Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025

The term congressional intelligence committees has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

The term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2025 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2025 the sum of $650,000,000.

In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2025 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

An indictment may be found or an information may be instituted at any time without limitation for—

(1) a violation of section 951, or a conspiracy to violate such section;

(2) a violation of section 794, or a conspiracy to violate such section; or

(3) a violation of section 1425, if the offense was committed to facilitate a violation of section 951.

The table of sections for chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

Section 19 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note) is amended by striking, 793, or 794 and inserting or 793.

Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

The Director of National Intelligence shall, upon the approval of specified congressional leaders—

(A) provide secure communications to support the oversight functions of the congressional intelligence committees, including through the procurement, installation, configuration, and maintenance of sufficient software, connectivity, information technology equipment, computers, printers, and related peripheral equipment to ensure that such committees are able to communicate with the intelligence community through secure data, voice, and video communications;

(B) ensure that such communications enabled under subparagraph (A) facilitate communication at all classification levels;

(C) ensure that the requirements specified in subparagraph (A) are met in conformity with applicable standards for the protection of national security information; and

(D) ensure that any security limitations or controls associated with use of capabilities pursuant to subparagraph (A) are consistent with such limitations or controls imposed within the executive branch and do not impede effective and efficient oversight of the intelligence community by Congress.

The Director, in coordination with specified congressional leaders, shall establish governance and security policies applicable to the connectivity, equipment, and software provided under this subsection and shall review and update such policies periodically, as appropriate, to address counterintelligence threats and technological changes.

Any data created, stored, or transmitted by the congressional intelligence committees through networks, equipment, or software provided under paragraph (1) is a congressional record and shall not be treated as an agency record for purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, (commonly known as the the Freedom of Information Act) or any other law.

The Director shall document the funding required to satisfy this subsection within each annual budget submission to Congress, including any anticipated upgrades or recapitalization expenditures over the 5-year period that begins on October 1 of the fiscal year for which year-by-year proposed funding is included.

In this subsection, the term specified congressional leaders means—

(A) the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

(B) the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate; and

(C) the Chair and Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees.

There is established, not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, an independent commission to be known as the National Security Commission on Anomalous Health Incidents (referred to in this section as the Commission) to review anomalous health incidents affecting United States Government personnel and their dependents for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents.

The Commission shall be composed of 9 members appointed as follows:

(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall appoint 1 member.

(B) The Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(C) The Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(D) The Chair of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(E) The Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.

(F) The Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(G) The Vice Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(H) The Chair of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

(I) The Ranking Member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall appoint 1 member.

Members shall be appointed to the Commission under paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the establishment of the Commission under subsection (a).

If one or more appointments under paragraph (1) is not made by the appointment date specified in paragraph (2), the authority to make such appointment or appointments shall expire, and the number of members of the Commission shall be reduced by the number equal to the number of appointments so not made.

It is the sense of Congress that each member of the Commission appointed under paragraph (1) should—

(A) have significant professional experience in national security, such as a position in—

(i) the intelligence community;

(ii) the Department of Defense;

(iii) the scientific community;

(iv) a medical institution; or

(v) an academic or scholarly institution; and

(B) be eligible to receive the appropriate security clearance to effectively evaluate their duties.

A member of the Commission appointed under paragraph (1) may not—

(A) be a current member of Congress;

(B) be a former member of Congress who served in Congress after January 1, 2017;

(C) be a current or former registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.);

(D) have previously received medical treatment for symptoms related to a suspected anomalous health incident, or have a dependent who previously received medical treatment for symptoms related to a suspected anomalous health incident; or

(E) have served, with direct involvement, in actions by or sponsored by the executive branch of the United States Government to investigate or respond to reports of anomalous health incidents.

The Commission shall select a Chair and a Vice Chair from among the members of the Commission.

Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. The Chair and Vice Chair shall report any vacancy in the Commission to the appropriate congressional committees immediately upon learning that there will be a vacancy in the Commission.

Not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed, the Commission shall hold the first meeting of the Commission.

The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chair and Vice Chair.

A majority of the members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold meetings.

The Commission shall carry out the review described in paragraph (2). In carrying out such review, the Commission shall consider both the events known as anomalous health incidents themselves, and the response to such incidents by the United States Government and other nations’ governments for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by the causes of, and responses to, anomalous health incidents.

In conducting the review under paragraph (1), the Commission shall consider the following:

(A) A historical review of the United States Government’s response to anomalous health incidents to identify a more effective, standardized model that can be applied to complex challenges to ensure all perspectives are fully and fairly presented to policy makers, mitigate real or perceived undue influence on analytical judgments, and effectively gather and act on intelligence and information to address complex national security challenges.

(B) A historical review of the United States Government’s provision of support and medical care to United States personnel and their dependents impacted by anomalous health incidents.

(C) Whether a review of all information on collected reports of anomalous health incidents can inform the development of a categorization mechanism which can inform appropriate steps to be taken following future reports.

(D) Whether available data points to the involvement of an external actor in some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(E) Whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(F) Whether comparable information, data, and reports on other intelligence questions led to similar analytic judgments.

(G) Any other matters the Commission deems relevant to the common defense of the Nation.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall brief the President, or the President’s designee, and the appropriate congressional committees on the progress of the activities of the Commission as of the date of such briefing.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the initial meeting of the Commission, and annually thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the progress of the activities of the Commission as of the date of such report, including any findings, recommendations, or lessons learned endorsed by the Commission.

On the date of the submission of each annual report required under this paragraph, the Commission shall brief the President, or the President’s designee, and the appropriate congressional committees.

Not later than 3 years after the date of the establishment of the Commission under subsection (a), the Commission shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a final report on the findings of the Commission and such recommendations that the Commission may have for action by Congress and the Federal Government, which shall address the following:

(i) Whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(ii) Whether available data points to the involvement of an external actor in some or all reported anomalous health incidents.

(iii) Whether the United States Government’s provision of support and medical care is sufficient to appropriately address the impacts of anomalous health incidents on affected personnel.

(iv) Effectively structuring United States Government responses to distinct, complex national security issues such as reports of anomalous health incidents.

(v) Research and development to improve the medical response and potential harm mitigation techniques for anomalous health incidents.

(vi) How analytic integrity and structured analytical techniques impacted the United States Government’s response to anomalous health incidents.

(vii) What the anomalous health incidents situation says about the counterintelligence posture of the United States Government.

(viii) Future policy recommendations for anomalous health incidents or other health incidents with a potential counterintelligence nexus.

Any member of the Commission may submit an addendum to the report required under subparagraph (A) setting forth the separate views of such member with respect to any matter considered by the Commission.

On the date of the submission of the final report required under this paragraph, the Commission shall brief the appropriate congressional committees.

Reports submitted under this subsection shall be made publicly available but may include a classified annex.

The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out this section—

(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission considers necessary to fulfill the Commission’s duties; and

(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information as the Commission considers necessary to fulfill the Commission’s duties.

A subpoena may be issued under this subsection only—

(I) by the agreement of the Chair and the Vice Chair; or

(II) by the affirmative vote of a majority of the Commission.

Subject to clause (i)—

(I) subpoenas issued under this subsection may be issued under the signature of the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the Commission; and

(II) subpoenas issued under this subsection may be served by any person designated by the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, or by a member designated by a majority of the Commission.

In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under this subsection, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).

Claims of common-law privileges made by any witness are applicable only at the discretion of the Chair and Vice Chair.

The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information for the purposes of this section.

In carrying out its duties, the Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government in providing the Commission with analysis, briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of the Commission’s duties.

Upon receipt of a written request made by the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, or by vote of a majority of the Commission, the head of the department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall expeditiously furnish such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information to the Commission. Claims of common-law privileges made by any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government are applicable only at the discretion of the Chair and Vice Chair.

Such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information received by the Commission shall only be received, handled, stored, and disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and Executive orders.

A department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall respond to requests submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, staff, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the duties of the Commission under this section.

The Secretary of Defense may provide the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such administrative services, staff, and other support services as the Commission may request.

In addition to the assistance set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), other departments and agencies of the United States may provide the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support as such departments and agencies consider advisable and as may be authorized by law.

The Director of National Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this section.

Any information related to the national security of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a congressional intelligence committee may not be further provided or released without the approval of the chairman of such committee.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the termination of the Commission under subsection (m), only the members and designated staff of the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of National Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such other officials of the executive branch of the Federal Government as the President may designate shall have access to information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission.

The Commission may use the United States mail in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

No member or staff of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such member or staff on the Commission.

Each member of the Commission who is not otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

A member of the Commission who is an officer or employee of the Federal Government shall serve without additional pay (or benefits in the nature of compensation) for service as a member of the Commission.

A member of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.

The Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

All staff of the Commission and all experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable provisions of law concerning the handling of classified information.

A Federal Government employee, with the appropriate security clearance to conduct their duties, may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

The Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals that do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of that title.

There is authorized to be appropriated funds to the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations acts for the purposes detailed in this section.

Subject to paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the Commission such amounts as the Commission may require for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this section.

Amounts made available to the Commission under paragraph (2) shall remain available until expended or upon termination under subsection (m), whichever occurs first.

The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the Commission submits the final report required under subsection (d)(3), but in no event later than three years after the date of establishment in subsection (a).

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

Not later than 60 days after the end of calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on civilian employees in the intelligence community placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action during that calendar year.

Each report under subsection (a) shall include, for the calendar year covered by the report, the following:

(1) The total number of employees who were placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action, disaggregated by intelligence community element and pay grade.

(2) The number of employees placed on paid administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action.

(3) The number of employees placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action whose leave has exceeded 365 days, disaggregated by paid and unpaid status.

If a referral is made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an allegation of misconduct against a civilian employee of the intelligence community, the head of the element of the intelligence community that employs the covered employee shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral not later than 10 days after the date on which such referral is made.

Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting in writing before to the Inspector General;

(2) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) by striking Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the and inserting (i) The;

(B) by striking whether the complaint or information and inserting whether a complaint or information under subparagraph (A); and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

(ii) The Inspector General shall comply with clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.

(C) ; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

(J) In this paragraph, the term employee includes a former employee, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee was an employee.

Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting in writing before to the Inspector General;

(2) in subparagraph (B)(i)—

(A) by striking Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the and inserting The; and

(B) by striking whether the complaint or information and inserting whether a complaint or information under subparagraph (A);

(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking paragraph (1) and inserting subparagraph (A);

(4) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and

(B) by inserting after clause (i) the following:

(ii) The Inspector General shall comply with clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.

(B) ; and

(5) by adding at the end the following:

(I) In this paragraph, the term employee includes a former employee or former contractor, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.

Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

The term employee includes a former employee or former contractor, if the complaint or information reported pursuant to this section arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting in writing after may report the complaint or information each place it appears; and

(3) in subsection (c)—

(A) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);

(B) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning on the date of receipt of an employee complaint or information under subsection (b), the and inserting The; and

(ii) by striking whether the complaint or information and inserting whether a complaint or information reported under subsection (b); and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:

The Inspector General shall comply with paragraph (1) with respect to a complaint or information reported under subsection (b) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.

Section 103H(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(2) by striking The Inspector General is authorized and inserting (A) The Inspector General is authorized; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

(i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of this Act, chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—

(I) does not include the access, handling, retention, or storage of such classified information; and

(II) is otherwise made in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures for such classified information.

(iii) In this subparagraph, the term covered provision means—

(I) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;

(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

(III) section 798 of title 18, United States Code; or

(IV) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.

Section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(2) by striking The Inspector General is authorized and inserting (A) The Inspector General is authorized; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

(i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—

(I) does not include the access, handling, retention, or storage of such classified information; and

(II) is otherwise made in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures for such classified information,

(iii) In this subparagraph, the term covered provision means—

(I) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;

(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

(III) section 798 of title 18, United States Code; or

(IV) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.

Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

An individual may disclose classified information to an Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.

A disclosure under paragraph (1) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—

(A) does not include the access, handling, retention, or storage of such classified information; and

(B) is otherwise made in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures for such classified information.

In this subsection, the term covered provision means—

(A) any otherwise applicable nondisclosure agreement;

(B) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;

(C) section 798 of title 18; or

(D) any other provision of law with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of national security information.

In this subsection, the term intelligence community has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

Nothing in this section, or the amendments made by this section, may be construed to limit or modify the obligation of an individual to appropriately store, handle, or disseminate classified information in accordance with applicable security guidance and procedures, including with respect to the removal of classified information.

Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. 3234) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting or covered intelligence community element after the appropriate inspector general of the employing agency; and

(2) in subsection (c)(1)(A), by inserting or covered intelligence community element after the appropriate inspector general of the employing or contracting agency.

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103L the following (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Intelligence Management Council.

(1) The National Intelligence Management Council shall be composed of senior officials within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public or private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the National Intelligence Management Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose.

Members of the National Intelligence Management Council shall work with each other and with other elements of the intelligence community to ensure proper coordination and to minimize duplication of effort, in addition to the following duties and responsibilities:

(1) Provide integrated mission input to support the processes and activities of the intelligence community, including with respect to intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation processes.

(2) Identify and pursue opportunities to integrate or coordinate collection and counterintelligence efforts.

(3) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, ensure the integration and coordination of analytic and collection efforts.

(4) Develop and coordinate intelligence strategies in support of budget planning and programming activities.

(5) Advise the Director of National Intelligence on the development of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of programs and activities).

(6) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, support the role of the Director of National Intelligence as principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters.

(7) Inform the elements of the intelligence community of the activities and decisions related to missions assigned to the National Intelligence Management Council.

(8) Maintain awareness, across various functions and disciplines, of the mission-related activities and budget planning of the intelligence community.

(9) Evaluate, with respect to assigned mission objectives, requirements, and unmet requirements, the implementation of the budget of each element of the intelligence community.

(10) Provide oversight on behalf of, and make recommendations to, the Director of National Intelligence on the extent to which the activities, program recommendations, and budget proposals made by elements of the intelligence community sufficiently address mission objectives, intelligence gaps, and unmet requirements.

Members of the National Intelligence Management Council, under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, shall serve as mission managers to ensure integration among the elements of the intelligence community and across intelligence functions, disciplines, and activities for the purpose of achieving unity of effort and effect, including through the following responsibilities:

(1) Planning and programming efforts.

(2) Budget and program execution oversight.

(3) Engagement with elements of the intelligence community and with policymakers in other agencies.

(4) Workforce competencies and training activities.

(5) Development of capability requirements.

(6) Development of governance fora, policies, and procedures.

The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the National Intelligence Management Council such staff as may be necessary to assist the National Intelligence Management Council in carrying out the responsibilities described in this section.

Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Management Council shall make reasonable efforts to advise and consult with officers and employees of other departments or agencies, or components thereof, of the United States Government not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.

The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall provide appropriate support to the National Intelligence Management Council, including with respect to intelligence activities, as required by the Director of National Intelligence.

Section 103(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3025) is amended—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (14) as paragraphs (6) through (15), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

(5) The National Intelligence Management Council.

It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the People’s Republic of China.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community determined relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on strategic competition.

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(A) Lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to strategic competition from the reorganizations implemented consequent to—

(i) the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act;

(ii) the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center; and

(iii) any other reorganization effort within or among elements of the intelligence community.

(B) Examination of the potential effects of a new national intelligence center established to—

(i) integrate all-source intelligence analysis efforts with respect to the activities, plans, and intentions of strategic adversaries;

(ii) synchronize collection efforts among the intelligence community;

(iii) optimize resource investments in the intelligence community in support of strategic competition;

(iv) identify options for the President, other departments and agencies of the United States Government, and allies and foreign partners of the United States to support the standing of the United States with respect to strategic competition; and

(v) integrate other national intelligence centers to deter the efforts of strategic adversaries targeting the United States.

The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified appendix.

It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with section 7325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (137 Stat. 1043), the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the counternarcotics mission of the United States.

Section 102A(z) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(z)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(A) by inserting, including with respect to counterintelligence before the semicolon; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

In this subsection:

(A) The term a review or an investigation of any proposed investment into the United States for which the Director has prepared analytic materials includes a review, investigation, assessment, or analysis conducted by the Director pursuant to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913 (85 Fed. Reg. 19643; relating to Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector), or successor order.

(B) The term investment includes any activity reviewed, investigated, assessed, or analyzed by the Director pursuant to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913, or successor order.

Section 102A(f)(10) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(10)) is amended by striking the period and inserting, and upon receiving any such direction, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees immediately in writing with a description of such other intelligence-related functions directed by the President..

Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113B the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the intelligence community may, subject to such guidance or regulations as may be developed by the Director of National Intelligence, provide goods or services to another element of the intelligence community without reimbursement or transfer of funds for such goods or services for the purposes of remote work and hoteling initiatives for intelligence community employees and affiliates.

A transfer of goods or services under paragraph (1) may not occur without the prior approval of the heads of both the providing and receiving elements of the intelligence community.

In this section, the term hoteling means an alternative work arrangement in which employees of one element of the intelligence community are authorized flexible work arrangements to work part of the time at one or more alternative worksite locations, as appropriately authorized.

Section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(i)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively;

(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

(A) The Director, or the Principal Deputy Director acting on behalf of the Director, shall be responsible for the creation, modification, deconfliction, and oversight of special access programs (referred to as controlled access programs) pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and intelligence activities (but not including military operational, strategic, and tactical programs).

(B) In carrying out the responsibility under subparagraph (A), the Director shall—

(i) ensure controlled access programs of the intelligence community conform with the requirements identified within Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or any successor order;

(ii) establish controlled access program minimum security requirements and guidance for the implementation of such requirements, to include general procedures, personnel security, physical security, and control marking requirements;

(iii) ensure access to controlled access programs is based on a documented need-to-know;

(iv) require controlled access programs to identify and periodically review Critical Program Information and to develop and periodically review a Program Protection Plan for each controlled access program;

(v) require periodic reviews of and, as appropriate, closure of controlled access programs; and

(vi) coordinate with other agencies to deconflict special access programs.

Not less frequently than once per year, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall ensure that an officer of the Field Intelligence Directorate of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security located in each State shall engage proactively with senior officials for each State, such as the chief executive or Homeland Security Advisor of such State, with respect to matters concerning homeland security or national security, consistent with any guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.

In the case of a territory which does not have a permanent Field Intelligence Directorate officer located in such territory, the headquarters element of the Field Intelligence Directorate shall designate a Field Intelligence Directorate officer who is responsible for carrying out the requirement under subsection (a) with respect to such territory.

For purposes of this section, the term State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard may use up to 1 percent of the amounts made available under the National Intelligence Program (as such term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) for each fiscal year for the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and each such certification shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.

The Secretary of Energy shall designate Senior Executive employees of the United States Government employed by the Department of Energy to have final approval authority with respect to authorizing the access of a foreign national into a National Laboratory in the event that an assessment of the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy identifies potential significant risks that are not agreed to by the Director of the relevant National Laboratory.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the progress to enhance the United States Government’s responsibility for the Department of Energy’s approval processes with regard to authorizing the access of foreign nationals into National Laboratories, including with respect to requiring that such decisions are the primary responsibility of United States Government leadership, as opposed to the Directors of the National Laboratories, and a plan for implementation of such enhancement.

In this section, the term National Laboratory has the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).

Section 215(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(3) The Director shall develop and implement—

(A) a delineated and standardized training plan with respect to counterintelligence to train all personnel in the Department; and

(B) a separate delineated and standardized training plan with respect to counterintelligence to train officers in the Office who have counterintelligence responsibilities.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the plans developed under section 215(d)(3) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (as amended by subsection (a)), including with respect to—

(1) the training content;

(2) periodicity;

(3) fulfillment rate;

(4) internal controls; and

(5) oversight.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall develop and make available an unclassified interface for use by owners and operators of United States critical infrastructure to connect with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to request cyber-related support.

The interface described in subsection (a) shall be available to congressional offices for purposes of facilitating connection with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The interface described in subsection (a) shall include information with respect to the following:

(1) Best practices for cyber hygiene, specifically geared towards owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(2) Tailored information that is relevant based on the threats to specific sectors of critical infrastructure.

(3) Suggestions for actions owners and operators of critical infrastructure are recommended to take in response to a cyber incident.

(4) Information on the best ways to liaise with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for cyber-related issues.

The term critical infrastructure has the meaning given that term in the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c).

No agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may open an individual as a confidential human source before the Special Agent in Charge of the relevant Federal Bureau of Investigation field office has verified the individual’s identity.

No Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation whose principal place of duty is at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters may open an individual as a confidential human source.

With respect to a potential or actual confidential human source who is identified as a potential counterintelligence concern or is the subject of an investigation for any criminal or counterintelligence purposes, a Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters agent shall conduct a validation assessment and report for such source in addition to such source validation requirements as are in effect pursuant to policies and procedures governing the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

If the handling agent with respect to a confidential human source has reasonable grounds to believe that a confidential human source has engaged in any unauthorized illegal activity, including any misdemeanor or felony criminal activity—

(A) the agent shall promptly notify a confidential human source coordinator or the assigned Federal prosecutor;

(B) a record of such event shall be recorded in the source’s case file; and

(C) the confidential human source will be subject to immediate source validation procedures.

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may not intervene in any way to impact the outcome of any proceeding relating to a civil action or administrative hearing to which a confidential human source managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a party.

No agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may open an individual as a confidential human source if such individual is a current Member of Congress (including a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress) or a candidate in an election for Federal office.

The requirements of this subsection shall take effect not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to any confidential human source under the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Each Special Agent in Charge of a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office shall conduct an annual review of each confidential human source who is being managed out of such field office.

At the conclusion of each annual review conducted under paragraph (1), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, on an annual basis, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with respect to—

(A) the number of active confidential human sources managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(B) the number of investigations opened as the result of annual reviews of confidential human sources;

(C) the number of confidential human sources whose relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been terminated in the last year as a result of an investigation opened as a result of an annual review; and

(D) the amount of funds expended on confidential human sources in the last fiscal year, including a delineation of funds expended from both National Intelligence Program and non-National Intelligence Program funds.

Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall develop and implement an oversight mechanism within the Bureau for activities with respect to any confidential human source under the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the management of which is funded through the National Intelligence Program.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.

The term congressional leadership means—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(B) the minority leader of the House of Representatives;

(C) the majority leader of the Senate;

(D) the minority leader of the Senate;

(E) the Chair and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(F) the Chair and Vice Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

The term National Intelligence Program has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

Notwithstanding section 533 of title 28, United States Code, the delegation of the authorities of the Attorney General, or any other delegation of authority, direction, or policy of the executive branch, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify congressional leadership not later than 5 days after the commencement of a counterintelligence investigation into an individual who holds an elected Federal office or an individual who is a candidate in an election for Federal office.

A notification under subsection (a) shall include, to the extent consistent with the need to protect the integrity of ongoing counterintelligence investigations or other exceptionally sensitive national security or law enforcement matters, a summary of the relevant facts associated with the counterintelligence investigation and the identity of the person subject to such investigation.

In this section, the term congressional leadership means—

(1) the majority leader of the Senate;

(2) the minority leader of the Senate;

(3) the Chair and Vice Chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(4) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(5) the minority leader of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Chair and Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

The term Department means the Department of Transportation.

The term Secretary means the Secretary of Transportation.

The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall seek to enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary shall establish within the Department an office, which shall be known as the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, in accordance with this section.

The Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office established pursuant to this section shall be physically located within the headquarters of the Department and within reasonable proximity to the offices of the leadership of the Department.

The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be responsible for the protection of classified information and for the establishment and enforcement of all security-related controls within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

There shall be at the head of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Director who is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall—

(i) be supervised and subject to performance evaluations by the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in consultation with the Secretary;

(ii) be an employee of the intelligence community with significant counterintelligence experience; and

(iii) serve for a period of 3 years.

The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall carry out the following responsibilities:

(i) Serving as the head of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, with supervisory responsibility for the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office and any other personnel assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

(ii) Advising the Secretary on counterintelligence and intelligence information.

(iii) Ensuring that counterintelligence threat information and, as appropriate, finished intelligence on topics related to the functions of the Department, are provided to appropriate personnel of the department or agency without delay.

(iv) Ensuring critical intelligence relevant to the Secretary is requested and disseminated in a timely manner.

(v) Establishing, as appropriate, mechanisms for collaboration through which Department subject matter experts, including those without security clearances, can share information and expertise with the intelligence community.

(vi) Correlating and evaluating counterintelligence threats identified within intelligence community reporting, in coordination with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to officials of the Department with a need-to-know.

(vii) Advising the Secretary on methods to improve the counterintelligence posture of the Department.

(viii) Where appropriate, supporting the Department’s leadership in engaging with the National Security Council.

(ix) In coordination with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, establishing counterintelligence partnerships to improve the counterintelligence defense of the Department.

There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director shall—

(A) be supervised and subject to performance evaluations by the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center;

(B) be a current or former employee of the Department with significant experience within the Department; and

(C) serve at the pleasure of the Secretary.

There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office such other employees as the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary, determines appropriate. Employment at the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office is an intelligence community joint duty assignment. A permanent change of station to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall be for a period of not less than 2 years.

The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall be responsible for the supervision and management of employees assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, including employees assigned by program elements of the intelligence community and other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate.

The Director of National Intelligence shall reimburse a program element of the intelligence community or a Federal department or agency for any permanent change of station employee assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office from amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Employees assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office under this paragraph shall operate under the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence for the duration of their assignment or period of employment within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, except for temporary duty assignment employees.

An employee who accepts employment at the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office during the 120-day period after the date of the establishment of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall receive an incentive payment, which shall be payable by the Director of National Intelligence, in an amount equal to 10 percent of the base annual pay of the employee. Such an employee who completes 2 years of service in the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office may receive an incentive payment in an amount equal to 10 percent of the base annual pay of the employee if the Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office determines the performance of the employee is exceptional.

An employee is only eligible for an incentive payment under clause (i) if the employee enters into an agreement with the Director of National Intelligence to serve in the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office for a period of at least 2 years.

To the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may expend such sums as are authorized within the National Intelligence Program of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for—

(1) the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;

(2) the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings, secure audio and video communications, and collaboration between employees of the Department and the intelligence community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;

(3) the provision of other information technology systems and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;

(4) the assignment of employees of the intelligence community to support the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office; and

(5) the provision of other personal services necessary for the operation of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

Not later than January 1, 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office within the Department.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the plan to establish the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1). Such report shall include the costs and schedule associated with establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.

The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a working group to identify and share lessons that the United States intelligence community has learned from the Ukraine conflict.

The composition of the Working Group may include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States Government determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense.

The Working Group shall be jointly chaired by—

(1) an officer or employee of the Department of Defense chosen by the Secretary of Defense; and

(2) an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community chosen by the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of the element concerned.

The duties of the Working Group shall be the following:

(1) Identify tactical and operational lessons derived from the Ukraine conflict.

(2) Develop a repeatable process for promulgating such lessons to elements of the Department of Defense responsible for the development of joint and service-specific doctrine, acquisitions decisions, and capability development.

(3) Provide recommendations on intelligence collection priorities to support the elements of the Department of Defense identified under paragraph (2).

The Working Group shall meet not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter.

Subject to paragraph (2), the Working Group shall terminate on the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense may extend the termination date under paragraph (1) to a date not later than 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act if the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly—

(A) determine than an extension is appropriate and agree to such extension; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of the extension that includes a description of the justification for the extension.

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the activities of the Working Group.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B) the congressional defense committees.

The term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

The term Working Group means the working group described in subsection (a).

Section 304(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(2)) is amended—

(1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:

The applicable head of an intelligence community element may waive a restriction in paragraph (1) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—

(i) the employee or former employee submits to the applicable head of the intelligence community element a written application for such waiver in such form and manner as the applicable head of the intelligence community element determines appropriate; and

(ii) the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community determines that granting such waiver will not harm the national security interests of the United States.

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking Director and inserting applicable head of the intelligence community element;

(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking Director each place it appears and inserting applicable head of the intelligence community element; and

(4) by amending subparagraph (E) to read as follows:

On a quarterly basis, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of each waiver or revocation that shall include the following:

(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

(I) the covered intelligence position held or formerly held by the employee or former employee; and

(II) a brief description of the covered post-service employment, including the employer and the recipient of the representation, advice, or services.

(ii) With respect to a revocation of a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—

(I) the details of the waiver, including any renewals of such waiver, and the dates of such waiver and renewals; and

(II) the specific reasons why the applicable head of the intelligence community element determined that such revocation is warranted.

Section 304(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

Upon request from a current employee who occupies a covered intelligence position or a former employee who previously occupied a covered intelligence position, the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community concerned may provide a written advisory opinion to such current or former employee regarding whether a proposed employment, representation, or provision of advice or services constitutes covered post-service employment as defined in subsection (g).

Section 304(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(g)(2)) is amended by striking relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security to, the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country and inserting to the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country if such employment, representation, or provision of advice or services relates to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security.

Section 304(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(1)) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking paragraph (2)(A)(i) and inserting paragraph (2)(A); and

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking paragraph (2)(A)(ii) and inserting paragraph (2)(A).

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated or expended to support the Intelligence Experts Group of the Department of Homeland Security, or any successor group.

In this section:

The term covered activity means—

(A) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with any individual, including a United States person, who has been criminally charged, arraigned, or taken into the custody of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, but whose guilt with respect to such criminal matters has not yet been adjudicated, unless the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has obtained the consent of the interviewee following consultation with counsel;

(B) with respect to either the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program or the Open Source Intelligence Collection Program, any collection targeting journalists in the performance of their journalistic functions; and

(C) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with a United States person where the Office of Intelligence and Analysis lacks a reasonable belief based on facts and circumstances that the United States person may possess significant foreign intelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

The term Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to Policy Instruction 907 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on June 29, 2016, or any successor program.

The term Open Source Collection Intelligence Program means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis for the purpose of collecting intelligence and information for potential production and reporting in the form of Open Source Information Reports as reflected in Policy Instruction 900 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on January 13, 2015, or any successor program.

The term United States person means—

(A) a United States citizen;

(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien;

(C) an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens; or

(D) a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

The term United States person information —

(A) means information that is reasonably likely to identify 1 or more specific United States persons; and

(B) may be either a single item of information or information that, when combined with other available information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific United States persons.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a covered activity.

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to increase, above the staffing level in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31), the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or superseding the authority of any official within the Department of Homeland Security to conduct legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties oversight of the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to limit the authority of, personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from sharing intelligence information with, or receiving information from—

(A) foreign, State, local, Tribal, or territorial governments (or any agency or subdivision thereof);

(B) the private sector; or

(C) other elements of the Federal Government, including the components of the Department of Homeland Security.

Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2025 for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, not more than 95 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees the document required to be established by the Director under section 7307(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3025 note).

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees the interagency guidance that governs engagement with social media companies for each element of the intelligence community.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees the most recently updated standard operating procedures document, without restrictions, that governs the Federal Bureau of Investigation's engagements with social media companies.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to intelligence support provided to executive branch departments and agencies that are not a part of the intelligence community in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive 404 (relating to Executive Branch Intelligence Customers), or successor directive.

The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A list of United States Government departments and agencies that have a Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator, an Intelligence Point of Contact, or a Federal Intelligence Coordination Office.

(2) A description of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s insight into how departments and agencies that have individuals holding a position described in paragraph (1) are selected for such position, and what role the Office of the Director of National Intelligence plays in that process, if any.

(3) An assessment of the successes, shortcomings, effectiveness, utility, and future planning for engaging with executive branch customers pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 404 or any successor directive.

In this section, the terms Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator, Intelligence Point of Contact, and Federal Intelligence Coordination Office have the meaning given such terms in Intelligence Community Directive 404.

The Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop a human resources strategy for enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members.

The strategy developed under subsection (a) shall address—

(1) a requirement for each intelligence community element to facilitate job applications for qualified covered military members on each element’s job application portal, on USA Jobs, or other appropriate hiring platform;

(2) additional authorities or policy waivers required to overcome identified barriers to enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members to include those military members with technical training and experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree; and

(3) in consultation with military services, the development of best practices for matching job applications from among covered military members who have transferable qualifying backgrounds, skills, or expertise to relevant intelligence occupational specialties within the Federal civilian intelligence community workforce, to include coordinating intelligence community recruiting events and hiring blitzes.

Not later than 30 days after the development of the strategy under subsection (a), the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing regarding the strategy developed under subsection (a), including a plan for how each element of the intelligence community intends to implement such strategy.

In this section, the term covered military member means any servicemember transitioning out of military service who holds a current top-secret security clearance.

The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall, in coordination with the human capital offices of such elements of the intelligence community as determined appropriate, develop an intelligence community-wide strategy to strengthen efforts to recruit qualified individuals residing in the United States territories.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the strategy developed under subsection (a), including with respect to a plan for the implementation of such strategy.

In this section, the term United States territories means Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa.

Section 1723(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1811) is amended—

(1) by striking May 1 2020 and inserting December 31, 2024; and

(2) by striking 2022 and inserting December 31, 2027.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with each head of an element of the intelligence community, shall assess the advisability and feasibility of revising applicable policies and regulations with respect to the sharing of intelligence by an element of the intelligence community with foreign governments to incorporate the principles described under subsection (b).

The principles to be assessed for advisability and feasibility shall be the following:

(1) The intelligence community may not share actionable intelligence with another country unless the intelligence community receives such credible and reliable written assurances from a representative of the country that the country shall use the intelligence in accordance with applicable international law.

(2) Any policies authorizing the sharing of actionable intelligence shall require special protections to reduce the risk of violations of applicable international law as a consequence of sharing such intelligence.

(3) Any policies authorizing the sharing of actionable intelligence with another country shall require the element of the intelligence community concerned to document the risks and benefits of requiring the country receiving the intelligence to make credible and reliable written assurances that the country, when using the intelligence, will conduct only lethal or capture operations that comply with policy standards of the United States with respect to detainee treatment and direct action counterterrorism operations outside areas of active hostilities.

(4) If the head of an element of the intelligence community receives or conducts an assessment calling into question the credibility or reliability of written assurances provided by another country to comply with applicable international law with respect to the intelligence, the head shall, within 45 days of receiving or conducting the assessment—

(A) inform the Director of National Intelligence and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Defense; and

(B) take appropriate action to assess further and remediate the situation, which may include suspending further sharing of intelligence or receiving further assurances from the country of compliance with applicable international law.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the advisability and feasibility of incorporating the principles described in subsection (b) into regulations on the sharing of intelligence by an element of the intelligence community, including the degree to which the current practices of each element of the intelligence community for the sharing of intelligence are consistent with such principles.

In this section, the term actionable intelligence means information sufficiently detailed and timely to permit, assist, or allow an action or operation in the near-term.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a complete and comprehensive summary of all budget information with respect to the element’s open-source intelligence activities.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report compiling the information in the summaries submitted to the Director pursuant to subsection (a).

In this section, the term open-source intelligence means intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps.

The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop a strategy to improve the sharing between the Federal Government and private entities of information and intelligence to mitigate the threat that foreign adversary illicit activities and tactics pose to United States persons in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy generation and storage, including with respect to critical minerals inputs.

The strategy required by subsection (a) shall cover——

(1) how best to assemble and transmit information to United States persons—

(A) to protect against foreign adversary illicit tactics and activities relating to critical mineral projects abroad, including foreign adversary efforts to undermine such United States projects abroad;

(B) to mitigate the risk that foreign adversary government involvement in the ownership and control of entities engaging in deceptive or illicit activities pose to the interests of the United States; and

(C) to inform on economic espionage and other threats from foreign adversaries to the rights of owners of intellectual property, including owners of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets, and other sensitive information, with respect to such property; and

(2) how best to receive information from United States persons on threats to United States interests in the critical mineral space.

Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director completes developing the strategy pursuant to subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), or provide such committees a briefing on, a plan for implementing the strategy, which shall include a description of risks, benefits, opportunities, and drawbacks.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, representatives from the Department of Homeland Security, which shall include representatives from Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which shall include representatives from the Threat Screening Center, shall jointly provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to existing policies and procedures for handling encounters with known or suspected terrorists at the borders of the United States.

The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the following:

(1) The existing processes for handling encounters with individuals at or between ports of entry, to include the difference in process for individuals encountered at and between ports of entry.

(2) The existing processes for the handling and sharing of potentially derogatory information concerning individuals who are known or suspected terrorists.

(3) The existing processes for managing asylum claims of known or suspected terrorists.

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and

(3) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

Not later than 90 days after the date the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of such elements of the intelligence community as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the intelligence relationship between Israel and Egypt that includes an assessment of intelligence failures with respect to either country and with respect to intelligence sharing between the two countries that contributed to the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023.

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the state, strengths, and limitations of any intelligence relationship between Egypt and Israel, especially with respect to Hamas and Gaza.

(2) The role of the United States, if any, in the relationship and an identification of the areas in which the participation of the United States would most strengthen the relationship and improve cooperation between Egypt and Israel going forward.

(3) A review of the failures in national and regional intelligence analysis, collection, and sharing that occurred before the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and any lessons learned for future intelligence activities.

The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the heads of other elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Assistant Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region and strategies that would enhance the resilience of countries in the Indo-Pacific region to economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China.

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of recent economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China against countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) An analysis of the effectiveness of economic coercion efforts against countries in the Indo-Pacific region by the People’s Republic of China in achieving the stated or assumed goals of the People’s Republic of China.

(3) An assessment of measures that would dissuade the People’s Republic of China from engaging in acts of economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and would encourage actions supporting the economic prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) An assessment of measures, including trade diversion or regional trade agreements, that would diminish the sway and influence of the market of the People’s Republic of China with respect to countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

(5) An analysis of measures that would help countries in the Indo-Pacific region to build supply chains independent of the People’s Republic of China.

The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

The term Indo-Pacific region includes the following countries:

(A) Australia.

(B) Bangladesh.

(C) Brunei.

(D) Burma (Myanmar).

(E) Cambodia.

(F) China.

(G) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

(H) Federated States of Micronesia.

(I) Fiji.

(J) French Polynesia.

(K) India.

(L) Indonesia.

(M) Japan.

(N) Kiribati.

(O) Laos.

(P) Malaysia.

(Q) Maldives.

(R) Mongolia.

(S) Nauru.

(T) Niue.

(U) Nepal.

(V) New Zealand.

(W) Palau.

(X) Papua New Guinea.

(Y) Philippines.

(Z) Republic of Korea.

(AA) Republic of Marshall Islands.

(BB) Samoa.

(CC) Singapore.

(DD) Solomon Islands.

(EE) Sri Lanka.

(FF) Thailand.

(GG) Timor-Leste.

(HH) Tonga.

(II) Tuvalu.

(JJ) Vanuatu.

(KK) Vietnam.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the intelligence community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations.

The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for measuring the effect of civilian harm.

(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community apply such methodology when assessing the degree to which a terrorist group is degraded, disrupted, or defeated.

(3) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on the mission of degrading, disrupting, or defeating a terrorist group, or an explanation of why such framework cannot be generated.

(4) The extent to which dissenting opinions of analysts of the intelligence community are included or highlighted in final written products presented to senior policymakers of the United States.

(5) Recommendations to improve the quality of future intelligence community analyses by accounting for the effects of civilian harm on efforts to successfully degrade, disrupt, or defeat a foreign terrorist group.

The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, the report shall include an unclassified summary of key findings that is consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

The report under subsection (a) shall include a classified annex that provides an inventory of the following:

(A) Collection gaps and challenges that may affect the analysis of the success or failure of campaigns against terrorist groups.

(B) Actions taken by the Director of National Intelligence to mitigate such gaps and challenges.

In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(3) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the economic outlook of the People’s Republic of China, which shall include alternative analyses of the economic projections of the People’s Republic of China.

The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy of the People’s Republic of China, including the potential effects of debt, demographics, and China’s international relationships.

(2) Potential challenges for the People’s Republic of China to sustain economic growth and the potential for global effects as a result.

(3) The implications of the economic future of the People’s Republic of China on the country’s foreign and defense policy.

Section 5522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2152) is repealed.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the intelligence community and the broader United States Government require professionals with advanced training in geomatics and geodesy and that the preservation of these skillsets is crucial to advancing geospatial intelligence tradecraft for the United States for national security and military operations;

(2) the intelligence community should use existing authorities to engage in novel ways with academic and industry partners to ensure the intelligence community’s demand signal for geomatics and geodesy professionals is received by the largest possible number of United States citizens while also seeking to foster a culture of academic excellence and research to propel the field of geomatics forward at the pace of innovation;

(3) by engaging with academic and industry partners the intelligence community can help speed the reversal of the current trend wherein the United States not only produces fewer geomatics scientists and engineers compared to its global competitors and potential adversaries, but such competitors and adversaries also provide them with training and expertise that could be used against the United States;

(4) there is abundant opportunity for the intelligence community to advance its growing need for geomatics and geodesy professionals by partnering with American universities and researchers with proven experience in diverse fields who can lead the way to solving the United States most vexing geomatics challenges; and

(5) the intelligence community must balance the increasing demand for recruiting the best geomatics and geodesy talent while still ensuring a dedicated and patriotic workforce with allegiance to the Constitution and the United States Government.

Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

The Secretary of Defense, or a designee of the Secretary determined by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, shall designate a civilian employee of the Department of Defense in the Senior Executive Service to serve as the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.

The Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall exercise independent oversight of all intelligence, intelligence-related, and sensitive activities of the Department of Defense, including activities involving—

(1) tradecraft;

(2) the operational use of an individual; or

(3) clandestine operational tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall have—

(1) complete and unrestricted access to all information concerning any intelligence, intelligence-related, or sensitive activity of the Department of Defense regardless of classification or compartmentalization, including special access programs, from any personnel or organizational entity of the Department of Defense, to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities and functions of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official; and

(2) direct access to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as circumstances require in the determination of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.

The Secretary of Defense shall review and update Department of Defense Directive 5148.13, and any associated or successor regulation or directive, to conform to this section.

The table of contents in chapter 21 of such title is amended by adding at the end of subchapter I the following new item:

Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1593) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking 2025 and inserting 2030;

(2) in subsection (d), by striking 2025 and inserting 2030; and

(3) in subsection (e), by striking $100,000 and inserting $125,000.

Section 7377 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the section heading, by inserting and Army Counterintelligence Command before the colon; and

(2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:

Subsection (a) applies to any employee of the Department of the Army who is—

(1) a special agent of the Army Criminal Investigation Command (or a successor to that command) whose duties include conducting, supervising, or coordinating investigations of criminal activity in programs and operations of the Department of the Army; or

(2) a special agent of the Army Counterintelligence Command (or a successor to that command) whose duties include conducting, supervising, or coordinating counterintelligence investigations in programs and operations of the Department of the Army.

The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 747 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 7377 and inserting the following new item:

Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting paragraphs (3) and (4);

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (5) as paragraphs (4) through (6), respectively;

(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

In the event that the provision of defense sensitive support is routine defense sensitive support, the Secretary shall provide notification under paragraph (1) on a quarterly basis after providing the support.

(D) in paragraph (4), as so redesignated—

(i) in the paragraph heading, by inserting and extraordinary security protections after support;

(ii) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)—

(I) by inserting or requires extraordinary security protections after time-sensitive; and

(II) by inserting shall after Secretary;

(iii) in subparagraph (A)—

(I) by striking may;

(II) by inserting or after the activity supported concludes after providing the support; and

(III) by striking; and and inserting; or; and

(iv) in subparagraph (B)—

(I) by striking shall; and

(II) by striking notice as soon as practicable after providing such support, but not later than 48 hours after providing the support and inserting notification simultaneously with the execution of the supported activity; and

(E) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking paragraphs (1) and (3) and inserting paragraphs (1), (3), and (4); and

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) in the subsection heading, by striking defense sensitive support defined and inserting definitions;

(B) by striking, the term defense sensitive support means support provided by the Department of Defense to a non-Department of Defense Federal department or agency that requires special protection from disclosure. and inserting a colon; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

(1) The term defense sensitive support means support provided by the Department of Defense to a non-Department of Defense Federal department or agency that requires special protection from disclosure.

(2) The term routine defense sensitive support has the meaning given such term elsewhere in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.

Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking December 31, 2024 and inserting December 31, 2027.

Section 431(b)(1) of such title is amended to read as follows:

(1) be pre-coordinated with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency using procedures mutually agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Director, and, where appropriate, be supported by the Director; and

Not later than January 31, 2025, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance on the governance and oversight of the contracts of the Department of Defense that support or enable sensitive activities.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Space Force jointly benefit from a robust United States Space Force military and civilian acquisition workforce that includes contracting officers, acquisition program managers, engineers, and program control and finance professionals;

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives is concerned that the United States Space Force’s uneven emphasis on developing space operators and making fewer acquisition professionals available for assignments at the National Reconnaissance Office can negatively affect the procurement goals of the National Reconnaissance Office, particularly in support of United States Space Force requirements; and

(3) a robust United States Space Force acquisition workforce, that encourages assignment opportunities at the National Reconnaissance Office, both benefits the procurement goals of the National Reconnaissance Office and provides valuable experience that acquisition professionals can apply to future United States Space Force assignments.

Section 32(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3533(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: No individual appointed as the Special Victim Investigator may, at the time of such appointment, be a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency..

Section 504(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094(a)(2)) is amended by inserting and, not later than 10 days after the date of the obligation or expenditure of such funds, of the activity requiring such obligation or expenditure before the semicolon.

The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study on the impacts of the Central Intelligence Agency’s modernization initiative.

The study required under subsection (a) may include the following:

(1) An assessment of the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative, including organizational changes and changes to Agency activities.

(2) An assessment of how any new administrative requirements made pursuant to the modernization initiative have affected Agency activities.

(3) An evaluation of whether the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative have affected the Agency’s ability to anticipate and respond to emerging issues.

(4) An assessment of the extent to which the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative have—

(A) fostered an organizational climate and structure that allows personnel in analytic and operational fields to take professional risks;

(B) grown the role of analytic personnel and provided opportunities for them to become subject matter experts within the analytical career fields; and

(C) changed the number of personnel from analytical fields represented in managerial and policy positions.

(5) Other matters deemed relevant by the Comptroller General.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the preliminary findings of the study conducted under subsection (a) at a time that is mutually agreed upon by the appropriate congressional committees and the Comptroller General.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

In this section:

The term appropriate congressional committees means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

The term Agency means the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, not later than December 31, 2029—

(1) assign responsibility to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities for all components of the Department of Defense, including the military departments, except with respect to the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

(2) ensure that the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency has the appropriate staff to successfully carry out such responsibility.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees with respect to the resource requirements for the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to carry out the accreditation responsibility under subsection (a).

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report not later than December 31, 2027, on the feasibility of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency assuming accreditation responsibility with respect to sensitive compartmented information facilities for the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency by December 31, 2029.

In this section, the term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on preventing intelligence community research grant funding from improperly benefiting foreign countries of concern.

The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An evaluation of the intelligence community’s current research security practices, including with respect to the requirements under section 121 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3061).

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and effects of prohibiting the award of an intelligence community grant for research to any individual or institution if the head of the relevant element of the intelligence community cannot verify that such grantee does not partner, formally or informally, with individuals from institutions located in any country of concern, or with institutions or entities from or located in any country of concern, subject to a waiver of such prohibition, on a case by case basis, by the head or deputy of the element of the intelligence community.

(3) Recommendations for the operational implementation of the prohibition described in paragraph (2).

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a) and the recommendations required under subsection (b)(3).

The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

For purposes of this section, the term country of concern has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(m)(1)).

Not later than June 30, 2025, the head of each covered element of the intelligence community shall submit a separate report to the congressional intelligence committees with respect to biotechnology threats and intelligence activities related to biotechnology threats.

Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each covered element of the intelligence community, the following:

(1) A description of any gaps that exist with respect to intelligence activities that impede such element from fully targeting, collecting, and analyzing intelligence related to biotechnology threats.

(2) A description of any existing formal mechanisms by which the intelligence community provides intelligence and support with respect to biotechnology threats to—

(A) departments and agencies of the Federal Government outside the intelligence community;

(B) the governments of foreign countries; and

(C) private industry and academic institutions.

(3) An assessment of any existing mechanisms and manners by which the intelligence community consults with biotechnology experts and other outside experts with related expertise.

For purposes of this section, the covered elements of the intelligence community are as follows:

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(4) The National Security Agency.

(5) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Section 7702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for rendering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable the raw data with respect to the timeliness of security clearance determinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.

The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided, which shall include citations to the applicable classification guide which explain the reason any such data is classified.

Section 7702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h), as amended by section 704, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for rendering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable the raw data with respect to the timeliness of polygraph examinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.

The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided, which shall include citations to the applicable classification guide which explain the reason any such data is classified.