and technology agreement
The term science and technology agreement means any treaty, memorandum of understanding, or other contract or agreement between the United States and 1 or more foreign countries for the purpose of—
(A) collaborating on or otherwise engaging in joint activities relating to scientific research, technological development; or
(B) sharing scientific or technical knowledge or resources between such countries.
(b) Notification required
The Secretary of State may not enter into, renew, or extend any science and technology agreement with the People’s Republic of China unless—
(1) the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notification containing each of the matters described in subsection (c); and
(2) a period of not less than 30 days has elapsed following such submission.
(c) Matters described
The matters described in this subsection are, with respect to the science and technology agreement for which a notification is submitted—
(1) a written notice of such agreement, including the full text of such agreement;
(2) a detailed justification for such agreement, including an explanation for why such agreement is in the national security interests of the United States;
(3) an assessment of the risks and potential effects of such agreement, including any potential for the transfer under such agreement of technology or intellectual property capable of harming the national security interests of the United States;
(4) a detailed justification for how the Secretary of State intends to address human rights concerns in any scientific and technology collaboration proposed to be conducted under such agreement;
(5) an assessment of the extent to which the Secretary will be able to continuously monitor the commitments made by the People’s Republic of China under such agreement; and
(6) such other information relating to such agreement as the Secretary may be determine appropriate.
(1) Definitions
In this subsection, the terms appropriate congressional committees and science and technology agreement have the meanings given such terms in section 65(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by subsection (a),.
(2) In general
The requirements under section 65 of such Act shall apply with respect to science and technology agreements entered into, renewed, or extended on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Existing agreements
Any science and technology agreement between the Secretary of State and the PRC in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall be revoked unless, not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of such agreement containing each of the matters described in section 65(c) of such Act.
Section 201. Defined term
In this title, the term strategic infrastructure means infrastructure for which a primary driver of the United States national interest in such infrastructure is—
(1) to advance the national security or economic security interests of the United States or of the country in which such infrastructure is located; or
(2) to deny foreign adversaries of the United States ownership or control over such infrastructure.
(a) Establishment
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund, which shall be known as the Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund (referred to in this section as the Fund), consisting of such amounts as are deposited into the Fund pursuant to subsection (b).
(c) Prioritization
In evaluating proposals for strategic infrastructure projects receiving funding from the Fund, the Secretary shall prioritize—
(1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the United States; and
(2) projects involving—
(A) strategic transport infrastructure, including ports, airports, railroads, and highways;
(B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align with the officially conveyed energy needs of partner countries and with the objective of maximizing such countries’ energy access, energy security, energy transition, and resilience needs;
(C) secure information and communications technology networks and infrastructure to strengthen the potential for economic growth and facilitate open digital societies; and
(D) global health security, including through infrastructure projects that increase the availability, accessibility, and affordability of health care in partner countries.
(d) Standards
In evaluating proposals for strategic infrastructure projects seeking funding from the Fund, the Secretary shall—
(1) comply with standards for transparent and high-quality infrastructure investment;
(2) ensure projects selected include opportunities—
(A) to advance economic growth priorities in the partner country; and
(B) to support good governance and the rule of law; and
(3) only use environmental, social, or governance standards, including as criteria for project selection, which are consistent with United States law or international agreements that have been approved by Congress.
(e) Limitation
The Secretary may not exclude or otherwise limit the provision of funds that would otherwise have been available under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to support natural gas and civil nuclear energy projects, including market development, infrastructure, technology, or technical assistance, solely on the basis that such projects result in new carbon emissions or associated infrastructure.
(f) Projects in high-Income countries
Amounts from the Fund may not be provided in countries with high-income economies (as defined by the World Bank) unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support—
(1) is necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States; and
(2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term sustainability.
(g) Qualifying non-Binding instruments
Any memorandum of understanding or other non-binding instrument for projects supported by the Fund shall be considered a qualifying non-binding instrument for purposes of section 112b of title 1, United States Code.
(b) Transaction Advisory Fund
As part of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network established pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary is authorized to provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as—
(1) legal services;
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
(3) debt sustainability analyses;
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
(1) In general
As part of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network established pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary is authorized to provide support, including through the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline development, and other infrastructure project support.
(2) Joint strategic infrastructure projects
Funds made available for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used, in consultation with the Department of Defense, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
(3) Strategic infrastructure projects
Funds made available for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support strategic infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the following 3 years, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(A) the identification of infrastructure projects, particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, that the United States is currently supporting or is considering supporting through financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other means;
(B) for each project identified pursuant to subparagraph (A)—
(i) the sector of the project; and
(ii) the recipient country of any such United States support;
(C) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by such United States support;
(D) a detailed accounting of the authorities and programs upon which the United States Government has relied in providing such support; and
(E) a detailed description of any support provided by United States allies and partners for such projects.
(2) Form
Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(a) In general
The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and organizations—
(1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and implementation;
(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of regulations and regulatory practices;
(4) to build consensus around industry and technical standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global economic growth and commerce; and
(5) to promote United States standards regarding environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
(b) Prioritization of activities
In facilitating expert exchanges pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize—
(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States;
(2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States, including with—
(A) the European Union;
(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;
(D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and
(E) multilateral development banks; and
(3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
(c) Participation by non-Governmental entities
With regard to the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may facilitate, including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as appropriate, to the extent that such participation advances the goals of such program.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress
The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Pacific islands
The term Pacific Islands means the countries of Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
(3) Southeast Asia
The term Southeast Asia means the countries of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Timor-Leste.
(4) Sub-Saharan Africa
The term sub-Saharan Africa means a country or successor political entity defined in section 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3706).
(5) Latin America and the Caribbean
In this section, the term Latin America and the Caribbean does not include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.
(b) Establishment of centers of excellence
The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to enter into public-private partnerships and establish centers of excellence located in countries in Southeast Asia, Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean to build and enhance the technical capacity of officials, emerging leaders, and other qualified persons from countries in those regions.
(c) Priority areas for technical assistance and capacity building
The centers of excellence established pursuant to subsection (b) shall provide technical assistance and capacity building in—
(1) domestic resource mobilization;
(2) regulatory management;
(3) procurement processes, including tendering, bidding, and contract negotiation;
(4) budget management and oversight; and
(5) management of key economic sectors, including energy, digital economy, and infrastructure.
(d) Terms and conditions
In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall—
(1) leverage existing United States foreign assistance programs and activities in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, which may include assistance provided under—
(A) future leaders initiatives, such as the Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative and the Young Pacific Leaders Program;
(B) the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program;
(C) the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.);
(D) United States Support for Economic Growth in Asia;
(E) programs related to the Asia-Pacific Economic Community;
(F) the Young African Leaders Initiative;
(G) the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative; and
(H) other relevant education or scholarship programs;
(2) support the program by ensuring that participation of instructors who—
(i) are serving in relevant areas of the United States Government with a rank of not less than 14 on the General Schedule (GS–14); or
(ii) possess at least 10 years of experience relevant to the areas of instruction described in subsection (c);
(B) meet high professional standards within their fields; and
(i) are contracted by any center of excellence established pursuant to subsection (b); or
(ii) are deployed or detailed directly from a Federal Government agency;
(3) seek to attract participants who—
(i) are serving as senior or mid-career officials in key technical ministries of participating countries in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, or Latin America and the Caribbean;
(ii) have demonstrated leadership potential and direct responsibility for crafting or implementing policies relevant to the areas of instruction described in subsection (c); or
(iii) demonstrate an intent to return to government service after completing the program outlined in this section; or
(B) are employed in utilities, publicly or privately owned companies, or other nongovernmental entities responsible for implementing policy and regulation or supporting government functions in the areas of instruction described in subsection (c); and
(4) require financial or in-kind contributions from participating governments that is commensurate with the gross domestic product of the countries governed by such governments.
(f) Specification for memoranda of understanding
The value of financial or in-kind contributions by the United States and a particular participating government should be assessed to ensure an appropriate level of contribution by an entity mutually decided upon by the United States and such government.
(1) Consultation
The Secretary shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress before obligating funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (h).
(2) Annual report
The Secretary shall submit an annual report to the appropriate committees of Congress that—
(A) describes—
(i) the activities of the program authorized under this section;
(ii) all of the major activities during the most recently concluded fiscal year;
(iii) the financial and other contributions of the United States Government to the program; and
(iv) the contributions made by governments in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, or Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(B) assesses—
(i) the program’s successes; and
(ii) any required authorities, funding, or other alterations to improve the program’s effectiveness.
(a) Establishment
The Secretary shall establish a pilot program—
(1) to identify and evaluate barriers to commerce in developing countries that are allies and partners of the United States; and
(2) to provide assistance to promote economic development and commerce to such countries.
(b) Purposes
Under the pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary, in partnership with the countries selected pursuant to subsection (c)(1), shall—
(1) identify barriers in such countries to enhancing international commerce with the goal of setting priorities for the efficient use of United States trade-related assistance;
(2) focus United States trade-related assistance on building self-sustaining institutional capacity for expanding commerce with those countries, consistent with their international obligations and commitments; and
(3) further the national interests of the United States by—
(A) expanding prosperity through the elimination of foreign barriers to commercial exchange;
(B) assisting such countries to identify and reduce barriers through the provision of foreign assistance to increase—
(i) international commerce; and
(ii) foreign investment;
(C) assisting each such country in undertaking reforms that will promote economic development, and promote conditions favorable for business and commercial development and job growth in the country; and
(D) assisting private sector entities in those countries to engage in reform efforts and enhance productive global supply chain partnerships with the United States and allies and partners of the United States.
(1) In general
The Secretary shall select countries for participation in the pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a) from among countries—
(A) that are—
(i) developing countries; and
(ii) allies and partners of the United States;
(B) the governments of which have clearly demonstrated a willingness to make appropriate legal, policy, and regulatory reforms that are proven to stimulate economic growth and job creation, consistent with international trade rules and practices; and
(C) that meet such additional criteria as may be established by the Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the head of any other Federal agency, as appropriate.
(2) Considerations for additional criteria
In establishing additional criteria pursuant to paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary and the Administrator shall—
(i) identify and address structural weaknesses, systemic flaws, or other impediments within countries being considered for participation in the pilot program that impact the effectiveness of United States assistance; and
(ii) make recommendations for addressing such weaknesses, flaws, and impediments;
(B) set priorities for commercial development assistance building to focus resources on countries in which the provision of such assistance can deliver the best value in identifying and eliminating barriers to trade and investment, including by fostering adherence to international trade obligations;
(C) developing appropriate performance measures and establishing annual targets to monitor and assess progress toward such targets, including measures to be used to terminate the provision of assistance determined to be ineffective; and
(D) ensure representation from across multiple geographic regions.
(A) In general
Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall select countries for participation in the pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a).
(B) Number
The Secretary shall select for participation in the pilot program—
(i) not fewer than 5 countries during the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(ii) not fewer than 15 countries during the 5-year period beginning on such date of enactment.
(4) Prioritization based on recommendations from chiefs of mission
In selecting countries for participation in the pilot program, the Secretary shall prioritize—
(A) countries recommended by chiefs of mission and other agencies present at the missions, such as the United States Agency for International Development—
(i) that will be able to substantially benefit from expanded commercial development assistance; and
(ii) the governments of which have demonstrated the political will to effectively and sustainably implement such assistance; or
(B) groups of countries, including groups of geographically contiguous countries recommended by chiefs of mission, that—
(i) meet the criteria described in subparagraph (A); and
(ii) as a result of expanded United States commercial development assistance, will contribute to greater intra-regional commerce or regional economic integration.
(1) In general
The Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, as appropriate, shall lead in engaging relevant government officials of each country selected pursuant to subsection (c) to participate in the pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a) with respect to the development of a plan of action to identify and evaluate barriers to economic and commercial development that then informs United States assistance.
(2) Analysis required
The development of a plan of action pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include a comprehensive analysis of relevant legal, policy, and regulatory constraints to economic and job growth in such country.
(3) Elements
Each plan of action developed for a country pursuant to paragraph (1) shall—
(A) set forth priorities for reform agreed to by the government of such country and the United States;
(B) include clearly defined policy responses, including regulatory and legal reforms, as may be necessary, to achieve improvement in the business and commercial environment in such country;
(C) identify the anticipated costs to establish and implement such plan;
(D) identify appropriate sequencing and phasing of the implementation of the plan to create cumulative benefits, as appropriate;
(E) identify best practices and standards;
(F) include considerations with respect to how to make the policy reform investments under such plan long-lasting; and
(G) require appropriate consultation with affected stakeholders in such country and in the United States.
(e) Termination
The pilot program established pursuant to subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(a) Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, done at New York December 12, 2001, and signed by the United States on December 30, 2003 (referred to in this section as the Convention), establishes uniform international rules governing a form of financing widely used in the United States involving the assignment of receivables.
(2) Receivables financing is an important tool in helping United States businesses secure working capital financing. Within the United States, lenders and buyers of receivables provide financing based on the use of receivables from debtors located within the United States as working capital collateral.
(3) Receivables financing occurs in transactions in which businesses either sell their rights to payments from their customers (commonly known as receivables) to a bank or other financial institution, or use their rights to those payments as collateral for a loan from a lender. The businesses selling or using their receivables as collateral are referred to as assignors and buyers and lenders are referred to as assignees.
(4) Many countries do not have the kinds of modern commercial finance laws on the assignment of receivables required to implement the Convention.
(5) United States-based lenders are less willing to make loans secured by receivables owed by debtors located outside the United States, as such cross-border transactions may involve countries the laws of which are inconsistent with modern financial practices.
(6) Because of the risk, cost, and uncertainty created by receivables financing laws in other countries, which vary greatly or can be vague or unpredictable, the ability of small and medium-sized United States businesses to access financing from lenders using international accounts receivables derived from exports or other cross-border transactions is severely limited.
(7) Expanded access to receivables financing in international trade, which the Convention would promote, will provide United States businesses with an additional source of capital at no cost to the United States taxpayer, benefitting small and medium-sized businesses that use receivables financing.
(8) The Convention is consistent with article 9 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
(9) The Convention includes extensive rules on the use of receivables to finance operations, using receivables as collateral, and how to resolve potential conflicts of law arising from the use of receivables.
(10) Adoption of the Convention would establish more predictability and uniformity with respect to receivables financing in cross-border transactions, thereby opening up new opportunities for trade and economic growth between the United States and its partners in the developing world.
(11) The Senate consented to ratification of the Convention on January 2, 2019.
(12) The President ratified the Convention on October 15, 2019.
(b) Sense of the Senate
It is the sense of the Senate that the Secretary should, in the regular course of economic dialogues with developing countries that are partners of the United States, promote the adoption and implementation of the Convention as an important tool—
(1) to help attract foreign investment to and trade with such countries; and
(2) to establish a predictable, rules-based framework that can help such countries create additional sources of capital at no cost, benefitting small and medium-sized businesses that use receivables financing.
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees detailing the activities of the Department of State with respect to promoting ratification and implementation by developing countries of the Convention through fiscal year 2030.
(2) Contents
The report required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) a list of countries expressing interest in ratification of the Convention;
(B) a detailed description of efforts made by the Department of State to promote the Convention as a tool for economic development; and
(C) any requests made by interested countries for technical and other assistance to facilitate adoption of the Convention.
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1) The People’s Republic of China is the world’s second largest economy and a major global lender.
(2) In the third quarter of 2022, the foreign exchange reserves of the PRC totaled more than $3,000,000,000,000.
(3) The World Bank classifies the PRC as a country with an upper-middle income economy.
(4) On February 25, 2021, President Xi Jinping announced complete victory over extreme poverty in the PRC.
(5) The Government of the PRC utilizes state resources to create and promote the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative.
(6) The PRC is the world’s largest official creditor.
(7) Through a multilateral development bank, countries are eligible to borrow until they can manage long-term development and access to capital markets without financial resources from the bank.
(8) The World Bank reviews the graduation of a country from eligibility to borrow from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development once the country reaches the graduation discussion income, which is equivalent to the gross national income. For fiscal year 2023, the graduation discussion income is a gross national income per capita exceeding $7,455.
(9) Many of the other multilateral development banks, such as the Asian Development Bank, use the gross national income per capita benchmark used by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to trigger the graduation process.
(10) The PRC exceeded the graduation discussion income threshold in 2016.
(11) Since 2016, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has approved projects totaling $9,610,000,000 to the PRC.
(12) Since 2016, the Asian Development Bank has—
(A) continued to approve loans and technical assistance to the PRC totaling more than $10,600,000,000; and
(B) also approved non-sovereign commitments in the PRC totaling more than $2,400,000,000.
(13) The World Bank calculates the PRC’s 2019 gross national income per capita as $10,390.
(b) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States to oppose any additional lending from the multilateral development banks, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank, to the People’s Republic of China as a result of the PRC’s successful graduation from the eligibility requirements for assistance from those banks.
(c) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Multilateral development banks
The term multilateral development banks has the meaning given such term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
(d) Opposition to lending to People’s Republic of China
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at each multilateral development bank to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States—
(1) to oppose any loan or extension of financial or technical assistance by the bank to the PRC; and
(2) to end lending and assistance to countries that exceed the graduation discussion income of the bank.
(e) Report
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(1) an assessment of the status of borrowing by the PRC from each multilateral development bank;
(2) a description of voting power, shares, and representation by the PRC at each such bank;
(3) a list of countries that have exceeded the graduation discussion income at each such bank;
(4) a list of countries that have graduated from eligibility for assistance from each such bank; and
(5) a full description of the efforts taken by the United States to graduate countries from such eligibility once they exceed the graduation discussion income at each such bank.
(a) Short title
This section may be cited as the Ending China’s Unfair Advantage Act of 2024.
(b) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Montreal protocol
The term Montreal Protocol means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done at Montreal September 16, 1987.
(3) United nations framework convention on climate change
The term United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992.
(c) Prohibition on use of funds for the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer until China is no longer defined as a developing country
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal funds may be obligated or expended to implement the Montreal Protocol, including its protocols and amendments, or any fund established under the Protocol, until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Parties to the Montreal Protocol have amended their Decision I/12E, Clarification of terms and definitions: developing countries, made at the First Meeting of the Parties to remove the People’s Republic of China.
(d) Prohibition on use of funds for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change until China is included among the countries listed in annex I of the Convention
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no Federal funds may be obligated or expended to fund the operations and meetings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, including it’s protocols or agreements, or any fund established under the Convention or its agreements, until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Parties to the Framework Convention have included the People’s Republic of China in Annex I of the Convention.
Section 301. Short title
This subtitle may be cited as the Countering Economic Coercion Act of 2024.
Section 302. Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) foreign adversaries are increasingly using economic coercion to pressure, punish, and influence United States allies and partners;
(2) economic coercion—
(A) causes economic harm to United States allies and partners;
(B) creates malign influence on the sovereign political actions of such allies and partners; and
(C) can threaten the essential security of the United States and its allies;
(3) economic coercion is often characterized by—
(A) arbitrary, abusive, and discriminatory actions that seek to interfere with sovereign actions, violate international trade rules, and run counter to the rules-based international order;
(B) capricious, pre-textual, and non-transparent actions taken without due process afforded;
(C) intimidation or threats of punitive actions; and
(D) informal actions that take place without explicit government action;
(4) economic coercion violates norms of state behavior and undermines the rules-based international order;
(5) existing mechanisms for trade dispute resolution and international arbitration are often inadequate for responding to economic coercion in a timely and effective manner as foreign adversaries exploit plausible deniability and lengthy processes to evade accountability;
(6) the United States should provide meaningful economic and political support to foreign trading partners affected by economic coercion, which can lead to opportunities for United States businesses, investors, and workers to reach new markets and customers;
(7) responding to economic coercion will be most effective when the United States provides relief to affected foreign trading partners in coordination with allies and like-minded countries; and
(8) such coordination will further demonstrate broad resolve against economic coercion.
Section 303. Definitions
In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees includes—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(C) with respect to the exercise of any authority under section 305(a)(2), subparagraphs (A), (I), (J), and (K) of section 305(b)(1), and section 305(b)(2)—
(i) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives;
(D) with respect to the exercise of any authority under subparagraphs (F) and (H) of section 305(b)(1)—
(i) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
(E) with respect to the exercise of any authority under section 305(a)(1)(A) and subparagraph (B), (E), or (G) of section 305(b)(1)—
(i) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) Economic coercion
The term economic coercion means actions, practices, or threats undertaken by a foreign adversary to unreasonably restrain, obstruct, or manipulate trade, foreign aid, investment, or commerce in an arbitrary, capricious, or non-transparent manner with the intention to cause economic harm to achieve strategic political objectives or influence sovereign political actions.
(3) Export; export administration regulations; in-country transfer; reexport
The terms export, Export Administration Regulations, in-country transfer, and reexport have the meanings given such terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).
(4) Foreign adversary
The term foreign adversary means any foreign government engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.
(5) Foreign trading partner
The term foreign trading partner means a foreign jurisdiction that is a trading partner of the United States.
(1) In general
If the President determines that a foreign trading partner is subject to an act of economic coercion by a foreign adversary that constitutes a long-term national security threat, after a comprehensive inter-agency review, the President may—
(A) submit to Congress a detailed determination (referred to as the Economic Coercion Response Package), which shall include—
(i) an assessment of why the economic coercion by a foreign adversary constitutes a national security threat and requires a comprehensive response;
(ii) a request to exercise any authority—
(I) described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of section 305 to support or assist the foreign trading partner in a manner proportionate to the economic coercion; or
(II) described in subsection (a)(2) or (b)(2) of section 305 to penalize the foreign adversary in a manner proportionate to the economic coercion;
(iii) justification for why the requested authorities are appropriate for the specific act of economic coercion; and
(iv) a statement of administration action outlining the intended use of the requested authorities.
(2) Information; hearings
To inform the determination and the formulation of a request under paragraph (1), the President shall—
(A) obtain the written opinion and analysis of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Trade Representative, and the heads of other Federal agencies, as the President considers appropriate;
(B) seek information and advice from and consult with other relevant officers of the United States; and
(C) afford other interested parties an opportunity to present relevant information and advice.
(3) Consultation with congress
In developing the determination and the formulation of the request under paragraph (1), the President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees—
(A) during the 40-day period beginning 30 days before such request is submitted to Congress; and
(B) not less frequently than once every 180 days while exercising the requested authority.
(4) Notice
Not later than 30 days after the date on which the President determines that a foreign trading partner is subject to economic coercion or submits the request under paragraph (1), the President shall publish in the Federal Register—
(A) a notice of the determination and the submission of the request; and
(B) a description of the economic coercion that the foreign adversary is applying to the foreign trading partner and other circumstances that led to such determination and the submission of the request.
(1) In general
If the President determines, on an emergency basis, that a foreign trading partner is subject to economic coercion by a foreign adversary, the President may exercise, for a period not exceeding 90 days, any authority described in section 305(a).
(A) In general
Not later than 5 days after an emergency determination under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of such determination.
(1) Revocation of extended determination
A determination made by the President pursuant to subsection (a) shall be revoked on the earliest of—
(A) the date that is 2 years after the date of such determination;
(B) the date of the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval revoking such determination; or
(C) the date on which the President issues a proclamation revoking such determination.
(2) Revocation of emergency determination
A determination made by the President pursuant to subsection (b) shall be revoked on the earliest of—
(A) the date that is 90 days after the date of such determination;
(B) the date of the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval revoking such determination; or
(C) the date on which the President issues a proclamation revoking such determination.
(a) Coordination by president
After a determination by the President that a foreign trading partner is subject to economic coercion by a foreign adversary, the President shall endeavor to coordinate—
(1) the exercise of the authorities described in section 305 with the exercise of relevant authorities by allies and partners to broaden economic support to the foreign trading partner affected by economic coercion; and
(2) with allies and partners to issue joint condemnation of the actions of the foreign adversary and support for the foreign trading partner.
(b) Coordination by Secretary
The Secretary, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall endeavor—
(1) to encourage allies and partners to identify or create mechanisms and authorities necessary to facilitate the coordination described in subsection (a)(1);
(2) to coordinate with allies and partners to increase opposition to economic coercion in the international community;
(3) to coordinate with allies and partners to deter the use of economic coercion by foreign adversaries; and
(4) to engage with foreign trading partners to gather information about possible instances of economic coercion and share such information with the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Coordination by United States Trade Representative
The United States Trade Representative shall examine the viability and utility of working with allies and partners at the World Trade Organization to negotiate a multilateral agreement regarding cooperation to address economic coercion.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Implementation bill
The term implementation bill means a bill of Congress consisting solely of the authorities requested by the President (referred to in this section as the Economic Coercion Response Package) pursuant to section 304(a).
(2) Instructions
The term instructions refers to the specific recommendations or actions requested by the President that detail the authorities to be exercised to respond to economic coercion.
(1) Presidential submission
If the President determines that a foreign trading partner is subject to economic coercion, the President shall submit to Congress an Economic Coercion Response Package pursuant to section 304(a), including detailed instructions outlining the specific actions and authorities requested.
(2) Committee instructions
Each Economic Coercion Response Package submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include instructions to the relevant congressional committees specifying the actions to be taken within their respective jurisdictions.
(1) Referral to committees
Each Economic Coercion Response Package, submitted to Congress pursuant to section 304(a) shall be immediately referred to the congressional committees with subject matter jurisdiction over the specific actions and authorities requested.
(2) Committee responsibility
Each congressional committee identified in the instructions described in subsection (b) shall, not later than 15 legislative days after receiving such instructions—
(A) draft its portion of the implementation bill; and
(B) report such portion to the clerk of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as appropriate.
(3) Failure to report
If any congressional committee fails to report its respective portion within the period provided under paragraph (2), such portion may not be included in the implementation bill.
(4) Amendments
Members of the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the subject matter of a portion of the implementation bill may offer germane amendments to such portion before it is reported by the committee.
(1) Committee reports
After all of the congressional committee in either the Senate or the House of Representatives with subject matter jurisdiction have reported their respective portions of the implementation bill or have failed to report such portion within the period prescribed under subsection (c)(2), all of the reported provisions shall be combined into a single implementation bill.
(2) No reports
If none of the congressional committees with subject matter jurisdiction reports their assigned provisions, no implementation bill may be introduced.
(3) Final bill
The implementation bill described in paragraph (1) shall—
(A) include all of the provisions that have been reported by the congressional committees with subject matter jurisdiction; and
(B) be considered on the floor of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as appropriate.
(1) Introduction
If the President submits an Economic Coercion Response Package pursuant to section 304(a) and 1 or more committees of the House of Representatives have reported their respective provisions, the implementation bill may be introduced in the House of Representatives (by request)—
(A) by the majority leader of the House of Representatives, or by a member of the House of Representatives designated by the majority leader, on the next legislative day following the combination of provisions pursuant to subsection (d); or
(B) if the implementation bill is not introduced pursuant to subparagraph (A), by any member of the House of Representatives on any subsequent legislative day.
(2) Proceeding to consideration
After the introduction of the implementation bill, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the implementation bill in the House of Representatives. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
(3) Consideration
The implementation bill shall be considered as read. All points of order against the implementation bill and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the request to its passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, and 1 motion to limit debate on the request. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the implementation bill shall not be in order.
(4) Amendments
Amendments to the implementation bill shall be in order, and debate on any amendment shall be limited to 10 minutes, equally divided by the proponent and an opponent.
(5) Vote on passage
The vote on passage of the implementation bill shall occur not later than 3 legislative days after the date of its introduction in the House of Representatives.
(1) Introduction in the senate
If the President submits an Economic Coercion Response Package pursuant to section 304(a) and 1 or more committees of the Senate with subject matter jurisdiction have reported their respective provisions, the implementation bill shall be introduced in the Senate, by request, by the majority leader of the Senate (for himself or herself and the minority leader of the Senate) or by any member of the Senate designated by the majority leader. If the Senate is not in session on the day on which the implementation bill is ready for introduction, the implementation bill shall be introduced as provided on the first day thereafter on which the Senate is in session.
(2) Proceeding to consideration
Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order, not later than 2 session days after the date on which the implementation bill is introduced, for the majority leader of the Senate or his or her designee to move to proceed to the consideration of the implementation bill. A motion to proceed is in order even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to. All points of order against the motion to proceed to the bill are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill is agreed to, the bill shall remain the unfinished business until disposed of. All points of order against the bill and against consideration of the bill are waived.
(3) Consideration
Debate on the implementation bill, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection with such bill, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority and minority leaders or their respective designees. Germane amendments to the implementation bill shall be in order, and debate on any amendment shall be limited to 10 minutes, equally divided between the proponent of the bill and an opponent of the bill. A motion to further limit debate is not in order. No motion to postpone, motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or motion to recommit the bill is in order.
(4) Vote on passage
The vote on passage of the implementation bill shall occur immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the request and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate, if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate.
(1) In general
If, before passing an implementation bill, 1 House of Congress receives from the other House an implementation bill consisting solely of the text of the Economic Coercion Response Package submitted by the President pursuant to section 304(a)—
(A) the implementation bill of the other House shall not be referred to a committee of such House; and
(B) the procedure in the receiving House shall be the same as if no implementation bill had been received from the other House until the vote on passage, when the implementation bill received from the other House shall supplant the implementation bill of the receiving House.
(2) No implementation bill in the senate
If, after the President submits an Economic Coercion Response Package pursuant to section 304(a), an implementation bill is not introduced in the Senate or if the Senate fails to consider an implementation bill pursuant to this section, the implementation bill of the House of Representatives shall be entitled to expedited floor procedures under this section.
(3) Treatment of companion measure in the senate
If, after the Senate passes an implementation bill, the Senate receives from the House of Representatives an implementation bill consisting of text that is identical to the Senate-passed implementation bill, the House-passed implementation bill shall not be debatable. The vote on passage of the implementation bill in the Senate shall be considered to be the vote on passage of the implementation bill received from the House of Representatives.
(h) Vetoes
If the President vetoes an implementation bill, consideration of a veto message in the Senate shall be limited to 10 hours, equally divided between the majority and minority leaders of the Senate or the designees of the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
(1) In general
In addition to the expedited procedures otherwise provided under this section, in case of an implementation bill consisting solely of the text of the Economic Coercion Response Package submitted by the President pursuant to section 304(a), the expedited procedures under this section shall apply to such implementation bill during the period—
(A) beginning on the date occurring—
(i) in the case of the Senate, 30 session days before the date on which Congress adjourns a session of Congress; or
(ii) in the case of the House of Representatives, 30 days before the date on which Congress adjourns a session of Congress; and
(B) ending on the date on which the same or succeeding Congress first convenes its next session.
(2) Application
In applying this section for the purposes of constructive resubmission, an implementation bill described under paragraph (1) shall be treated as though such implementation bill were submitted on—
(A) in the case of the Senate, the 15th session day; or
(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, the 15th legislative day, after the succeeding session of Congress first convenes.
(3) Limitation
A constructive resubmission of an implementation bill pursuant to this subsection shall not apply if a vote with respect to the implementation bill was taken in either House in a preceding session of Congress.
(a) Definitions
In this section, the term joint resolution of disapproval means, with respect to an emergency determination pursuant to section 304(b), per the revocation outlined in section 304(c), only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—
(1) that does not have a preamble;
(2) the title of which is as follows: “A joint resolution disapproving the emergency authorities to act against economic coercion, as exercised by the President under section 304(b) of the Countering Economic Coercion Act of 2024; and
(3) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: That Congress disapproves the authorities exercised by the President under section 304(b) of the Countering Economic Coercion Act of 2024, submitted to Congress on ___., with the blank space being filled with the appropriate date.
(A) Introduction in the house of representatives
During a period of 5 legislative days beginning on the date that a notice of action is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with section 4(b)(2)(B), a joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced in the House of Representatives by the majority leader or the minority leader.
(B) Introduction in the senate
During a period of 5 days on which the Senate is in session beginning on the date that a notice of action is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with section 4(b)(2)(B), a joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced in the Senate by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).
(1) Reporting and discharge
If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of disapproval has been referred has not reported such joint resolution within 10 legislative days after the date of such referral, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.
(2) Proceeding to consideration
In the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of disapproval:
(A) Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution of disapproval has been referred reports it to the House of Representatives or has been discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House of Representatives.
(B) All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House of Representatives has disposed of a motion to proceed on a joint resolution with regard to the same certification. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
(3) Consideration
The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate, equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.
(1) Committee referral
A joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Reporting and discharge
If the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate does not report a joint resolution of disapproval within 10 days during which the Senate is in session after the date such resolution was referred to such committee, the committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(3) Motion to proceed
Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate reports the joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from its consideration (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) shall be waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution of disapproval is agreed to, the joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business until disposed.
(4) Debate
Debate on a joint resolution of disapproval, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection with such joint resolution, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between the majority and minority leaders or their designees. A motion to further limit debate is in order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order.
(5) Vote on passage
The vote on passage of a joint resolution of disapproval shall occur immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the joint resolution of disapproval and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate, if requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate.
(6) Rules of the chair on procedure
Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to the joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
(7) Consideration of veto messages
Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with such joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
(e) Procedures in the Senate
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following procedures shall apply in the Senate to a joint resolution of disapproval to which this section applies:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a joint resolution of disapproval that has been passed by the House of Representatives shall, when received in the Senate, be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for consideration in accordance with this subsection.
(2) If a joint resolution of disapproval to which this section applies was introduced in the Senate before receipt of a joint resolution of disapproval that has passed the House of Representatives, the joint resolution from the House of Representatives shall, when received in the Senate, be placed on the calendar. If this paragraph applies, the procedures in the Senate with respect to a joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate that contains the identical matter as a joint resolution of disapproval that passed the House of Representatives shall be the same as if no joint resolution of disapproval had been received from the House of Representatives, except that the vote on passage in the Senate shall be on the joint resolution of disapproval that passed the House of Representatives.
(f) Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate
This section is enacted by Congress—
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of disapproval under this paragraph, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
(1) In general
No entity owned, controlled, or directed by a foreign state or an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in section 1603 of title 28, United States Code) and participating in international commerce may establish or set prices below the average variable cost in a manner that may foreseeably harm competition.
(2) Economic support
In determining the average variable cost under paragraph (1), the court may take into account the effects of economic support provided by the owning or controlling foreign state to the entity on a discriminatory basis that may allow the entity to unfairly price at or below marginal cost.
(3) Government subsidies
In determining the foreseeability of the elimination of market competitors under paragraph (1), the court may take into account the aggravating factor of the actions of the foreign state owning or controlling the entity referred to in such paragraph to use government resources to subsidize or underwrite the losses of the entity in a manner that allows the entity to sustain the predatory period and recoup its losses.
(4) Market power not required
For the purpose of establishing the elements under paragraph (1), the plaintiff may not be required to demonstrate that the defendant has monopoly or market power.
(b) Recovery of damages
Any person (as defined in section 1(a) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)) whose business or property is injured as a result of the actions of an entity described in subsection (a) shall be entitled to recovery from the defendant for damages and other related costs under section 4 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 15).
(c) Elements of prima facie case
A plaintiff may initiate a claim against a defendant in an appropriate Federal court for a violation of subsection (a) in order to recover damages under subsection (b) by—
(1) establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant—
(A) is a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (as such terms are defined in section 1603 of title 28, United States Code); and
(B) is not immune from the jurisdiction of the Federal court pursuant to section 1605(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code; and
(2) setting forth sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable inference that the defendant has violated subsection (a).
(d) Court determination leading to evidentiary burden shifting to defendant
If a Federal court finds that a plaintiff has met its burden of proof under subsection (c), the court may determine that—
(1) the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that the conduct of the defendant violated subsection (a); and
(2) the defendant has the burden of rebutting such case by establishing that the defendant did not violate subsection (a).
(1) In general
For the purposes of considering questions of international comity with respect to making decisions regarding commercial activity and the scope of applicable sovereign immunity, the Federal court may receive and consider relevant amicus briefs filed by the Secretary.
(2) Attorney general
For the purposes of considering questions regarding assessing potential harm to competition, the Federal court may receive and consider relevant amicus briefs filed by the Attorney General.
(3) Savings provision
Nothing in paragraph (1) may be construed to limit the ability of the Federal court to receive and consider any other amicus briefs.
(a) In general
Section 1832(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs (5) and (6), respectively;
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
(4) without authorization, modifies or develops a product or digital article that could not have been modified or developed in the same way without access to such information;
(2) ; and
(3) in paragraphs (5) and (6), as redesignated, by striking (3) each place it appears and inserting (4).
(b) Applicability To conduct outside the United States
Section 1837 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking or at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting; or; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
(3) in the case of a violation of section 1832(a)(4), the offender attempts to import a product or digital article described in such section into the United States.
(c) Definitions
Section 1839 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in paragraph (3), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting data, after programs,;
(2) in paragraph (6)(B), by striking and at the end;
(3) in paragraph (7)—
(A) by inserting an end quote after purposes; and
(B) by striking the end quote and final period at the end and inserting; and; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
(8) the term digital article means an algorithm, digitized process, or database, or any other electronic technology that generates, stores, or processes data.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(2) Committee
The term Committee means the committee established or designated pursuant to subsection (b).
(3) Foreign person
The term foreign person means a person that is not a United States person.
(4) Intellectual property
The term intellectual property means—
(A) any work protected by a copyright under title 17, United States Code;
(B) any property protected by a patent granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office under title 35, United States Code;
(C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, that is registered as a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office under the Act entitled An Act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes, approved July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the Lanham Act or the Trademark Act of 1946) (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.);
(D) a trade secret (as defined in section 1839 of title 18, United States Code); or
(E) any other form of intellectual property.
(5) United states person
The term United States person means—
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
(1) In general
The President shall—
(A) establish a multi-agency committee to carry out this section; or
(B) designate an existing multi-agency committee within the executive branch to carry out this section if the President determines that such existing committee has the relevant expertise and personnel to carry out this section.
(2) Membership
Except as provided under paragraph (3), the Committee shall be comprised of—
(A) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary;
(D) the Attorney General;
(E) the Director of National Intelligence; and
(F) the heads of such other agencies as the President determines appropriate, generally or on a case-by-case basis.
(3) Designee
An official specified in paragraph (2) may select a designee to serve on the Committee from among individuals serving in positions appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(4) Chair and vice chair
The President shall appoint a chairperson and a vice chairperson of the Committee from among the members of the Committee.
(1) In general
A United States person described in paragraph (3) may submit a petition to the Committee requesting that the Committee—
(A) review, in accordance with subsection (d), a significant act or series of acts described in paragraph (2) committed by a foreign person; and
(B) refer the matter to the President with a recommendation to impose sanctions pursuant to subsection (e) to address any threat to the national security of the United States posed by the significant act or series of acts.
(2) Significant act or series of acts described
A significant act or series of acts described in this paragraph is a significant act or series of acts of—
(A) theft of intellectual property of a United States person; or
(B) forced transfer of technology that is the intellectual property of a United States person.
(3) United states person described
A United States person is described in this paragraph if—
(A) a court of competent jurisdiction in the United States has rendered a final judgment in favor of the United States person that—
(i) the foreign person identified in the petition submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) committed the significant act or series of acts identified in the petition;
(ii) the United States person is the owner of the intellectual property identified in the petition; and
(iii) the foreign person is using that intellectual property without the permission of the United States person; and
(B) the United States person can provide clear and convincing evidence to the Committee that the value of the economic loss to the United States person resulting from the significant act or series of acts exceeds $10,000,000.
(1) Review
Upon receiving a petition pursuant to subsection (c), the Committee shall conduct a review of the petition in order to determine whether the imposition of sanctions pursuant to subsection (e) is necessary and appropriate to address any threat to the national security of the United States posed by the significant act or series of acts identified in the petition.
(2) Action
After conducting a review pursuant to paragraph (1) of a petition submitted pursuant to subsection (c), the Committee may take no action, dismiss the petition, or refer the petition to the President with a recommendation with respect to whether to impose sanctions under subsection (e).
(1) In general
The President may impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to a foreign person identified in a petition submitted pursuant to subsection (c) if the President determines that imposing such sanctions is necessary and appropriate to address any threat to the national security of the United States posed by the significant act or series of acts identified in the petition.
(2) Notice to congress
Not later than 30 days after the Committee refers a petition to the President with a recommendation pursuant to subsection (d)(2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of the determination of the President under paragraph (1) with respect to whether or not to impose sanctions described in paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in the petition. Each notice required under this paragraph shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(3) Sanctions described
The sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to a foreign person identified in a petition submitted pursuant to subsection (c) are the following:
(A) Export sanction
The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the person under—
(i) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.);
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or
(iv) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.
(B) Loans from united states financial institutions
The President may prohibit any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided for such activities.
(C) Loans from international financial institutions
The President may direct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the international financial institution that would benefit the person.
(D) Prohibitions on financial institutions
The following prohibitions may be imposed against the person if the person is a financial institution:
(i) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer
Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the continuation of any prior designation of, the financial institution as a primary dealer in United States Government debt instruments.
(ii) Prohibition on service as a repository of government funds
The financial institution may not serve as agent of the United States Government or serve as repository for United States Government funds.
(E) Procurement sanction
The President may prohibit the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the person.
(F) Foreign exchange
The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in which the person has any interest.
(G) Banking transactions
The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the person.
(H) Property transactions
The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any person from—
(i) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect to which the person identified in the petition has any interest;
(ii) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to such property; or
(iii) conducting any transaction involving such property.
(I) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned person
The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the person.
(J) Exclusion of corporate officers
The President may direct the Secretary to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, the person identified in the petition.
(K) Sanctions on principal executive officers
The President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of the person, or on individuals performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions described in this paragraph.
(1) Implementation
The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties
Any person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section.
(1) In general
The Committee shall protect from disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a United States person and marked as business confidential information, unless the person submitting the information—
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that the information would be released by the Committee; or
(B) subsequently consents to the release of the information.
(2) Treatment as trade secrets
Proprietary information submitted by a United States person pursuant to this section shall be—
(A) considered to be trade secrets and commercial or financial information (as those terms are used for purposes of section 552b(c)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
(B) exempt from disclosure without the express approval of the person.
(h) Rulemaking
The President may prescribe such licenses, orders, and regulations as are necessary to carry out this section, including with respect to the process by which United States persons may submit petitions pursuant to subsection (c).
(a) In general
The Secretary may not exclude or otherwise limit the provision of funds that would otherwise have been available under any Federal law or regulation to support natural gas and civil nuclear energy projects, including market development, infrastructure, technology, or technical assistance on the basis that—
(1) such projects result in new carbon emissions or associated infrastructure;
(2) a higher-cost and lower-emissions alternative is available; or
(3) lower cost alternatives are available where pricing does not take into account dispatchability, given the importance of flexible generation for ensuring a stable and reliable power supply.
(b) Partner country driven energy projects
In prioritizing energy projects for which United States allies and partners are seeking assistance authorized to be appropriated under Federal law the Secretary should take into consideration—
(1) the objectives of improving—
(A) energy access within the partner country;
(B) energy security; and
(C) economic needs of the host country;
(2) appropriate coordination with host country government authorities; and
(3) the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
(c) Additional funding
Federal foreign assistance funds allocated to an energy project—
(1) shall be in addition to investments made by the United States private sector and the private sector of United States partners or allied countries; and
(2) should not displace or complicate private sector involvement in the development of host country energy resources.
(a) In general
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the basket of currencies used to determine the value of Special Drawing Rights, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted a written report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that includes a certification that—
(1) the PRC is in compliance with all its obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund;
(2) during the preceding 12 months, there has not been a report submitted under section 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22 U.S.C. 5305) or section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (19 U.S.C. 4421) in which the PRC has been found to have manipulated its currency; and
(3) the PRC has instituted and is implementing the policies and practices necessary to ensure that the renminbi is freely usable (within the meaning of Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund).
(b) Sunset
Subsection (a) shall have no force or effect beginning on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 316. Strengthening congressional oversight of Special Drawing Rights at International Monetary Fund
Section 6 of the Special Drawing Rights Act (22 U.S.C. 286q) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking each basic period and inserting any 10-year period; and
(B) by inserting 25 percent of before the United States quota; and
(2) in subsection (b)(1)—
(A) by inserting, or consent to or acquiesce in such an allocation, before without consultations; and
(B) by striking 90 days and inserting 180 days.
(a) Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of certain agricultural real estate transactions
Section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by section 308, is further amended by adding at the end the following:
(vii) Any acquisition or transfer of an interest, other than a security, in agricultural land held by a person that is a national of, or is organized under the laws or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, a country—
(I) designated as a nonmarket economy country pursuant to section 771(18) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677(18)); or
(II) identified as a country that poses a risk to the national security of the United States in the most recent annual report on worldwide threats issued by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043b) (commonly known as the Annual Threat Assessment).
(b) Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of real estate transactions near military installations
Section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by subsection (a) and sections 102(a)(1)(B) and 308(a), is further amended by adding at the end the following:
(viii) Any acquisition or transfer of an interest, other than a security, in any form of real estate that is located not more than 50 miles from a military installation (as defined in section 2801(c)(4) of title 10, United States Code) other than residential property held by a person that is a national of, or is organized under the laws or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, a country described in clause (vii).
(c) Expansion of membership in Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Section 721(k)(6) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(k)(6)) is amended to read as follows:
(6) Other members
The chairperson shall include the heads of relevant departments, agencies, and offices (or the designee of any such head) in any review or investigation under subsection (b), on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the covered transaction under review or investigation.
(d) Prohibition on use of funds for certain agricultural real estate holdings
No assistance, including subsidies, may be provided by any Federal agency to a person for an agricultural real estate holding wholly or partly owned by a person that is a national of, or is organized under the laws or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, a country described in section 721(a)(4)(B)(viii) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection (a).
(1) Reporting requirements
Section 2(a) of the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 3501(a)) is amended—
(A) in the first sentence of the matter preceding paragraph (1)—
(i) by inserting, or enters into a leasing agreement the period of which is longer than 5 years with respect to agricultural land, after agricultural land; and
(ii) by striking acquisition or transfer and inserting acquisition, transfer, or lease; and
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking acquired or transferred and inserting acquired, transferred, or leased.
(2) Revocation of minimum acreage requirement
Section 9(1) of the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 3508(1)) is amended by inserting, subject to the condition that the Secretary may not exclude land from this definition based on the acreage of the land before the semicolon at the end.
(f) Reports of holdings of agricultural land in the United States by foreign persons
Section 6 of the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 3505) is amended—
(1) by striking the section designation and heading and all that follows through Not later than and inserting the following:
(a) Transmission of reports to States
Not later than
(1) ; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
(1) In general
The Secretary shall prepare and make publicly available an annual report describing holdings of agricultural land by foreign persons, as determined by the reports submitted pursuant to section 2, including—
(A) an analysis of the countries with the most extensive agricultural land holdings on a State-by-State and county-by-county basis;
(B) data and an analysis of agricultural land holdings in each county in the United States by a foreign person from—
(i) the People’s Republic of China;
(ii) the Russian Federation; or
(iii) any other country that the Secretary determines to be appropriate;
(C) an analysis of the sectors and industries for which the agricultural land holdings are used; and
(D) in consultation with the Director of the United States Geological Survey, an identification of countries that own or lease water rights and mineral deposits on a State-by-State and county-by-county basis.
(2) Transmission to states
The Secretary shall transmit each report prepared pursuant to paragraph (1) to each State department of agriculture or appropriate State agency described in subsection (a) in conjunction with the applicable reports transmitted pursuant to that subsection.
(a) In general
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the IP violators list) that identifies—
(1) all centrally administered state-owned enterprises incorporated in the People’s Republic of China that have benefitted from—
(A) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual property theft that subjected a United States economic sector or particular company incorporated in the United States to harm; or
(B) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the United States; and
(2) any corporate officer of, or principal shareholder with controlling interests in, an entity described in paragraph (1).
(b) Rules for identification
To determine whether there is a credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the IP violators list, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall consider—
(1) any finding by a United States court that the company has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; or
(2) substantial and credible information received from any entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
(c) Consultation
In carrying out this section, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with—
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector;
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise; and
(4) the Governments of Australia, of Canada, of the European Union, of Japan, of New Zealand, of South Korea, and of the United Kingdom.
(1) In general
The Secretary shall publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report that—
(A) lists the companies engaged in the activities described in subsection (a)(1);
(B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in the activities described in subsection (a)(1); and
(D) assesses whether each company engaged in the activities described in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used the stolen intellectual property in commercial activity in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United States.
(2) Form
The report published pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be published in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Declassification and release
The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as appropriate, used to prepare the report published pursuant to subsection (d).
(1) In general
The Secretary and the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the IP violators list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private sector participant and marked as business-confidential information, unless the party submitting the confidential business information—
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that such information would be released by the Secretary; or
(B) subsequently consents to the release of such information.
(2) Nonconfidential version of report
If confidential business information is provided by a private sector participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if necessary, such confidential business information.
(3) Treatment as trade secrets
Proprietary information submitted by a private party pursuant to this section—
(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and commercial or financial information (as defined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the express approval of the private party.
(a) Defined term
In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the risks posed to the United States by the presence in United States capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.
(2) Matters to be included
The report required under paragraph (1) shall—
(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC that—
(i) are listed or traded on 1 or more stock exchanges within the United States, including over-the-counter market and A Shares added to indexes and exchange-traded funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
(ii) based on the factors for consideration described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and materially contributed to—
(I) activities that undermine United States national security;
(II) serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights; or
(III) a substantially increased financial risk exposure for United States-based investors;
(B) describe the activities of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United States Government, State governments, United States financial institutions, United States equity and debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed by the presence in United States capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(3) Factors for consideration
In preparing the report required under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—
(A) has materially contributed to the development or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the People's Liberation Army, of lethal military equipment or component parts of such equipment;
(B) has contributed to the construction and militarization of features in the South China Sea;
(C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has been determined to have conducted business with sanctioned entities;
(D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of intellectual property theft;
(E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
(F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or missile technology in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions or United States sanctions;
(G) has contributed to the repression of religious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or the Tibet Autonomous Region;
(H) has contributed to the development of technologies that enable censorship directed or directly supported by the Government of the PRC;
(I) has failed to comply fully with Federal securities laws (including required audits by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and material risk disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission; or
(J) has contributed to other activities or behavior determined to be relevant by the President.
(c) Form
The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Publication
The unclassified portion of the report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.
(a) Limitation
Beginning on October 1, 2027, none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of State may be obligated or expended to procure a battery produced by an entity specified in subsection (b).
(b) Entities specified
The entities specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also known as CATL).
(2) BYD Company, Limited.
(3) Envision Energy, Limited.
(4) EVE Energy Company, Limited.
(5) Gotion High tech Company, Limited.
(6) Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited.
(7) Any successor to an entity specified in paragraphs (1) through (6).
(c) Treatment of production
For purposes of this section, a battery shall be treated as having been produced by an entity specified in subsection (b) if such entity—
(1) assembles or manufactures the final product; or
(2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the components used in the battery.
(d) National interest waiver
The Secretary may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
(1) a written determination that such waiver is important to the national interests of the United States; and
(2) a detailed explanation of how such waiver is important to such interests.
(a) Investment Project Financing contracts
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States—
(1) to limit the awarding of Investment Project Financing contracts to entities or individuals organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the People’s Republic of China, including entities owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China;
(2) to limit the awarding of Investment Project Financing contracts to entities listed on—
(A) the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Entities List (NS-CMIC List) or any of their subsidiaries;
(B) entities or individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List);
(C) the Consolidated Sanctions List (Non-SDN List);
(D) the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSI List);
(E) the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List);
(F) the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List);
(G) the Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List (NS-MBS List);
(H) the Covered List;
(I) the Entity List;
(J) the Military End-User List; and
(K) the Consolidated Screening List; and
(3) to encourage the adoption of sanctions and export control lists as appropriate as criteria in future iterations of the World Bank Procurement Framework or successor guidance documents for Investment Project Financing projects.
(b) Report
Beginning in the first calendar year beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Department of the Treasury, as part of the Annual Report to Congress from the Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, shall include—
(1) information regarding any contracts awarded by the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank to entities described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) during the preceding calendar year, including—
(A) the title or other identifying name of the project;
(B) a description of the project;
(C) the location of the project;
(D) the amount of funding or financing allocated for the project;
(E) the amount of funding or financing disbursed under the project; and
(F) a summary of the status of the implementation of the project;
(2) to the greatest extent possible, information regarding any other entities that submitted bids for Investment Project Financing contracts ultimately awarded to persons or entities described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) during the preceding calendar year;
(3) records of votes held by the World Bank Group Boards of Governors in the preceding calendar year regarding policies related to the World Bank Procurement Framework; and
(4) any changes to the Framework resulting from such votes.
(a) Defined term
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and House Committee on Foreign Affairs;
(2) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(6) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
(8) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
(b) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(1) a description of the current interagency process for coordinating international development projects and investments among—
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the United States Agency for International Development;
(C) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
(D) the United States Trade and Development Agency;
(E) the Department of Commerce;
(F) the Department of the Treasury;
(G) the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
(H) the Office of the United States Trade Representative; and
(I) other executive branch agencies that the Secretary considers relevant to such report;
(2) a list of interagency priorities when identifying and pursing joint or complementary international development projects;
(3) the extent to which the interagency process for identifying and pursing international development projects considers competition with the PRC and its Belt and Road Initiative;
(4) the extent to which such interagency process consults with the Department of Defense for guidance on projects or investments that might advance United States national security interests as laid out in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy;
(5) an interagency strategy for identifying international development projects that can be pursued jointly or in a complementary fashion with other United States development agencies and initiatives, including how United States Government development agencies can work together to counter the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative;
(6) how the interagency process works with global partners and allies, including international development bodies, to compete with the PRC and its Belt and Road Initiative; and
(7) strategic industries or regions where the United States Government and its foreign partners should pursue more international development projects in order to compete with the PRC and its Belt and Road initiative.
Section 401. Defined term
In this subtitle, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the PRC has undertaken a breathtaking expansion of its nuclear weapons and missile arsenal and is now engaged in a sprint to strategic parity with the United States;
(2) the PRC has failed to respond to United States efforts to participate in confidence-building measures related to strategic issues or to establish official dialogues with the United States on crisis stability and arms race stability;
(3) the PRC is not implementing previously agreed to military-to-military confidence-building measures that require notification of major military exercises, nor is it adhering to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, done at Washington and Beijing November 9, 2014, or its supplemental agreements;
(4) the PRC is failing to adhere to its commitment under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the NPT), to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;
(5) the PRC's nuclear weapons expansion is designed to undermine extended deterrence commitments made by the United States to allies in the Indo-Pacific region;
(6) Sino-Russian nuclear energy cooperation is designed in part to generate additional fissile material to help fuel the PRC's nuclear weapons expansion;
(7) the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not share the United States interest in preventing proliferation and has been a central contributor to fostering the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs of Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran;
(8) the United States should not continue to solicit Chinese participation in arms control talks;
(9) multilateral fora like P–5 meetings of the nuclear-weapon states (as defined in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) are ineffective and are used by the Chinese Communist Party to create the appearance of cooperation; and
(10) the United States should cease funding and participating in Track 1.5 dialogues with the PRC on nuclear weapons, strategic space, and missile defense, which—
(A) have not led to beneficial outcomes in government-to-government discussions on those topics; and
(B) provide the PRC with insight and know-how into nuclear strategy and other topics without providing reciprocal insight for the United States.
(b) Defined term
In this section, the term Track 1.5 dialogue means a dialogue or other meeting on a policy issue or issues that includes nongovernment representatives and government representatives.
(c) Limitation on use of funds
No amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of State or the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for any diplomatic or military-to-military Track 1.5 dialogues on nuclear, missile defense, or space policy with any entity under the direct control of the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China.
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps and the civil service workforce of the Department of State must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging security challenges of the 21st century, particularly those posed by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
(2) an increased focus on the PRC in the international security sphere is necessary to achieve objectives of the Department in strategic affairs and nonproliferation;
(3) the focus described in paragraph (2) must be implemented with attention on increasing the number of Foreign Service officers and civil servants at the Department—
(A) to ensure the Department is resourced at sufficient levels such that diplomatic tools remain central to the implementation of a long-term competitive strategy with the PRC; and
(B) to coordinate with efforts of allies and partners to improve the security of the United States and advance allied interests in the face of the military modernization and expansion of the PRC;
(4) the centrality of traditional legally binding arms control agreements in United States national security policy is likely to diminish in an era of strategic competition with the Russian Federation and the PRC;
(5) emerging technologies such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, space, hypersonic missiles, and fractional orbit bombardment systems, and advances in missile defense systems, will increasingly impact the strategic balance between the United States and its great power adversaries; and
(6) strategic threats will be increasingly addressed through risk reduction measures such as the promotion of international norms in multilateral forums, increasing communication and predictability with adversaries, and close cooperation and security integration with allies and partners.
(b) Statement of policy
It shall be the policy of the United States—
(1) to ensure funding levels for the Department of State for international security reflect the importance and significance of the Indo-Pacific region to the political, economic, and security interests of the United States;
(2) to increase funding and the proportion of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the international security budget of the Department of State; and
(3) to confront the current limitations on United States Foreign Service Officer exposure to the Russian Federation by maintaining education and focus on Russian culture, politics, military strategy, and language.
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an action plan that—
(A) identifies the requirements to advance the international security objectives of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and the personnel and budgetary resources needed to meet those requirements, assuming an unconstrained resource environment;
(B) identifies the offices responsible for managing bilateral and multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements that are expired, are expiring, or the United States has withdrawn from, and a description of how the missions of those offices could be revised to focus on competitive strategies and risk reduction initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(C) identifies any staff positions related to arms control efforts that adversaries are not participating in or cooperating with, and a description of how those positions could be reallocated;
(D) includes a plan for increasing the portion of the international security budget of the Department of State dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region, including through the reallocation of personnel and resources, with a focus on the threat posed by the military modernization and expansion of the PRC;
(E) includes a plan for increasing the number of positions in bureaus of the Department that report to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and in overseas missions with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of such increases and how such increases will advance United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(F) describes concrete, annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan; and
(G) describes any barriers to implementing the action plan.
(2) Updates
During the 2-year period beginning on the date on which the action plan is submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees semiannual updates on the implementation of the action plan that includes—
(A) supporting data; and
(B) a detailed assessment of benchmarks that have been met.
(a) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding United States diplomatic engagement with other countries that host or are considering hosting any military installation of the Government of the PRC.
(b) Matters To be included
The report required under subsection (a) shall—
(1) list the countries that currently host or are considering hosting any military installation of the Government of the PRC;
(2) describe in detail United States diplomatic and related efforts to engage countries that are considering hosting a military installation of the Government of the PRC, and the results of such efforts;
(3) assess the adverse impact on United States interests of the Government of the PRC successfully establishing a military installation at any of the locations it is currently considering;
(4) describe and list any commercial ports outside of the PRC that the United States Government assesses could be used by the Government of the PRC for military purposes, and any diplomatic efforts to engage the governments of the countries where such ports are located;
(5) describe the impact of the military installations of the Government of the PRC on United States interests; and
(6) include lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of addressing the PRC’s first overseas base in Djibouti.
(c) Form of report
The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative as a development initiative, the PRC is also utilizing the Belt and Road Initiative to advance its own security interests, including to expand its power projection capabilities and facilitate greater access for the People’s Liberation Army through overseas military installations; and
(2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army globally through overseas military installations will undermine the medium- and long-term security of the United States and the security and development of strategic partners in critical regions around the world, which is at odds with United States goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
(b) Limitation on assistance
Except as provided under subsection (c), for fiscal years 2024 through 2033, the government of a country that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligible for assistance under section 609 or 616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).
(c) National interest waiver
The President, on a case by case basis, may waive the limitation under subsection (b) if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
(1) a written determination that such waiver is important to the national interests of the United States; and
(2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important to such interests.
Section 406. Amendment to the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act
The Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act (division J of Public Law 118–50) is amended—
(1) by redesignating section 6 as section 7; and
(2) inserting after section 5 the following:
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States condemns the January 28, 2024, drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan by Iranian-backed militias that tragically took the lives of 3 American servicemembers and wounded 47 others;
(2) one-way attack drones and similar low-cost armed unmanned aerial systems are the most dangerous asymmetric threat employed by Iranian-aligned militias against Americans and American interests;
(3) United States defense against drones relies on a patchwork of defensive systems, and the United States and like-minded partners need to develop defensive systems that leverage innovation and are responsive to rapidly changing technology and attack methodologies;
(4) the United States should improve cooperation with like-minded partners to systematically map out, expose, and disrupt missile and drone procurement networks used by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen and other Iranian proxies targeting United States forces and assets and United States allies and partners in the region;
(5) the partner countries of the United States, including Iraq, Jordan, and countries on the Arabian Peninsula, face urgent and emerging threats from unmanned aerial systems and other unmanned aerial vehicles;
(6) joint research and development to counter unmanned aerial systems will serve the national security interests of the United States and its partners in Iraq, Jordan, and on the Arabian Peninsula;
(7) development of counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems technology will reduce the impacts of these attacks, build deterrence, and increase regional stability; and
(8) the United States and partners in Iraq, Jordan, and on the Arabian Peninsula should continue to work together to protect against the threat from unmanned aerial systems.
(b) Defined term
In this section, the term Arabian Peninsula means Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
(d) Rule of construction with respect To use of military force
Nothing in this section may be construed as an authorization for the use of military force.
(a) Definitions
In this section, the terms Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, and MTCR equipment or technology have the meanings given such terms in section 74(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)).
(b) Modification of certain provisions relating to bilateral agreements and AUKUS defense trade cooperation under the Arms Export Control Act
Section 38(j)(1)(C)(ii) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(j)(1)(C)(ii)) is amended—
(1) by striking subclauses (I), (II), and (III); and
(2) by redesignating subclauses (IV), (V), (VI), and (VII) as subclauses (I), (II), (III), and (IV), respectively.
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(A) the opportunities and challenges United States participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime create—
(i) in addressing missile proliferation threats, including a comprehensive description of diplomatic and technical engagements with allies and partners regarding MTCR participation, guidelines, and standards; and
(ii) regarding security cooperation with allies and partners, including a comprehensive description of diplomatic and technical engagements with allies and partners regarding MTCR participation, guidelines, and standards;
(B) an update on MTCR-related deliberations and engagements specific to North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, Australia, and other partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, including—
(i) technical consultations, diplomatic engagements, and export control regime consultations and assistance; and
(ii) an enumeration of planned modifications to or recommended changes to address the need for expedited sales and transfer of MTCR-controlled systems to address threats to United States national security, including in the Indo-Pacific region;
(C) a detailed description and assessment of disinformation and misinformation campaigns or activities seeking to discredit or undermine global nonproliferation regimes, including such campaigns or activities conducted by the PRC, Iran, Russia, and North Korea and their assessed impact on such regimes;
(D) a detailed description of Russia’s efforts to disrupt consensus based decisions at the MTCR;
(E) a detailed description and assessment of cooperation between the PRC, Iran, Russia, and North Korea relating to MTCR equipment or technologies;
(F) a comprehensive list, disaggregated by category of MTCR equipment or technology, of all countries that sought to purchase MTCR equipment or technologies during the 10-year period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, including—
(i) average time for an approval or disapproval decision;
(ii) reasoning and procedures that led to an approval or disapproval decision; and
(iii) details about countries that have repeatedly overcome the presumption of denial standard if and how the Department of State expedited considerations for further requests; and
(G) a comprehensive list, disaggregated by category of MTCR equipment or technology, of United States persons that have sought to export MTCR equipment or technologies to other countries, including—
(i) average time for an approval or disapproval decision;
(ii) reasoning and procedures that led to an approval or disapproval decision;
(iii) information on those United States persons who have challenged any disapproval decision; and
(iv) a detailed explanation of the process United States persons can follow to appeal a disapproval decision, including a detailed licensing process that such persons should expect to follow to in order to receive consideration for an approval decision.
(2) Form
The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1) United States extended deterrence commitments to South Korea have failed to keep pace with the nuclear and strategic threats in East Asia, in particular those posed by North Korea.
(2) In response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program and the March 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (a South Korean Navy frigate) the Department of Defense established the United States-Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (referred to in this section as the EDPC) in October 2010—
(A) to strengthen deterrence of North Korea; and
(B) to enhance assurance of the South Korean public.
(3) In 2012, the EDPC agreed to begin work on a Tailored Deterrence Strategy which was endorsed at the 45th United States-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting on October 2nd, 2013 and completed in 2014.
(4) In 2015, the EDPC was merged with the Counter Missile Capabilities Committee and renamed the Deterrence Strategy Committee with the express purpose of strengthening extended deterrence in response to advances in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
(5) North Korea conducted 2 nuclear weapons tests in 2016. In response to urgent requests from the Government of South Korea to further strengthen extended deterrence, the United States and South Korea formed the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group (referred to in this section as the EDSCG) with the Department of State and the Department of Defense co-chairing the EDSCG in a 2+2 format.
(6) The purposes of the EDSCG are—
(A) to elevate consultations to more senior levels;
(B) to develop concrete deterrence measures in response to the evolving threat from North Korea; and
(C) to strengthen assurance of the South Korean public.
(7) The establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (referred to in this section as the NCG) between the United States and the Republic of Korea during President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to the United States on April 26, 2023, reflected a recognition—
(A) of the accelerating threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile program; and
(B) that previous alliance attempts to strengthen assurance of South Korea had proven unsuccessful.
(8) It is clear that the EDPC and the EDSCG were unsuccessful in assuring South Korea or strengthening deterrence because they failed to identify concrete changes to our defense posture in the Korean theater of operations and United States officials were unwilling to adjust long-standing policies with regard to extended deterrence.
(9) For the NCG to be more effective than its predecessor groups, the NCG must adopt a program of work embracing the need—
(A) to adjust the United States defense posture in the Korean theater of operations to include consideration of deploying United States nuclear assets and restoring United States nuclear infrastructure in the region;
(B) to establish a crisis consultation mechanism to be convened in response to North Korean nuclear threats and consult on alliance deterrence related decision making;
(C) to increase alliance nuclear planning activities related to consequence management and the conduct conventional operations in a weapons of mass destruction environment; and
(D) to explore options to increase South Korean contributions to operations related to nuclear burden sharing.
(b) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States-Republic of Korea alliance is a bilateral, integrated alliance that benefits both countries;
(2) South Korea shares the burden of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and the larger region by maintaining a large standing army of more than 3,000,000 personnel, with 500,000 on active duty, and spends 2.7 percent of its gross domestic product on defense-related expenditures; and
(3) the NCG can strengthen the alliance between the Government of the United States and the Government of South Korea by deepening the ability of such governments to plan, consult, and conduct exercises on issues related to nuclear deterrence.
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees and the congressional defense committees that includes a description of—
(A) the organization of the NCG, including co-chairs and interagency participants from the United States;
(B) the scope of the operations, activities and initiatives of the NCG and how such activities connect to the Security Consultative Mechanism and the Military Consultative Mechanism between South Korea and the United States;
(C) the relationship of the NCG to existing extended deterrence mechanisms of the South Korea and the United States, including the DSC and the EDSCG;
(D) the frequency and circumstances under which the NCG convenes; and
(E) how the NCG addresses strategic planning, crisis consultation, and military exercises.
(2) Form
The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(3) Briefing
Not later than 180 days after date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until December 31, 2026, the Secretary and the Secretary of Defense shall brief the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding the outcomes of NCG meetings.
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that the United States must be prepared to take immediate action to impose sanctions with respect to any military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party to—
(1) overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in Taiwan;
(2) occupy any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan;
(3) violate the territorial integrity of Taiwan; or
(4) take significant action against Taiwan, including—
(A) conducting a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(B) seizing any outlying island of Taiwan; or
(C) perpetrating a significant cyber attack on Taiwan.
(b) Defined term
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
(c) Task force
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Office of Sanctions Coordination of the Department of State and the Office of Foreign Asset Control of the Department of the Treasury, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an interagency task force (referred to in this section as the Task Force) to identify military or non-military entities that could be subject to sanctions imposed by the United States immediately following any action or actions taken by the PRC that demonstrate an attempt to achieve or has the significant effect of achieving the physical or political control of Taiwan, including by taking any of the actions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a).
(d) Strategy
Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for identifying targets under this section, which shall include—
(1) an assessment of how existing sanctions regimes could be used to impose sanctions with respect to entities identified pursuant to subsection (c);
(2) a strategy for developing or proposing, as appropriate, new sanctions authorities that might be required to impose sanctions with respect to such entities;
(3) an analysis of the potential economic consequences to the United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, of imposing various types of sanctions with respect to those entities and assess measures that could be taken to mitigate those consequences, including through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other forms of relief;
(4) a strategy for working with allies and partners of the United States—
(A) to leverage sanctions and other economic tools to deter or respond to aggression against Taiwan;
(B) to identify and resolve potential impediments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts with respect to responding to or deterring aggression against Taiwan; and
(C) to identify industries, sectors, or goods and services with respect to which the United States and allies and partners of the United States can take coordinated action through sanctions or other economic tools that will have a significant negative impact on the economy of the PRC;
(5) an assessment of the resource gaps and needs at the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and other Federal agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threat posed by the PRC;
(6) recommendations on how best to target sanctions and other economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic sectors in the PRC, taking into account the role of those targets in supporting policies and activities of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party that pose a threat to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, the negative economic implications of those sanctions and tools for that government, including its ability to achieve its objectives with respect to Taiwan, and the potential impact of those sanctions and tools on the stability of the global financial system, including with respect to—
(A) state-owned enterprises;
(B) officials of the Government of the PRC;
(C) financial institutions associated with the Government of the PRC; and
(D) companies in the PRC that are not formally designated by the Government of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; and
(7) the identification of any foreign military or non-military entities that would likely be used to achieve the outcomes specified in subsection (a)(1), including entities in the shipping, logistics, energy (including oil and gas), aviation, ground transportation, and technology sectors.
(1) In general
Not later than 60 days after the submission of the strategy required under subsection (d), and semiannually thereafter, the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes information regarding—
(A) any entities identified pursuant to subsection (c) or (d)(7);
(B) any new authorities needed to impose sanctions with respect to those entities;
(C) potential economic impacts on the PRC, the United States, and allies and partners of the United States of imposing sanctions with respect to those entities, as well as mitigation measures that could be employed to limit deleterious impacts on the United States and allies and partners of the United States;
(D) the status of coordination with allies and partners of the United States on sanctions and other economic tools identified under this section;
(E) resource gaps and recommendations to enable the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to use sanctions to more effectively respond to the malign activities of the Government of the PRC; and
(F) any additional resources that may be necessary to carry out the strategy.
(2) Form
Each report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified/form.
(a) In general
The Department of State and other United States Government agencies shall—
(1) treat the democratically elected Government of Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan; and
(2) end the outdated practice of referring to the Government in Taiwan as the authorities.
(b) No restrictions
Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in, Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State and other United States Government agencies from interacting directly and routinely with counterparts in the Government of Taiwan, including restricting the travel of senior officials of Taiwan in the United States, including restricting the travel of senior officials of Taiwan in the United States.
(a) In general
Notwithstanding section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the President may transfer to Taiwan any or all of the items described in subsection (b).
(b) Items described
The items referred to in subsection (a) are armor, artillery, automatic weapons ammunition, missiles, and other munitions that are—
(1) obsolete or surplus items;
(2) in the inventory of the Department of Defense;
(3) intended for use as reserve stocks for Taiwan; and
(4) located in a stockpile in Taiwan.
(c) Congressional notification
Not later than 30 days before making any transfer under this section, the President shall submit a notification identifying the items to be transferred and the concessions to be received to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(a) Defined term
In this section, the term official purposes means—
(1) the wearing of official uniforms;
(2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or functions; and
(3) appearances on Department of State social media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.
(b) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of State for fiscal year 2025 may be used to prepare, propose, draft, review, or promulgate any regulation, guidance, or executive order, or to otherwise implement, administer, or enforce any policy that restricts the ability of members of the armed forces and government representatives from the Republic of China (Taiwan) or the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) to display, for official purposes—
(1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan); or
(2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of military units.
Section 415. American Institute in Taiwan
The position of Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office—
(1) shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate; and
(2) shall have the title of Representative.
Section 421. Short title
This part may be cited as the South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through account
The terms account, correspondent account, and payable-through account have the meanings given such terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
(2) Alien
The term alien has the meaning given such term in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
(3) Chinese person
The term Chinese person means—
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the People’s Republic of China; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
(4) Financial institution
The term financial institution means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.
(5) Foreign financial institution
The term foreign financial institution has the meaning given such term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
(6) Good
The term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.
(7) Person
The term person means any individual or entity.
(8) United states person
The term United States person means—
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
(b) Initial imposition of sanctions
On or after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any Chinese person, including any senior official of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, that the President determines—
(1) is responsible for or significantly contributes to large-scale reclamation, construction, militarization, or ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas of the South China Sea;
(2) is responsible for or significantly contributes to, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions, including the use of coercion, to inhibit another country from protecting its sovereign rights to access offshore resources in the South China Sea, including in such country’s exclusive economic zone, consistent with such country’s rights and obligations under international law;
(3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that significantly threaten the peace, security, or stability of disputed areas of the South China Sea or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, including through the use of vessels and aircraft by the People’s Republic of China to occupy or conduct extensive research or drilling activity in those areas;
(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, or in support of, any person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or
(5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
(c) Sanctions described
The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a person described in subsection (b) are the following:
(1) Blocking of property
The President may, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
(A) Visas, admission, or parole
In the case of an alien, the alien may be—
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(i) In general
An alien described in subparagraph (A) may be subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect
A revocation under clause (i) may—
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.
(3) Exclusion of corporate officers
The President may direct the Secretary to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, the person.
(4) Export sanction
The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the person under—
(A) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); or
(B) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services.
(5) Inclusion on entity list
The President may include the entity on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, for activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
(6) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned person
The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing equity or debt instruments of the person.
(7) Banking transactions
The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the person.
(8) Correspondent and payable-through accounts
In the case of a foreign financial institution, the President may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by the foreign financial institution.
(1) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement
The requirements under section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for purposes of subsection (c)(1).
(2) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and national security activities
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States.
(3) Compliance with united nations headquarters agreement
Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c) shall not apply if admission of an alien to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, June 26, 1947, and entered into force, November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States.
(4) Exception relating to importation of goods
The authority or a requirement to impose sanctions under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(1) Implementation
The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties
The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed under subsection (c)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.
Section 423. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China
It is the sense of Congress that the Government Publishing Office should not publish any map, document, record, electronic resource, or other paper of the United States (other than materials relating to hearings held by committees of Congress or internal work product of a Federal agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is the position of the United States that the territory or airspace in the South China Sea that is disputed among 2 or more parties or the territory or airspace of areas administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, including in the East China Sea, is part of the territory or airspace of the People’s Republic of China.
(a) Finding
Congress finds that on July 12, 2016, a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration found in the arbitration case between the Philippines and the PRC under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea that the People’s Republic of China’s claims, including those to offshore resources and historic rights, were unlawful, and that the tribunal’s ruling is final and legally binding on both parties.
(b) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States and the international community should reject the unlawful claims of the PRC within the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the Philippines, as well as the maritime claims of the PRC beyond a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea from the islands it claims in the South China Sea;
(2) the provocative behavior of the PRC, including coercing other countries with claims in the South China Sea and preventing those countries from accessing offshore resources, undermines peace and stability in the South China Sea;
(3) the international community should—
(A) support and adhere to the ruling described in subsection (a) in compliance with international law; and
(B) take all necessary steps to support the rules-based international order in the South China Sea; and
(4) all claimants in the South China Sea should—
(A) refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert control over disputed claims;
(B) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;
(C) clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law; and
(D) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including over territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law.
(a) In general
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until the date that is 3 years after such date of enactment, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying each country that the Secretary determines has taken an official and stated position to recognize, after such date of enactment, the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over territory or airspace disputed by one or more countries in the South China Sea or the territory or airspace of areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea.
(b) Form
The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Secretary determines it is necessary for the national security interests of the United States to do so.
(c) Public availability
The Secretary shall publish the unclassified part of the report required by subsection (a) on a publicly available website of the Department of State.
(a) In general
The Secretary shall designate a senior official at the Department of State, who shall—
(1) negotiate and oversee the Department of State’s role in implementing and maintaining the Compacts of Free Association (referred to in this section as the Compacts) at the Department of State and the conduct of United States foreign policy with respect to countries affiliated with the United States under such Compacts; and
(2) report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Affairs.
(b) Duties
The senior official designated pursuant to subsection (a) shall—
(1) be responsible for the conduct of United States foreign policy with respect to—
(A) the Republic of Palau;
(B) the Marshall Islands; and
(C) the Federated States of Micronesia;
(2) assist the Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Affairs in providing overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government in the countries listed under paragraph (1), including ensuring the timely transfer of assistance and provision of benefits through the Department of the Interior, as laid out in the Compacts;
(3) oversee and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of United States policy with respect to these countries as well as the plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy, including activities implemented by the Department of the Interior;
(4) directly supervise the policy and operations of the Compacts and provide guidance to relevant United States missions within the Indo-Pacific region;
(5) direct and oversee the provision of an adequate, regular flow of information to posts abroad about United States Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic exchanges with regards to the Compacts and the freely associated states, especially on matters that may result in initiatives, policy actions, or other official representations of Department policy abroad; and
(6) ensure the continuity of responsibilities and benefits as laid out in the Compacts, consistent with United States national interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
(a) Defined term
In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(6) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives; and
(8) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(1) In general
Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of State for fiscal year 2025, not more than $10,000,000 may used to carry out the Department of State's responsibilities under this section.
(2) In general
Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2025, not more than $10,000,000 may be used to carry out the Department of Commerce's responsibilities under this section.
(3) Termination
The availability of funds under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall expire on October 1, 2028.
(d) Report
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary and the Secretary of Commerce shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the activities of the Department of State and the Department of Commerce locally-employed staff in Pacific island countries, including—
(1) a detailed description of the additional diplomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and activities in the Pacific island countries provided by locally-employed staff; and
(2) an assessment of the impact of the activities with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of the United States.
(e) Exception for American Samoa
The Secretary may treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country, as appropriate, while carrying out this section.
Section 441. Short title
This part may be cited as the Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review Act of 2024.
Section 442. Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States—
(A) has vitally important political, economic, and security interests in the Indian Ocean region; and
(B) is uniquely positioned to capitalize on opportunities that will advance such interests.
(2) The United States needs to engage and cooperate with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including India, Japan, Australia, and island countries located within such region—
(A) to bolster regional governance;
(B) to increase sustainable economic development; and
(C) to strengthen cooperation on security challenges such as threats to freedom of navigation and environmental disasters.
(3) It is within the United States interests to better understand the political, security, economic, and environmental issues faced by the governments of Indian Ocean region countries.
Section 443. Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States, with respect to the Indian Ocean region, as part of the United States broader strategy for engagement in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen engagement with Indian Ocean region countries (including the governments, civil society, academia, and private sectors of such countries) and to enhance meaningful diplomatic, security, and economic relations with allies and partners of the United States in the Indian Ocean region by—
(1) promoting cohesive political ties between the United States and Indian Ocean region countries through active participation in regional organizations and strengthening bilateral diplomatic relations with such allies and partners;
(2) continuing to strengthen bilateral security relationships between the United States and partners within the Indian Ocean region and build the bilateral security relationship between the United States and India, for the purpose of regularizing security cooperation by building upon foundational agreements concerning intelligence sharing, military communication, and naval cooperation;
(3) engaging with India to better understand and operationalize economic and political opportunities across the Indian Ocean region;
(4) enhancing economic connectivity and commercial exchange between the United States and Indian Ocean region countries;
(5) maintaining the freedom of navigation of international waters within the Indian Ocean region in accordance with international law;
(6) cooperating with the Governments of Indian Ocean region countries regarding security challenges, including issues relating to piracy and illegal fishing;
(7) supporting the ability of such governments, and of nongovernmental organizations within the Indian Ocean region, to respond to environmental disasters and work to mitigate potential future disasters with resilient infrastructure;
(8) facilitating cooperation between the United States and allies and partners of the United States in the Indian Ocean region to build capacity in maritime security and maritime domain awareness;
(9) promoting cooperation with United States allies in the Indo-Pacific region (including Japan and Australia), major defense partners (including India), and NATO allies (including the United Kingdom and France), to support a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(10) understanding resources and costs required for the United States to effectively engage diplomatically and economically in the Indian Ocean region.
Section 444. Definitions
In this part:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(2) Indian Ocean region
The term Indian Ocean region means—
(A) the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal; and
(B) the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean, including the east coast of Africa.
(3) Indian Ocean region country
The term Indian Ocean region country means any country located within or surrounding the Indian Ocean region.
(a) Strategy
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy and implementation plan for United States engagements and posture to support the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region.
(b) Matters
The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—
(1) the identification of the political, economic, and security goals and opportunities of the United States in the Indian Ocean region;
(2) an explanation of the political, economic, and security goals of Indian Ocean region countries and a detailed description of areas with respect to which such interests align with the goals of the United States;
(3) a list detailing the economic and political efforts of the PRC with respect to the Indian Ocean region, particularly with respect to the engagement by the PRC with each country located within the Indian Ocean region;
(4) a description and analysis of challenges, including countries and specific projects, to the engagement with Indian Ocean region countries as a result of—
(A) disparate policy goals across the departments and agencies of the United States Government; and
(B) disparate definitions of the term Indian Ocean region across the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the United States Agency for International Development;
(5) a list detailing efforts to improve cooperation between the United States and Australia, India, and Japan (referred to in this section as the Quadrilateral Dialogue or the Quad) through coordination between members of the Quad with respect to diplomacy and development priorities, joint military exercises and operations, and other activities that promote and balance the political, economic, and security interests of the United States with respect to Indian Ocean region countries;
(6) an overview of efforts to support the economic connectivity and development of island countries located within the Indian Ocean region, including through—
(A) the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group;
(B) the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor; and
(C) other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region (including with the countries of Southeast Asia) that maintain high standards of investment and support for civil society and people-to-people connectivity;
(7) a description of how the United States may engage with regional intergovernmental organizations and multilateral organizations, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the United Nations, to promote the political, economic, and security goals of the United States in the Indian Ocean region;
(8) a description of how the United States may facilitate cooperation between Indian Ocean region countries (including the governments, civil society, academia, and private sectors of such countries) and Taiwan through Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy;
(9) a review of the diplomatic posture of the United States in the Indian Ocean region, including—
(A) an assessment of United States diplomatic engagement with Indian Ocean region countries without a permanent United States embassy or diplomatic mission;
(B) an assessment of means by which to improve cooperation by the United States with the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;
(C) an assessment of the sufficiency of United States diplomatic personnel and facilities available in the Indian Ocean region to achieve the policy described in section 444;
(D) a description of any resources required to fill identified gaps with respect to such diplomatic posture; and
(E) a description of the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic goals of the Department of State that the Secretary of State deems necessary to achieve the policy described in section 444;
(10) a review of the agreements entered into between the United States and Indian Ocean region countries for the purpose of facilitating the military operations of the United States pursuant to bilateral and multilateral agreements;
(11) a description of any efforts to expand the naval and coast guard cooperation between the United States and India and other Indian Ocean region countries through the negotiation of additional agreements;
(12) a strategy for strengthening security cooperation between the United States and partners within the Indian Ocean region, including through the provision of security assistance, which should include—
(A) a summary of the security priorities, objectives, and actions of the prospective recipient country;
(B) a description of the means by which the United States may support such security priorities, objectives, and actions while promoting the political, economic, and security goals of the United States in the Indian Ocean region; and
(C) an assessment of the capabilities, training, and funding needed for Indian Ocean region countries to push back against shared challenges in the region; and
(13) a plan to expand the diplomatic and development presence of the United States with respect to the governments of island countries located within the Indian Ocean region, including a description of any resources or policy tools required to expand the ability of the United States to support high-quality infrastructure resiliency projects in such countries.
(c) Inclusion
The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) may be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees as a part of any other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific region.
(d) Reports on implementation
Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Secretary submits the strategy required under subsection (a), and 1 year later, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the progress made toward implementing such strategy.
(a) Modification
Section 1238(c)(2)(E) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)(E)) is amended—
(1) by inserting (including in the Indian Ocean region) after deployments of the People’s Republic of China military; and
(2) by adding at the end the following: In this subparagraph, the term Indian Ocean region means the Indian Ocean (including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal) and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean (including the East Coast of Africa)..
(b) Applicability
The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to each report submitted pursuant to section 1238(c) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 451. Short titles
This subtitle may be cited as the Countering Espionage and Surveillance Entities in Cuba Act or the CEASE Act.
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Alien
The term alien has the meaning given such term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(D) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(3) Foreign person
The term foreign person means a person that is not a United States person.
(4) Good
The term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.
(5) Person
The term person means an individual or entity.
(6) United States person
The term United States person means—
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
(b) In general
The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines engages in or has engaged in a significant transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings with, or has provided significant material support to or for a military or intelligence facility of the PRC in Cuba.
(c) Sanctions described
The sanctions described in this subsection with respect to a foreign person are the following:
(1) Asset blocking
The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Exclusion from the United States and revocation of visa or other documentation
In the case of a foreign person who is an alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.
(1) Implementation
The President shall exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties
A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section.
(1) Importation of goods
The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(2) Compliance with United Nations Headquarters agreement
Sanctions described in subsection (c)(2) shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.
(f) National security waiver
The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person, on a case-by-case basis for renewable periods of 180 days, if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a determination that such waiver is in the vital national security interests of the United States.
(g) Termination of sanctions
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees (and Congress has not enacted legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period) that all military or intelligence facilities of the PRC in Cuba have been closed.
Section 453. Codification of Cuba restricted list
The President may not remove any entity or subentity from the List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba of the Department of State (commonly known as the Cuba Restricted List) if that entity or subentity was on such list as of July 1, 2024.
Section 461. Sense of Congress regarding China’s support for Russia in Ukraine
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the PRC and the Russian Federation are strengthening their relationship to advance their mutual fundamental interests in countering and weakening the United States and the transatlantic alliance as well as creating divisions between the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) the PRC is supporting Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale, and brutal invasion of Ukraine, including through—
(A) increasing trade with Russia by 30 percent in 2022, and by another 26.3 percent in 2023;
(B) purchasing massive amounts of Russian crude oil, coal, and natural gas under embargo by the transatlantic alliance;
(C) selling high-precision machinery, electronics, microelectronics, components of weapons and weapons systems, base metals, textiles and apparel, vehicles, ships, and aircraft to Russia;
(D) abetting sanctions evasion in countries bordering Russia; and
(E) amplifying Russian propaganda and false information;
(3) the PRC has explored providing weapons and ammunition to the Russian Federation in order to support that country’s unlawful, imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine;
(4) the Government of the PRC is not taking sufficient action to prevent PRC-based companies from exporting lethal equipment to the Russian Federation, as revealed by the credible evidence that PRC companies and entities have—
(A) shipped unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia that were designated on customs forms as being for use in the special military operation;
(B) supplied Iran with drone parts that were later used by Russian forces in Ukraine;
(C) sent Tiger armored personnel carriers to Chechen forces, raising the possibility that these vehicles being could be deployed to Ukraine;
(D) shipped tens of thousands of kilograms of smokeless gunpowder to a munitions factory in Russia;
(E) provided Russia with optical parts used in tanks and armored vehicles;
(F) permitted Russian purchases of nitrocellulose; and
(G) allowed the shipment of engines for both missiles and drones to Russia;
(5) because of this ongoing support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, the United States has sanctioned dozens of PRC and Hong Kong-based entities;
(6) the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine threatens European stability and security, including that of those countries that the United States is committed to defend under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(7) the United States, the European Union, and European countries must continue and increase implementation of sanctions and other appropriate punitive economic tools against PRC firms supporting the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, including those supporting Russian paramilitary organizations;
(8) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (referred to in this section as NATO) 2022 Strategic Concept correctly recognizes the need to prepare for and respond to the threats posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security, including threats derived from its relationship with the Russian Federation and its efforts to divide United States and European allies;
(9) NATO members must work to implement and build on steps identified in NATO’s Strategic Concept, including—
(A) building greater NATO expertise on the PRC and its military and intelligence apparatuses;
(B) using NATO summits as an opportunity to check progress and update priorities;
(C) making any needed adjustments to NATO’s operational plans to account for the ownership or involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises and other entities in space, key seaports, communications nodes, and airports; and
(D) instituting standards for NATO member nations’ sales to the PRC or purchases of PRC-owned, security-related infrastructure, companies, and capabilities;
(10) the PRC has been clear about its desire to be included in diplomatic discussions about ending Russia’s war in Ukraine, including through the February 2023 publication of a 12-point position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis and the appointment of a Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs;
(11) the PRC has done nothing to deliver tangible outcomes on the elements of its position paper beyond symbolic actions, including a statement warning against nuclear saber rattling and a single phone call with Ukraine’s president;
(12) although the PRC’s position paper calls for the full implementation of the July 2022 United Nations-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative as a means to maintain global food security, and despite Xi Jinping’s emphasis on food security for his own country, Beijing did nothing to pressure the Russian Federation to return to the deal, which it abrogated in July 2023;
(13) in February 2023, President Joseph R. Biden rightly dismissed the PRC’s peace plan (referring to the 12-point position paper), stating that it would not help anyone other than Russia;
(14) the Biden Administration’s statements to PRC officials and public pronouncements since May 2023 that the United States is open to a constructive role for the PRC in Ukraine, even describing it as potentially beneficial, are deeply misguided and concerning;
(15) given the PRC’s full support for Russia, Xi Jinping and the Government of the PRC should not be viewed as impartial brokers that will bring this war to an end on terms that will be positive for Ukraine, its independence, and the security of Europe;
(16) although Russia and the PRC have disagreements, both countries—
(A) have independently concluded that their partnership is critical to their shared objective of countering the United States power; and
(B) will not be swayed from this belief by strategies to drive a wedge between the 2 countries;
(17) openness to PRC diplomatic involvement in Ukraine would set a precedent for allowing further PRC involvement in European security issues, while also allowing Xi Jinping to present himself as a responsible party to the international community;
(18) the PRC’s role in a diplomatic peace settlement in Ukraine would clear the way for that country’s substantial involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction, allowing the PRC to benefit economically after it supported the aggressor and undermining broader United States efforts to counter PRC malign influence in Europe;
(19) as earlier PRC investments in Ukraine targeted strategic sectors, any post-war PRC investments in Ukraine would give the PRC access to valuable military technology and know-how, as Ukraine inherited roughly one third of the Soviet Union’s defense-industrial base and 15 percent of Soviet military research and development facilities, and during its war against Russia, has made great strides in the development of certain defense items;
(20) given China’s documented track record on corruption, a role for the PRC in Ukraine’s reconstruction would undercut extensive ongoing United States and European efforts to align Ukrainian governance and anti-corruption standards with those of Western institutions, as well as the European Union’s progress in helping Ukraine adhere to the standards required for its prospective entry into the European Union;
(21) it is of vital importance that the United States and Europe remain united in confronting the security and economic risks posed by a significant PRC role in diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, executing policies that account for greater Sino-Russian alignment, and working together closely on planning ahead for reconstruction to ensure that the PRC does not become Ukraine’s only option;
(22) the United States, in collaboration with its partners, should support European countries targeted by Chinese economic coercion and other attempts to exert undue influence, either with respect to Ukraine or other issues; and
(23) United States allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—
(A) view the success of Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression as a key factor for deterring Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific; and
(B) have demonstrated this conviction by providing humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine and building ties with allies in Europe through defense industry relationships.
(a) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States to increase United States investment in Africa, and to promote and facilitate trade between the United States and Africa, focused on key countries and sectors, that supports mutual economic growth and development outcomes, long-term development of markets, and the strategic interests of the United States.
(1) Establishment
The President shall establish an office within a bureau of the United States Agency for International Development (referred to in this section as USAID) to coordinate the activities of the United States Government related to increasing trade and investment between the United States and Africa, which—
(A) should include representation from relevant agencies designated by the President;
(B) identifies priority countries and sectors for United States foreign investment in countries in Africa and sectors and countries that support United States economic growth and promotes trade based on the analysis required in subsection (c);
(C) coordinates activities and implementing mechanisms, including at United States embassies in Africa, to carry out the policy set forth in subsection (a), including by—
(i) providing program support and guidance to implement the policy described in subsection (a);
(ii) providing information and analysis to United States companies and investors in countries and sectors identified pursuant to subparagraph (B);
(iii) serving, as needed, as an information clearinghouse for the United States Government for businesses, investors, and civic organizations, and others in the United States seeking information related to investing in Africa; and
(iv) connecting such entities with teams at United States embassies overseas; and
(D) identifies barriers to trade and investment in priority countries and sectors and identifies concrete actions that will be taken to address them, including strengthening programs and activities aimed at improving the enabling environment in those countries.
(A) In general
The office established pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be led by an Executive Director who shall be designated by the USAID Administrator, and who shall—
(i) lead the interagency efforts described in subsection (a);
(ii) identify, not later than 90 days of the release of the analysis required in subsection (c), a list of priority countries for the purposes of carrying out this Act;
(iii) plan, coordinate, and oversee the policies, activities, and programs of United States Government Agencies, in the United States and in overseas missions, involved in promoting or facilitating trade, and investment activities between the United States and Africa, and development and coordination of relevant activities meant to improve the enabling environment;
(iv) identify and provide information about investment opportunities, market information, and United States Government programs to support trade and investment activities in priority countries and sectors identified in paragraph (1)(A); and
(v) convene, not less frequently than quarterly, a committee consisting of the directors from each agency designated under subparagraph (B) to provide strategic guidance and coordination for the policy, programs, and activities of Prosper Africa.
(B) Designation of participating departments
The President shall designate Federal departments and agencies to participate in support of the policy set forth in subsection (a) and direct the head of each of designated agency—
(i) to designate an employee to serve as a focal point for each agencies’ respective activities related to subsection (a), who shall coordinate the relevant activities of their respective agency and liaise with the Executive Director designated pursuant to subparagraph (A); and
(ii) to designate an employee to serve at United States embassies in priority countries identified in paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Staffing
In order to carry out subsection (a)—
(A) the Executive Director shall have the authority, as appropriate, to hire employees and contractors in a manner that is consistent with existing hiring authorities of USAID to support the execution of efforts in paragraph (2), and shall be supported, as appropriate, by staff detailed from any Federal agency designated pursuant to paragraph (2)(B); and
(B) the Chief of Mission in priority countries—
(i) shall take an active and direct leadership role in promoting, supporting, and facilitating activities pursuant to subsection (a);
(ii) shall designate a Foreign Service Officer, a Foreign Commercial Service Officer, or other direct hire person under Chief of Mission Authority to lead an interagency team to support activities pursuant to subsection (a) who shall—
(I) conduct assessments of market conditions and business operating environments;
(II) identify investment opportunities;
(III) foster relationships and communications between United States investors and businesses and African businesses and individuals within their country of responsibility; and
(IV) carry out other duties as necessary; and
(iii) is authorized to hire locally employed staff with relevant experience to support the activities of the team established pursuant to clause (ii).
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 4 years thereafter until 2031, the Executive Director of Prosper Africa shall commission and publish a study of the investment environment in Africa that incorporates—
(A) an analysis of which markets are the most promising for private investment;
(B) an analysis of African markets that identifies which industries and sectors United States firms have an advantage in comparison to other sources of foreign direct investment; and
(C) an analysis of perceived and actual barriers to United States private investment, including—
(i) significant legal and regulatory constraints to foreign investment and business operating environments;
(ii) reputational risks;
(iii) investor information gaps; and
(iv) access to and affordability of capital, labor markets, currency volatility, and infrastructure.
(2) Agreement
To produce the study required under paragraph (1), the Executive Director may enter into an agreement with a qualified United States private sector consultant or subject matter expert who shall conduct the study.
(3) Distribution
The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit each study required under paragraph (1) to the appropriate congressional committees and shall make each such study publicly available.
(4) Priority countries
The Executive Director shall identify the priority countries of the Prosper Africa program, pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A)(2), based on the findings of the study required under paragraph (1).
(d) Small and medium enterprises
To the extent practicable, Prosper Africa shall promote and facilitate investments in small and medium enterprises, including by establishing and supporting relationships between United States Government institutions, philanthropic institutions, and private lenders to mobilize blended finance for small and medium enterprises in Africa.
(1) In general
Prosper Africa shall seek to support and facilitate investments in Africa by United States citizens and residents who identify as members of the African Diaspora.
(2) President’s Advisory Council on African diaspora engagement in the United States
The Prosper Africa Coordinator shall consult with the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States (referred to in this subsection as the Council), established by Executive Order 14089, on issues relating to increasing, developing, and sustaining investments in Africa by United States members of the African diaspora.
(A) Membership
The Executive Director shall recommend to the President for appointment to the Council not fewer than 3 individuals who have significant relevant experience in the fields of trade, private investment, economics, or international development, or other relevant fields.
(B) Annual report
The Council shall publish an annual report on investment in Africa by United States members of the African diaspora and barriers to increased investment by the diaspora.
(3) Diaspora business forums
The Prosper Africa Coordinator shall organize public meetings throughout the United States with members of the African Diaspora community that—
(A) provide a forum for communication, education, and information about investment opportunities; and
(B) may be coordinated with local civic, community, and business organizations, as appropriate.
(f) Business enabling environment
The Prosper Africa Coordinator, in coordination with the respective Chiefs of Mission at designated United States Embassies, shall seek to strengthen the business enabling environment in Africa by—
(1) identifying barriers to United States investment on a country-by-country basis;
(2) identifying existing development and technical assistance programs that can serve to eliminate the barriers in paragraph (1);
(3) ensuring country development cooperation strategies and regional development cooperation strategies incorporate program and activities, focused on addressing specific barriers to private sector investment as identified in paragraph (1); and
(4) providing policy advice and technical assistance to select African countries to develop and improve regulatory and legal structures, taxation and customs regimes, policy frameworks, and other relevant structures and practices to improve the operating environments for businesses and eliminate other barriers to competition.
(g) Evaluation
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing recommendations for improving effectiveness of United States Government actions to carry out subsection (a), including by evaluating the effectiveness of the organizational structure and staffing of this section the effectiveness of the steps undertaken to carry out subsection (d) and the applicability of metrics used to produce this report.
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is in the interest of the United States to engage in diplomatic efforts in the Red Sea region that counter PRC influence through increased United States engagement that—
(A) promotes the strengthening of free, open, transparent, democratic partners;
(B) encourages international dialogue on shared transnational security issues;
(C) assesses the root causes of forced migration and cooperatively responds to vulnerable refugees;
(D) maintains secure and free navigation of international waters to encourage international economic integration and mitigate threats;
(E) prevents and counters violent extremism, as well as the illicit activities that enable terrorist activities; and
(F) monitors and combats illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;
(2) increased United States engagement in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region has presented an opportunity to build and strengthen security cooperation with key partners in that region;
(3) the Red Sea region includes a strategic maritime choke point, the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, which—
(A) connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden; and
(B) is essential to support United States national security interests, including countering the flows of Iranian lethal aid to Yemen and facilitating the free flow of commerce;
(4) increased United States engagement with Somaliland, which occupies a strategic geographic location in the Horn of Africa and is adjacent to strategic maritime routs in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden could—
(A) contribute to the achievement of United States national security interests given the evolving security situating in the region; and
(B
could provide flexibility with regards to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the Horn of Africa region and beyond; and
(5) security cooperation in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region is critical—
(A) to maintaining a de facto ceasefire in Yemen; and
(B) to further a political resolution to the Yemeni conflict.
(b) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to establish and maintain an approach towards the Red Sea region that promotes United States economic, political, and security interests in the region;
(2) to facilitate and support sustained regional dialogue between the United States and countries in the Red Sea region and other non-littoral states that have interests in the Red Sea region by creating lasting mechanisms for cooperative, multinational efforts to advance democracy, human rights, good governance, combat illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; counter-terrorism, counter-smuggling, conflict prevention, resolution, and adaptation in and surrounding the Red Sea region;
(3) to preserve and enhance a free, stable, prosperous Red Sea region by supporting and defending principles that contribute to such conditions, including by supporting—
(A) the sovereignty and self-determination of countries in the Red Sea region;
(B) sustainable economic development;
(C) increased democratization and respect for internationally recognized human rights;
(D) transparent and accountable governance;
(E) prudent management of natural resources and enhanced food security;
(F) protection of migrants and refugees; and
(G) women and girls with attention to gender-based violence in the region;
(4) to secure the safe transit of vessels through the Red Sea waterways and mitigate threats to maritime security posed by malign actors, including the Houthis in Yemen, by—
(A) helping build the capacity of partner countries and sharing information with regional partners, where appropriate;
(B) securing coastal infrastructure critical to the interests of the United States, including United States military bases, ports, undersea communication cables, oil pipelines, and depots;
(C) supporting, where appropriate, law enforcement and defense capabilities of Red Sea region partners;
(D) enabling partner nations’ defensive capabilities and encouraging counter-smuggling operations; and
(E) reducing human, narcotics, and arms trafficking, piracy, and illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing;
(5) to bolster preventative diplomacy to prevent conflicts and to support the peaceful resolution of conflict within and among countries;
(6) to analyze and address natural and man-made environmental threats in cooperation with our partners in the region, including risk of oil spills, locusts, threats to regional water supplies, and developmental activities;
(7) to encourage principled, transparent foreign investment and trade, with a particular emphasis on the Horn of Africa, including by United States and Western corporations;
(8) to ensure foreign investments and presence, including economic, military, or otherwise, do not result in the destabilization of any countries;
(9) to help countries address opaque investments and undue influence by malign actors and promote and assist with the development of strategies to ensure transparency and fair treatment by foreign actors;
(10) to help countries respond to violent extremist groups that threaten stability and disrupt their funding and weapons supplies;
(11) to increase United States diplomatic presence and influence;
(12) to counter PRC military, diplomatic, economic and cultural influence in the Red Sea region through increased United States engagement, including democracy and governance assistance, economic assistance, infrastructure investment and security assistance and cooperation; and
(13) to mitigate threats posed by the Houthis in Yemen to regional stability and to vessels transiting the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden by enabling partner nations’ defensive capabilities and encouraging counter-smuggling operations.
(c) Strategy
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant Federal Government agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 5-year integrated strategy for the Red Sea region that includes—
(1) a clear articulation of the security, political, and economic interests of the United States, with special emphasis on the promotion of the policy objectives in subsection (b);
(2) plans for ensuring the Red Sea Security Forum required under subsection (f) will further shared interests between the United States and partners and allies in democracy, human rights, inclusive governance, economic development, anti-corruption, counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and resolution, and other relevant areas;
(3) plans for fostering regional cooperation on issues, such as migration, including forced migration and its root causes, and supporting refugee assistance;
(4) plans for increasing United States economic engagement in the region through diplomatic and, where applicable, programmatic support for—
(A) a rules-based investment climate;
(B) United States private sector investment;
(C) regional economic integration, if and as appropriate; and
(D) an assessment that clearly identifies the implications of investment schemes of malign actors and strategic competitors in the Red Sea region;
(5) plans for ensuring engagement, as appropriate, of initiatives such as Prosper Africa, Power Africa, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and expertise of independent United States Government agencies, such as the Development Finance Corporation, the United States African Development Foundation, and other relevant United States Government programs to carry out activities that advance United States security, environment, energy, and economic interests in the Red Sea region;
(6) plans for supporting specific programs and activities required to help bolster military and civilian capacity to prevent and counter violent extremism, to reduce human, narcotics, and arms trafficking, and to maintain the secure and free flow of United States and partner military and commercial vessels informed by a county by country assessment of the gaps left by current programming, and in accordance with international humanitarian law;
(7) plans for protecting coastal infrastructure critical to United States interests and, where appropriate, enhance partner government capacity to that end, including United States military bases, ports, undersea communication cables, and oil pipelines and depots; and
(8) plans for countering Russian and PRC military, diplomatic, economic and cultural influence in the Red Sea region.
(d) Consultation
Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on the strategy detailed in subsection (c).
(1) Establishment of new position
There may be established within the Department of State an Office of the United States Senior Coordinator for the Red Sea Region, which shall be led by a Senate-confirmed Senior Coordinator who shall work closely with the Bureaus of African Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, relevant Department bureaus and offices, the Department of Defense, the United States Agency for International Development and others in the United States Government to develop, integrate, and coordinate a strategic approach towards the Red Sea region and who shall—
(A) be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate;
(B) report directly to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs;
(C) coordinate the development and lead the implementation of the strategy required under subsection (c);
(D) ensure, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, that United States Ambassadors in the Red Sea region—
(i) are aware of such strategy; and
(ii) are taking concrete actions on a regular basis in the countries in which they serve to help further such strategy;
(E) ensure relevant Department of State programs and activities being carried out in the Red Sea region are coordinated in such a way that they advance the policy and strategy described in [section b and c];
(F) coordinate, through the establishment of an interagency working group, with the Assistant Administrators for Africa, the Middle East, and other relevant USAID bureaus, and with the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Africa and the Middle East at Department of Defense to identify programs and activities of their respective bureaus and agencies that will support the strategy described in subsection (c);
(G) lead United States diplomatic efforts on transnational issues in the Red Sea region; and
(H) ensure that appropriate congressional committees are regularly informed relative to Red Sea and Gulf of Aden issues.
(2) Diplomatic posts
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that examines—
(A) the feasibility of adding at least 1 additional position to United States diplomatic posts at each of the embassies in the Red Sea region;
(B) any other explicit personnel plans to increase reporting on, among other issues, political, economic, and security engagement in the Red Sea region by actors from outside the region, especially the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Arabian Gulf countries; and
(C) actions taken by countries that could have a destabilizing effect on the Red Sea region.
(3) Establishment of reporting category
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall create a Red Sea region category within the internal reporting system of the Department of State to enable readers from throughout the United States Government to better identify and access reporting pertaining to the Red Sea region.
(f) Red Sea Security Forum
The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall convene an annual security forum involving United States and foreign diplomatic, development and defense officials, representatives of multilateral organizations, and civil society to identify and develop approaches to shared challenges in the Red Sea region, including—
(1) countering PRC influence;
(2) maritime security and transnational threats including counter-terrorism, piracy and arms, and narcotics trafficking;
(3) food security;
(4) trade;
(5) forced migration; and
(6) environmental security.
(g) Reporting requirement
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for the following 4 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—
(1) the status of the implementation of the strategy required under subsection (c);
(2) a description of the engagement of international actors in countries in Africa that are part of the Red Sea region, with special emphasis on the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, the Republic of Türkiye, and Arabian Gulf countries, the implications of their engagement for the national security interests of the United States, and steps taken to counter the influence of the aforementioned international actors;
(3) a detailed description of the illicit networks that move people, narcotics, and arms across the Red Sea region;
(4) a discussion of key foreign investors and investments in the Red Sea region initiated over the previous year, including by United States and foreign actors;
(5) a country-by-country itemization of all United States democracy and governance assistance provided to countries in the Red Sea region, broken down by program and by funding sources and levels, along with an identification of the intended and actual outcomes;
(6) a country-by-country itemization of all United States security assistance provided to countries in the Red Sea region, along with an identification of the security capabilities of countries in the Red Sea region, intended gaps in capabilities that United States assistance is intended to fill, and actual outcomes;
(7) an assessment of the extent to which a sustained United States presence in Somaliland would—
(A) support United States policy focused on the Red Sea region, including the promotion of conflict avoidance and resolution;
(B) improve cooperation on counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing, including by—
(i) degrading and ultimately defeating the terrorist threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State in Somalia, and other terrorist groups operating in Somalia; and
(ii) countering the malign influence of the Iranian regime and its terror proxies;
(C) enhance cooperation on counter-trafficking, including the trafficking of humans, wildlife, weapons, and illicit goods;
(D) support trade and development in the region;
(8) recommendations for facilitating the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the Horn of Africa; and
(9) recommendation for countering the presence of the Russian Federation and the PRC in the Horn of Africa, including by detailing—
(A) the PRC’s interest in access to port facilities in Djibouti, Mombasa, Massawa, and Assab;
(B) the PRC’s role in fomenting unrest in the Sool region of Somaliland; and
(C) the role Somaliland’s relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan) counters PRC influence in the region and contributes to United States interests.
(h) Form
The report required under this section shall be unclassified to the maximum extent practicable, but may include a classified annex.
Section 464. Sense of Congress on Jackson-Vanik
It is the sense of Congress that it is in the interests of the United States to waive the application of section 402(e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2432(e)) with respect to Uzbekistan (upon Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization) and with respect to Kazakhstan.
Section 471. Global peace operations initiative
Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(e) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out this chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the Department of State, may be used to train or support foreign military forces in peacekeeping training exercises implemented by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the People’s Liberation Army, unless, by not later than October 1 of each year, the Secretary certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that such training or support is important to the national security interests of the United States.
Section 472. Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel
The Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State shall create and maintain, within the Bureau, the Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, which shall—
(1) create, coordinate, and maintain a whole-of-government strategy to strengthen United States engagement and leadership with multilateral institutions;
(2) coordinate United States Government efforts related to the United Nations Junior Professional Office program (referred to in this section as JPO), including—
(A) recruiting qualified individuals who represent the United States rich diversity to apply for United States-sponsored JPO positions;
(B) collecting and collating information about United States-sponsored JPOs from across the United States Government;
(C) establishing and providing orientation and other training to United States-sponsored JPOs;
(D) maintaining regular contact with current and former United States-sponsored JPOs, including providing career and professional advice to United States-sponsored JPOs;
(E) making strategic decisions, including regarding the location and duration of United States-sponsored JPO positions, to strengthen United States national security interests and the competitive advantage of United States-sponsored JPOs for future employment;
(F) sponsoring events, including representational events, as appropriate, to support United States-sponsored JPOs; and
(G) evaluating the efficacy of the United States JPO strategy and its implementation at regular intervals;
(3) coordinate and oversee a whole-of-government United States strategy and efforts in relation to promoting qualified candidates, including candidates from partner or allied nations, to elected or appointed to senior positions at multilateral institutions, including—
(A) creating a whole-of-government strategy that identifies and prioritizes upcoming openings of leadership positions at multilateral organizations;
(B) identifying and recruiting qualified candidates to apply or run for such positions; and
(C) creating and implementing a strategy to obtain the support necessary for candidates for such positions, including—
(i) liaising and coordinating with international partners to promote candidates; and
(ii) working with embassies to lobby other officials needed to support relevant candidates;
(4) promote detail and transfer opportunities for qualified United States personnel to multilateral organizations under section 3343 or 3581 of title 5, United States Code, including—
(A) by liaising with multilateral institutions to promote and identify detail and transfer opportunities;
(B) by developing and maintaining a database of detail and transfer opportunities to multilateral organizations;
(C) by promoting such detail and transfer opportunities within the United States Government and making such database available to those eligible for details and transfers; and
(D) by facilitating any relevant orientation, training, or materials for detailees and transferees, including debriefing detailees and transferees upon their return to the United States Government; and
(5) develop and oversee official and regular United States Government fellowships at multilateral institutions to provide United States Government personnel additional opportunities to undertake details at multilateral institutions.
(a) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the United Nations system is critical to advancing peace and security, internationally recognized human rights, and development;
(2) the United States benefits from opportunities at the United Nations to engage in multilateral diplomacy—
(A) to advance its own interests; and
(B) to work with other members of the international community to address complex and shared challenges; and
(3) the United States has an interest in safeguarding the integrity the United Nations system.
(b) Prioritizing the United Nations system
The Secretary, in coordination with the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, as appropriate, shall prioritize the United Nations system, including by instructing the senior leadership of the United States Mission to the United Nations and other United States missions to the United Nations—
(1) to promote United States participation in the United Nations system, and that of United States allies and partners who are committed to upholding the integrity of the United Nations;
(2) to ensure that United Nations employees are held accountable to their obligation to uphold the United Nations charter, rules, and regulations;
(3) to monitor and counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian governments, within the United Nations system;
(4) to promote the participation and inclusion of Taiwan throughout the United Nations system and its affiliated agencies and bodies; and
(5) to advance other priorities deemed relevant by the Secretary and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to safeguard the integrity of the United Nations system.
(a) Annual report
Not later than January 31 of each year through January 31, 2027, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the People’s Republic of China's United Nations peacekeeping efforts.
(b) Elements
The report required under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the PRC's contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions, including—
(1) a detailed list of the placement of PRC peacekeeping troops;
(2) a list of the number of troops participating in the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission from the PRC, the United States, and other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
(3) an estimate of when the PRC is expected to surpass the United States as the top financial contributor to the United Nations peacekeeping operations;
(4) an estimate of the amount of money that the PRC receives from the United Nations for its peacekeeping efforts;
(5) an estimate of the portion of the money the PRC receives for its peacekeeping operations and troops that comes from United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping efforts;
(6) an analysis comparing the locations of PRC peacekeeping troops and the locations of One Belt, One Road projects; and
(7) an assessment of the number of Chinese United Nations peacekeepers who are part of the People’s Liberation Army or the People’s Armed Police, including the rank, division, branch, and theater command of such peacekeepers.
(a) In general
Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) and (F) as subparagraphs (F) and (G), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
(E) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices, or any other type of sexual or gender based violence.
(b) Effective date; applicability
The amendment made by subsection (a)—
(1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) shall apply with respect to the first report required under section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) submitted after such date of enactment.
Section 502. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses
The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States—
(1) to reform the process for suspending the rights of membership on the United Nations Human Rights Council for countries whose governments commit gross and systemic violations of human rights, including—
(A) seeking to lower the threshold vote at the United Nations General Assembly for suspension of the rights of membership to a simple majority;
(B) ensuring information detailing a member country’s human rights record is publicly available before a vote on suspension of its rights of membership; and
(C) making the vote of each country on the suspension of rights of membership from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly available;
(2) to reform the rules for electing members to the United Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure United Nations members whose governments have committed gross and systemic violations of internationally recognized human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
(3) to oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any United Nations member—
(A) the government of which has been determined to be engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights pursuant to section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n and 2304);
(B) currently designated as a state sponsor of terrorism;
(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under section 110(b)(1)(C) the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101(b)(1)(C));
(D) the government of which is identified on the list published by the Secretary pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) as a government that recruits and uses child soldiers; or
(E) the government of which the United States determines to have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.
(a) Reaffirmation of policy
It is the policy of the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260), that any interference by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people.
(b) International efforts To protect religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists
The Secretary should engage with United States allies and partners to—
(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’ sole religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai Lama;
(2) oppose claims by the Government of the People’s Republic of China that the PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and
(3) reject interference by the Government of the People’s Republic of China in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
Section 601. Short title
This title may be cited as the Biological Weapons Act of 2024.
Section 602. Definitions
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
(F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Biological weapons convention
The term Biological Weapons Convention means the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972.
(3) Dual use research of concern
The term dual-use research of concern is life sciences research that—
(A) involves an international partner; and
(B) based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
(4) Other international life sciences research of concern
The term other international life sciences research of concern means research that—
(A) is conducted by or with an international partner;
(B) involves, or is anticipated to involve—
(i) enhancing a potential pandemic pathogen;
(ii) the characterization of pathogens with pandemic potential; or
(iii) modifying a pathogen in such a way that it could acquire pandemic potential; or
(C) involves enhancing the pathogenicity, contagiousness, or transmissibility of viruses or bacteria in ways or for purposes that can be reasonably anticipated to pose a threat to public health and safety or national security.
Section 603. Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to conduct rigorous scrutiny of and regularly review international biological, bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research collaboration that could be weaponized or reasonably considered dual-use research of concern, and incorporate national security and nonproliferation considerations and country-specific conditions into decisions regarding such collaborations;
(2) to ensure that, in the search for solutions to pressing global health challenges, United States Government support for public health research and other actions does not advance the capabilities of foreign adversaries in the area of dual-use research of concern or inadvertently contribute to the proliferation of biological weapons technologies; and
(3) to declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all intelligence relevant to the PRC’s compliance or lack of compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention, and other national security concerns regarding PRC biological, bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research that could be weaponized or reasonably considered dual-use research of concern that may be outside the scope of the Biological Weapons Convention.
(a) Research, development, and other studies
Section 301(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571(a)) is amended by inserting biological, virological, after bacteriological.
(1) In general
Title III of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
Section 605. Report on threats related to specific dual use research of concern and other international life sciences research of concern
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives an assessment of the key national security risks of dual-use research of concern or other international life sciences research of concern, including—
(1) major issues the Department of State is prioritizing with respect to the misuse or weaponization of, or that be reasonably anticipated to be misused or weaponized, biological, bacteriological, and virological research, or the misuse or weaponization of, or that be reasonably anticipated to be misused or weaponized, any other category of dual-use research of concern or other international life sciences research of concern by state and non-state actors;
(2) the Department of State’s efforts to develop and promote measures to prevent such misuse, weaponization, or proliferation of dual-use research of concern or other international life sciences research of concern;
(3) an assessment of targeted national level and government directed policies, research initiatives, or other relevant efforts focused on dual-use research of concern or other international life sciences research of concern, including—
(A) the People’s Republic of China;
(B) the Russian Federation;
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
(E) any other nation identified in the report required under section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a); and
(F) any terrorist group or malign non-state actor;
(4) an assessment of the national security concerns posed by any of the activities described in paragraph (1) or (3);
(5) a description of collaboration between ostensibly civilian entities, including research laboratories, and military entities, involving the activities identified in paragraph (3);
(6) a description of the confidence-building measures or other attempts by the countries referred to in paragraph (3) to justify, clarify, or explain the activities described in such paragraph;
(7) the extent to which the Secretary assesses the Biological Weapons Convention and any other relevant international agreements account for or keep pace with the security threats of the activities identified in paragraph (3);
(8) a description of the process used by the United States Government, including the role of the Department of State, to approve and review funding or other support, including subgrants in other countries for dual-use research of concern or other life sciences research of concern, including research related to biological agents, toxins, and pathogens that poses, or can reasonably be anticipated to pose, a risk of misuse, weaponization, or other threat to United States national security;
(9) a list and description of United States Government interagency mechanisms and international groups or coordinating bodies on biosecurity and dual-use research of concern in which the Department of State is a member or has a formal role; and
(10) a description of any obstacles or challenges to the ability of United States Government to address the requirements specified in this section, including a description of gaps in authorities, intelligence collection and analysis, organizational responsibilities, and resources.
(a) In general
The President shall—
(1) not later than 400 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, conduct a formal review regarding all United States Government-funded research collaboration initiatives conducted with international partners during the 20-year period ending on such date of enactment with the PRC related to research areas that pose potential biological weapons proliferation risks or meet the criteria of dual-use research of concern or other international life sciences research of concern; and
(2) not later than 15 days after completing the review pursuant to paragraph (1), submit a written, unclassified report, which may include a classified annex, to—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(E) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
(F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(b) Elements
The report required under subsection (a)(2) shall—
(1) provide a detailed description and example of projects of the initiatives identified pursuant to subsection (a), the current status of such programs, including—
(A) dates of initiation and termination; and
(B) the criteria for granting approval of funding;
(2) outline the procedures used to approve or deny such grants or other funding, including the coordination, if any, between agencies responsible for public health preparedness and biomedical research agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, and national security agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community;
(3) identify gaps in United States Government safeguards regarding sufficient measures to prevent any such research intended for civilian purposes from being diverted for military research in the PRC;
(4) include an assessment of how to best address any such procedural gaps, especially regarding greater interagency input;
(5) explain how the research conducted with the grants and funding requests referred to in paragraph (1) may have contributed to the development of biological weapons, or the development of technology and advancements that meet the criteria of dual-use research of concern or other international life sciences research of concern in the PRC;
(6) explain how the United States Government’s understanding of the PRC’s military-civil fusion national strategy—
(A) informed and affected such funding decisions; and
(B) will inform future funding decisions in research related to gain-of-function, synthetic biology, biotechnology, or other research areas that pose biological weapons proliferation or dual-use concerns;
(7) explain whether any United States Government funding was used to support gain-of-function research in the PRC during the United States moratorium on such research between 2014 and 2017;
(8) identify the steps taken the by United States Government, if any, to apply additional scrutiny to United States Government funding, including subgrants, to support gain-of-function research in the PRC after the United States Government lifted the moratorium on gain-of-function research in 2017; and
(9) include any other relevant matter discovered during the course of such review.
(a) Statement of policy
In order to promote international peace and security, it is the policy of the United States to promote compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention in accordance with subsections (b) through (d).
(b) Activities To advance United States interests at meetings of the biological weapons convention
Before each Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Secretary shall—
(1) demand greater transparency from the Government of the PRC’s activities on dual-use research of concern and the applications of such research that raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention;
(2) engage with other governments, the private sector (including in relevant science and technology fields), and other stakeholders, as appropriate, regarding—
(A) United States concerns about the PRC’s compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention; and
(B) the national security, public health, and non-proliferation implications of such concerns;
(3) emphasize that the PRC’s national strategy of military-civil fusion undermines the underlying utility and effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention, which may not adequately capture the full range of technologies with dual-use implications being pursued by the PRC.
(c) Declassification of intelligence
The President should, as appropriate, declassify intelligence relevant to the PRC’s obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention and concerns about its compliance the such Convention.
(d) Security council complaint
If the questions and concerns raised pursuant to subsection (b) are not adequately addressed and the Secretary determines that another state party is in breach of an obligation under the Biological Weapons Convention, the President should consider lodging a complaint to the Security Council pursuant to Article VI of the Convention.
(a) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Administrator of the United States International Development shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing all funding, including subgrants, for research involving or related to the study of pathogens, viruses, and toxins provided to entities subject to the jurisdiction of countries listed in subsection (b), which shall include a national security justification by the Secretary for such funding.
(b) List of countries specified
The countries list in this subsection are—
(1) the People’s Republic of China;
(2) the Russian Federation;
(3) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(4) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and
(5) any other country specified in the report assessing compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, as required under section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) during the relevant calendar year.
(c) Form
The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(a) Requirement
The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to block representatives from any country specified in the report required under section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) from serving in leadership positions within any United Nations organ, fund, program, or related specialized agency with responsibility for global health security (including animal health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, or food security and agricultural development.
(b) List of countries specified
The countries to be covered by the report required under subsection (a), are—
(1) the People’s Republic of China;
(2) the Russian Federation;
(3) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(4) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
(5) the Assad Regime of Syria; and
(6) any other country specified in the report required under section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) during the relevant calendar year.
(c) Sunset
This section shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Section 610. Rule of construction
Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing or endorsing United States Government funding for dual-use research of concern and other international life sciences research of concern with international partners that present risks to the national security and public health of the United States.